

# **Pancho Villa Capture Expedition John J. Pershing Report**

**BACM RESEARCH  
WWW.PAPERLESSARCHIVES.COM**



# About BACM Research – PaperlessArchives.com

BACM Research/PaperlessArchives.com publishes documentary historical research collections.

Materials cover Presidencies, Historical Figures, Historical Events, Celebrities, Organized Crime, Politics, Military Operations, Famous Crimes, Intelligence Gathering, Espionage, Civil Rights, World War I, World War II, Korean War, Vietnam War, and more.

Source material from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Secret Service, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Justice, National Archive Records and Administration, and Presidential Libraries.

<http://www.paperlessarchives.com>

## **Pancho Villa Capture Expedition - John J. Pershing Report**

Punitive Expedition Report, the report of Major General John J. Pershing, commander of the expedition into Mexico to "capture Villa and his bandits." Also referred to as the "Pancho Villa Expedition" or the "Mexican Expedition." It was launched against the Mexican insurgent Francisco "Pancho" Villa in retaliation for Villa's attack on Columbus, New Mexico during the Mexican Revolution. The expedition took place from March 14, 1916 to February 7, 1917. The Expedition ended without the capture of Pancho Villa.

The report is made up of a series of smaller sections submitted to the commanding general of the Southern Department at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. It is broken into two general sections. The first is organization and operations and the second deals with the administration of general staff in the field.

The Punitive Expedition led by Brigadier General John J. Pershing in Mexico is one of the more obscure campaigns conducted by the United States Army. On March 9, 1916, 500 to 1,000 of Villa's troops attacked Columbus, New Mexico and its local detachment of the U.S. 13th Cavalry Regiment. The attack killed 10 civilians and 8 soldiers, and left 2 civilians and 6 soldiers injured. Villa's troops took animals and weapons, and then burned the town. Five of Villa's troops were taken prisoner and executed. Colonel Frank Tompkins, in his book "Chasing Villa," estimated that 190 of Villa's men were killed.

On March 15, President Woodrow Wilson ordered General John J. Pershing to lead an expeditionary force of 4,800 men into Mexico to capture Villa. The U.S. army had a newly developed military ordnance at its disposal. The 1st Provisional Aero Squadron used the Curtiss "Jenny" airplane to conduct aerial reconnaissance.

U. S. Army Military History Institute

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

18

170-16

PUNITIVE EXPEDITION.

REPORT

By

Major General John J. Pershing,  
Commanding the Expedition.

Colonia Dublan, Mexico,  
October 10, 1916.

Record Section

RETURN TO  
RECORD SECTION, ROOM 82,  
THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE.

REPORT

by

Major General John J. Pershing,  
Commanding, #1

of the

PUNITIVE EXPEDITION.

Colonia Dublan, Mexico,  
October 10, 1916.

RETURN TO  
LIBRARY  
ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA.  
THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE

HEADQUARTERS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U.S. ARMY,  
In the Field, Mexico, October 7, 1916.

From: The Commanding General.  
To: The Commanding General, Southern Department,  
Fort Sam Houston, Texas.  
Subject: Report of operations of Punitive Expedition to June 30, 1916.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS.

1. This expedition was organized and its operations conducted under instructions contained in the following telegrams and letters:

1st.

"Fort Sam Houston, Texas,  
March 11, 1916.

General Pershing,  
Fort Bliss, Texas.

Secretary of War has designated you to command expedition into Mexico to capture Villa and his bandits. There will be two columns, one to enter from Columbus and one from Hachita, via Culber-son's. Hachita column will consist of Seventh Cavalry, Tenth Cavalry (less two troops) and one battery horse artillery. Columbus column will consist of Thirteenth Cavalry (less one troop) a regiment of cavalry from the east, one battery of horse artillery, one company of engineers and First Aero Squadron with eight aeroplanes. Reinforced brigade of Sixth Infantry, Sixteenth Infantry, First Battalion Fourth Field Artillery and auxiliary troops will follow Columbus column. Two companies of engineers will be ordered to Fort Bliss awaiting further orders. Necessary signal corps will be ordered from here. Will furnish you War Department instructions later. Have you any recom-mendations to make? HXONH.

BUNDY."

2nd.

"March 11, 1916.

From: Department Adjutant.  
To: Brigadier General John J. Pershing, U.S. Army,  
Fort Bliss, Texas.  
Subject: Signal corps detachments and radio equipment.

1. In connection with the contemplated movements of troops the following signal corps detachments, etc., have been directed to re-

port to you.

Signal corps wagon radio set at Douglas, Arizona, complete with its signal detachment will be sent by rail to Columbus, New Mexico, and the operator in charge directed to report to you by wire for instructions.

The operator in charge of signal corps radio pack set at Culber-son's Ranch, New Mexico, has been ordered to report to you by wire for instructions.

The operator in charge of signal corps wagon radio set at Las Ciengas, New Mexico, has been ordered to report to you by wire for instructions.

The operator in charge of signal corps radio pack set at Hachita, New Mexico, has been ordered to report to you by wire for instructions.

Two signal corps radio pack sets, complete with pack animals and signal corps detachments, now at Mission, Texas, have been directed sent by rail to Columbus, New Mexico, the senior noncommissioned officer in charge having been ordered to report to you by wire upon arrival for instructions.

The signal corps radio tractor set will be sent to Columbus, New Mexico, with orders to report to you for instructions. It is intended to install this set at Columbus for the purpose of maintaining communi-cation with wagon sets sent with the two columns.

2. In connection with this movement you are authorized to use the re-maining portion of Field Company I, Signal Corps, to such extent as may be necessary. This company has two reserve pack sets on hand, but it is understood no pack equipment. These sets could be taken as reserve sets in case of accident to those before mentioned. Field Company I can also probably provide at least four wire sections, should you deem it advisable to have same accompany the columns.

By command of Major General Funston:

OMAR BUNDY,  
Colonel, Adjutant General."

3rd.

"March 11, 1916.

From: Department Adjutant.  
To: Brigadier General John J. Pershing,  
Fort Bliss, Texas.  
Subject: Expeditionary Force.

1. Inclosed is a copy of War Department instructions to these headquarters in regard to the expeditionary force which you are desig-nated to command. Instructions in cipher have been sent you this day which are intended for your general information and guidance.

2. As commander of the expeditionary force, the Department Com-mander leaves you free to make such assignments of the troops under your command as you think best in order to accomplish the purpose in hand. The instructions that have been given you and that are being given troops which will be placed under your immediate command are for

the purpose of organizing the expedition. If you wish any changes in these instructions telegraph these Headquarters at once, but from the time the troops report to you they will be subject to your orders.

3. Full reports should be made to these Headquarters of all events of importance.

By command of Major General Funston:  
OMAR BUNDY,  
Colonel, Adjutant General"

(1 inclosure)

4th.

(Enclosure) "Washington, D.C.,  
March 10, 1916.

Commanding General,  
Southern Department,  
Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Number eight eighty three.

You will promptly organize an adequate military force of troops under the command of Brigadier General Pershing and will direct him to proceed promptly across the border in pursuit of the Mexican band which attacked the town of Columbus and the troops there on the morning of the 9th instant. These troops will be withdrawn to American territory as soon as the de facto government in Mexico is able to relieve them of this work period. In any event the work of these troops will be regarded as finished as soon as Villa band or bands are known to be broken up period In carrying out these instructions you are authorized to employ whatever guides and interpreters necessary and you are given general authority to employ such transportation including motor transportation, with necessary civilian personnel as may be required. \* \* \* \* \*

You are instructed to make all possible use of aeroplanes at San Antonio for observation. Telegraph for whatever reinforcements or material you need. Notify this office as to force selected and expedite movement.

McCain."

5th.

"Washington, D. C.  
March 11, 1916.

Commanding General,  
Southern Department,  
Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Number eight ninety seven.

Replying your number 992 the Secretary of War approves your general plan except that it must not be based upon the assumption of any railroad in Mexico being opened and guarded by U.S. troops period Your plan must assume that troops will be supplied direct from border to whatever extent necessary and that the use of railroad is contingent upon its being kept open by the de facto government and permis-

sion of that government for us to use it period Secrecy and prompt movement essential period First Cavalry and Eleventh Cavalry will be ordered to report to you as soon as you indicate where you want them period Keep Department fully and frequently advised using War Department code period Code all messages to your subordinates relating to proposed expedition.

McCAIN."

Supplementary to these instructions, a confidential telegram, dated March 16th, conveyed orders indicating the attitude to be observed toward troops of the de facto government, and the course to be followed in the event of a menacing attitude or actual attack on the part of the forces of the Mexican government.

Mobilization of Troops.

2. The troops designated by the Department Commander to comprise the expedition were the 7th, 10th, 11th and 13th Regiments of Cavalry, 6th and 16th Regiments of Infantry, Batteries B and C, 6th Field Artillery, 1st Battalion 4th Field Artillery, Companies E and H, 2nd Battalion of Engineers, Ambulance Company Number 7, Field Hospital Number 7, Signal Corps detachments, 1st Aero Squadron and Wagon Companies, Number 1 and 2. Their organization, together with preliminary instructions as to conduct of our troops in Mexico, are shown in the following order:

HEADQUARTERS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U.S.ARMY,  
Columbus, N.M., March 14, 1916.

General Orders,) )  
No. 1. )

1. 1. The forces of this command are organized into a provisional division to be called "Punitive Expedition, U.S.Army."

2. The following staff is announced:

Chief of Staff:	Lt.Col. DeR. C. Cabell, 10th Cav.
Asst. to Chief of Staff:	Captain Wilson B. Burtt, 20th Inf.
Adjutant:	Major John L. Hines, Adj. Gen. Dept.
Intelligence Officer:	Major James A. Ryan, 13th Cavalry
Inspector:	Col. Lucien G. Berry, 4th F.A.
Judge Advocate:	Capt. Allen J. Greer, 16th Infantry.
Quartermaster:	Major John F. Madden, Qr. Mr. Corps.
Surgeon:	Major Jere B. Clayton, Medical Corps.
Engineer Officer:	Major Lytle Brown, Corps of Engrs.
Signal Officer:	Capt. Hanson B. Black, Sig. Corps.
Commander of the Base:	Major William R. Sample, 20th Inf.
Aides:	1st Lieut. James L. Collins, 11th Cav. 2nd Lieut. Martin C. Shallenberger, 16th Inf.

3. The Provisional Division will consist of -

- (a) First Provisional Cavalry Brigade, Colonel James Lockett, Commanding.
  - Troops-
  - 11th Cavalry 13th Cavalry  
Battery C, 6th Field Artillery (attached)
- (b) Second Cavalry Brigade, Colonel George A. Dodd, Commanding
  - Troops-
  - 7th Cavalry 10th Cavalry  
Battery B, 6th Field Artillery (attached).
- (c) First Provisional Infantry Brigade, Colonel John H. Beacom, Commanding.
  - Troops-
  - 6th Infantry 16th Infantry  
Cos. E and H 2nd Battalion of Engineers (attached)
- (d) Ambulance Company No. 7. Field Hospital, No. 7.
- (e) Signal Corps Detachments, First Aero Squadron.  
Detachment Signal Corps.
- (f) Wagon Companies, Number 1 and 2.

4. Lieut. Colonel Euclid B. Frick, Medical Corps, will report to the Commanding Officer (Major Sample) as surgeon in charge Medical Base Group.

II. 1. The following telegrams from Department Headquarters are quoted for the information of all concerned and compliance therewith is enjoined:

"March 14, 1916.

The Department Commander directs that you inform all subordinates in your command that they will report promptly by wire to proper authorities who will report to these headquarters, the names of all officers and enlisted men accompanying your command who are wounded or killed in action or who die of sickness while in the field. Commanding officers of base and cantonment hospitals will be instructed to make reports.

BUNDY."

"March 14, 1916.

The greatest caution will be exercised after crossing the border that fire is not opened on troops pertaining to the de facto government of Mexico, as such troops are very likely to be found in country which you will traverse. The greatest care and discretion will have to be exercised by all.

BUNDY."

2. It is enjoined upon all members of the command to make the utmost endeavor to convince all Mexicans that the only purpose of this expedition is to assist in apprehending and capturing Villa and his bandits. Citizens as well as soldiers of the de facto government will

be treated with every consideration. They will not in any case be molested in the peaceful conduct of their affairs, and their property rights will be scrupulously respected.

By command of Brigadier General Pershing:

DeR. C. Cabell,  
Lieutenant Colonel, 10th Cavalry,  
Chief of Staff."

Crossing the Border.

3. Under orders from Department Headquarters the command was to enter Mexico in two columns. The west column, to consist of the 7th and 10th Regiments of Cavalry and one battery of 6th Field Artillery, was to have its base at Hachita and move by way of Culberson's Ranch. When orders for the organization of the expedition were issued on March 11th the troops to constitute the Hachita column were stationed as shown below:

7th Cavalry:--Troops A and B at Alamo Hueco, New Mexico; Troop C at Culberson's Ranch, New Mexico; Troops D, H, I and L at Laing's Ranch, New Mexico; Headquarters Troops (Prov.), Machine Gun Platoon and Troops E, F, G, and K at Douglas, Arizona; and Troop M at Hudspeth's Ranch, Arizona.

10th Cavalry:--Entire regiment (less Troops L and M) at Douglas, Arizona, having left Fort Huachuca, Arizona, on march 9th, arriving at Douglas on March 11th.

Battery B, 6th Field Artillery, at Douglas, Arizona.

These troops were directed to proceed overland without delay to Culberson's Ranch, New Mexico, where they had all arrived the night of March 14th, except wagon transportation which came in early on the morning of the 15th.

4. The east column, consisting of all other troops of the expedition, was to use Columbus, New Mexico, as its base and move directly south from there. The stations of these troops at that time were as follows:

13th Cavalry (less one troop at Fort Riley) Columbus, New Mexico and vicinity.

The 6th and 16th Regiments of Infantry at El Paso, Texas, from which point they reached Columbus by rail on the night of March 13th and the morning of the 14th.

Battery C, 6th Field Artillery, Nogales, Arizona, arrived at Columbus by rail on March 14th.

Troops of the staff departments were scattered all along the border and arrived on various dates.

5. Under the proposed plan the two columns were to unite at Asencion and thereafter take such course as circumstances might dictate. Information reached Columbus before our departure that Villa's band had passed Casas Grandes, moving south. From Villa's movements it was apparent that for the two columns to unite at Asencion would cause delay, and also that the use of Hachita as a base for the western column was inexpedient. It was therefore decided that the Hachita column was to push through from Culberson's Ranch by the most direct route to Casas Grandes which should for the time being become the advanced base.

On the night of the 13th it was learned that the commanding officer of the small detachment of de facto troops, stationed at Palomas for the purpose of guarding the gate at the line, six miles south of Columbus, had received orders to oppose the entry of American troops into Mexico. Every argument was used to convince him that opposition would be futile, and he was advised that an understanding on the subject had been reached between the two governments. But he maintained that his orders made it imperative that he oppose us by force. As an armed clash at the very start was undesirable, Department Headquarters was notified of the situation, and was advised that the column would cross the line at noon on the fifteenth. Notification was also sent to the officer at Palomas that he would enter Mexico at the appointed time whether he should offer opposition or not. The command entered as planned and found that the de facto detachment had left Palomas that morning.

6. Telegraphic orders were sent Colonel Dodd at Culberson's Ranch to hold his command in readiness to start upon my arrival early that evening, but owing to an automobile accident my arrival was delayed until nearly 12 o'clock P.M., so that the column did not start until about midnight. From Culberson's Ranch, the wagon transportation pertaining to the troops of this column was ordered overland to Columbus, pack trains being the only transportation taken across the line from Culbersons.

This command bivouacked early on the morning of the 16th at Geronimo Rock, marching again at noon and halting for the night at Ojitas, a distance of fifty miles from Culberson's Ranch. The column started early on the 17th toward Casas Grandes, arriving in camp one half mile north of Colonia Dublan on the Casas Grandes river at 7:30 P.M.

#### Early Pursuit.

7. Upon arrival of the Culberson force at Dublan, it was reported by natives that Villa and his band were somewhere in the vicinity of San Migule de Babicora gathering supplies, recuperating their stock and seizing new mounts from the people in that vicinity. It was at once determined to send south three separate cavalry columns with instructions to cooperate with each other to the fullest extent. It was believed possible, by moving these detachments, in general, parallel to each other, that Villa would be prevented from moving toward Sonora on the west, or toward the railroad on the east, with the additional chance of cutting his trail or getting ahead of him before he could move south of the railroad into the mountains

back of Guerrero, to which section it was believed he would probably go.

8. One of the three detachments, consisting of the 7th Cavalry, 29 officers and 647 enlisted men under Colonel James B. Erwin, 7th Cavalry, left Colonia Dublan on the night of March 17th-18th with orders to proceed without delay by way of Galeana to the southwest of El Valle, thence to ascend the eastern slope of the Sierra Madre Oriental mountains by trail to the eastern edge of the San Miguel plateau in the hope of striking Villa's band if there, or as he moved eastward with his spoils.

The second detachment consisting of the second squadron of the 10th Cavalry, 14 officers and 258 enlisted men, under Colonel W. C. Brown, was directed to proceed by rail and detrain at Rucio and from there move direct to San Miguel.

The third column consisting of the first squadron of the 10th Cavalry, 8 officers and 204 enlisted men, under command of Major E. W. Evans, was also ordered to proceed by rail to Las Varas, near Madera, cover the territory to the south of Babicora plateau, prevent Villa from moving southwest, and to cooperate with the other two columns as far as practicable.

9. The reason for sending the two 10th cavalry detachments by rail was that this regiment had already traveled from Fort Huachuca to Colonia Dublan, a distance of 252 miles since March 10th, an average of over 30 miles a day, and the animals had begun to show the effects of the strain. Moreover, it was thought that they could thereby gain time on Villa's swiftly moving column. Upon my telegraphic request to the general manager of the El Paso Southwestern Railroad, a train was promptly sent from Jaures for the use of this regiment. Upon arrival of the train at Colonia Dublan on the morning of March 19th, the cars were found in very bad condition. The box cars had to be ventilated by cutting holes in the sides, and many repairs had to be made on all cars, causing considerable delay in departure. Many difficulties as to fuel, water and unwillingness on the part of railroad employees were encountered during the rail journey so that Colonel Brown's squadron did not arrive at Rucio until 8 o'clock on the morning of the 20th. He promptly detrained and proceeded to San Miguel over a rocky mountain trail, arriving there on the morning of the 21st to find that Villa had not been within several miles of the place. From this point Colonel Brown's column moved on the 23rd to El Toro where he received information that Villa had recently fought Colonel Cano's command of Carrancistas near Santa Clara Ranch.

Major Evans' column continued by rail to Musica where he concluded to detrain and march overland to Las Varas, arriving there on March 22nd. A railroad wreck at the switchback over Cumbre Tunnel, in which two cars were overturned and eleven men injured, considerably delayed Major Evans' column.

10. In the meantime Colonel George A. Dodd was directed to join the 7th Cavalry detachment and take charge of the operations of both regiments with an especial injunction to establish communication with the other two columns and endeavor to secure all possible cooperation among our forces.

On March 22nd Colonel Dodd got in touch with Colonel Salas, commanding de facto troops near El Valle, who confirmed the report that the latter had encountered a detachment of Villistas on the 19th instant and had been driven back through Cruces to El Valle. Colonel Dalas's command was found to be in a demoralized condition, and had taken up a defensive position just south of El Valle, expecting further attack from the Villistas.

11. As it was thought that Villa was still at Namiquipa, Colonel Dodd's column continued south, crossing the Santa Maria river on March 23rd about six miles north of Cruces, to a point about fifteen miles north-east of Namiquipa where he bivouacked for the night. Later news apparently confirmed the report that Villa had recently fought a detachment of Carrancistas near Namiquipa, but the information as to the direction Villa had taken was indefinite and confusing.

Reports to Colonel Dodd on the 24th indicated that Villa had passed through or near Oso Canyon and had gone south or southwest. In the hope of cutting in ahead of him Dodd therefore moved westward to Santa Ana, arriving early on the morning of the 26th. It would be noted that the country was extremely dry, and that it was next to impossible to follow a trail of any kind.

12. Upon information received at headquarters by telegraph from Colonel Brown, that Villa's forces were somewhere between Namiquipa and Santa Clara, Major Evans was directed by wire to move to San Jose de Babicora and communicate with Colonel Brown. On the 24th at Namiquipa, Colonel Brown had a consultation with Colonel Cano and was advised that Villa's band was either at Oso Canyon or near Santa Clara. Upon this report Colonel Brown telegraphed headquarters that he would attack Villa next day. He marched through Namiquipa to Oso Canyon remaining the night of the 25th, Colonel Cano's command of two hundred men camping near by. Cano was to cooperate by sending out scouting parties to locate the enemy, while Colonel Brown was to remain at Oso Canyon and plan to move against Villa by night. Meanwhile Major Evan's column was joined at El Toro on the 24th. Colonel Brown, with both columns, remained at El Oso on the 26th and, upon learning that Colonel Cano had not sent out scouting parties as agreed, left the 27th for Peloncillos. Being advised that Villa was at Santa Catalina, he surrounded the ranch at daylight on the 28th but found nothing. Here he heard that Villa in person had passed to Quemada three days before. From here Major Evans' column went to Tapahuanes and on the 29th at El Rubio, Colonel Brown moved to Quemada where he remained during the 29th.

Colonel Dodd's column left Santa Ana on the 27th and camped east of Providencia, hoping to obtain news of Villa's whereabouts. But Colonel Dodd remarks in his report that he had about concluded that all information up to that time regarding Villa's movements after the Namiquipa fight was false, and cites a belated message from Colonel Brown, dated Namiquipa the 25th stating "Villa's whereabouts unknown, but it is thought possibly he has gone through the mountains toward Bachineva."

13. Tracing Villa's movements from March 19th, the date of his fight with the Carrancista force at Namiquipa, it is now known that he left there on March 20th camping at El Rosal, or Lujan's Well, that night; that on the 21st he marched to La Cartmucera, twelve miles southeast of Lujan's Well;

that he was at Quemade on the 23rd; that he reached Rubio on the 23d, leaving on the night of the 25th and reaching San Diego del Monte on the morning of the 26th. From there he followed a trail leading southwest to Agua Caliente, thence changed direction to the westward arriving the night of the 26th at San Ysidro near Guerrero, where he successfully fought with the Carrancistas on the 27th.

Attitude of the People.

14. The movements of our columns are given above in detail to show that the information upon which they were acting was very conflicting. It had now become evident that the de facto troops intended to prevent the Americans from overtaking Villa if possible. At the start the report that Villa was at San Miguel was unfounded. Practically every Mexican so far encountered had questioned our right to be in Mexico, and claimed there was no authority for our presence.

A proclamation had been issued by General Obregon and published in several towns, copies of which our columns carried and displayed as evidence of an agreement between the two governments. This proclamation should have settled the mooted question in so far as the local inhabitants were concerned, but it did not change their views nor their intentions, although it probably did prevent active hostilities at the start. The proclamation was as follows:

"The Governor of the State, in a telegram dated the 15th inst., advised this Municipal Presidency, of which I am in charge, of the following, which I copy herewith:

"Municipal President, Casas Grandes. In a telegram dated the 13th instant, General Alvaro Obregon, Secretary of War and Navy, says the following: "Our government having entered into an agreement with that of the United States of the North, providing that the troops of either government may cross the border, in pursuit of bandits who are committing depredations along our frontier, I advise you of same in order that you may in turn advise all commanders along the border in order that they may make judicious use of these powers, taking care in each case to act in accord with the military authorities of the American Army in order that the pursuit of these bandits may give the best results. Affectionately. "Which I take pleasure in communicating to you, advising you that the difficulty has now been settled. Affectionately. The Acting Provisional Governor. Colonel Ignacio C. Ruriquez."

This is a true copy taken from the original.

Constitution and Reforma,

Casas Grandes, March 20, 1916

The Acting Municipal President,

F. G. Galindo,

(Rubio)"

(MUNICIPAL SEAL)

15. Colonel Dodd, in his report on March 28th states: But information having reached me too late, combined with misrepresentations, nullified what was done toward carrying out the plan." Colonel Brown learned while

at Oso Canyon that Cano had not kept his word, and had made no attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of Villa. Colonel Brown in his report says: "Have just had a conference with Cano who could not produce the man who saw Villa's trail. I fear he simply lied to me." No apparent effort was made by any of the various Carrancista commanders to keep in touch with Villa, nor was there any active pursuit of Villa's rapidly fleeing command. Many deserters from Villa were returning to their homes who must have brought back information, and it is idle to presume that the direction Villa had taken, or his actual location were unknown to the de facto commanders.

Convincing evidence of opposition was shown in the tissue of falsehoods told our officers. As the Mexican villages along the Santa Maria river are known as the "Pueblos de los Indios" and the inhabitants are generally Villista sympathizers, and as it was from these towns that Villa had recruited much of the force he led to Columbus, it was probably natural that they should mislead us. Namiquipa was the home of Cervantes, Villa's chief lieutenant, who planned and carried out the attack on Columbus. So there was among the people a resentment toward us that was clearly shown in the brazenly false news they disseminated. Practically all information from native sources was either entirely misleading, or if based on fact, located Villa's band at places several days later than the actual date. The people in general were but following Villa's well-known methods in using his means to assist him to escape. Several Mexicans have frankly said that they would consider it a national disgrace if the Americans should capture Villa. Nor was this attitude confined entirely to the native Mexicans. Most foreigners, including Americans with interests in Mexico, hoped we would not succeed, believing that the expedition would be withdrawn if we should succeed, and consequently no assistance came from that source.

#### OTHER PURSUING COLUMNS.

16. In the meantime other pursuing detachments were organized to be held in readiness to move in any direction that circumstances might dictate. The first of these detachments was the 2d Squadron and troop L of the 13th Cavalry, under Major Elmer Lindsley, 13th Cavalry, consisting of 11 officers and 275 men. This column was directed to occupy Chuichupa. It left Colonia Dublan on March 20th, marching mainly by night, by way of Colonia Pecheco, and reached Chuichupa March 22d. The purpose of this move was to guard the trails leading westward in the event Villa should evade the columns pursuing him and strike in that direction. As Villa continued to flee south, Major Lindsley's detachment was moved to Babicora plain to cover the territory vacated by the 10th Cavalry. Leaving Chuichupa on the 24th of March by way of Musica, he arrived at San Miguel de Babicora on the 27th and continued on to San Jose de Babicora on March 30th.

Another detachment under Major Tompkins, 13th Cavalry, consisting of Troops K, M and machine Gun Platoon, 13th Cavalry, with Troops I and K of the 10th Cavalry, 11 officers and 160 enlisted men, left Colonia Dublan on March 21st with instructions to follow up the Santa Maria river and be on hand should his services be needed later in the pursuit of any portion of Villa's force. In accordance therewith Major Tompkins went to Namiquipa

where he was in camp on March 29th.

A provisional squadron was organized from the 11th Cavalry, composed of men selected from all troops of the regiment, and placed under command of Major Robert L. Howze, 11th Cavalry. This command, consisting of 10 officers and 255 enlisted men, left Colonia Dublan on March 24th and proceeded south along the line of communications to Namiquipa, where it was in camp March 29th.

Another provisional squadron, from the 11th Cavalry, consisting of picked men from each troop with two machine gun detachments, making a total of 10 officers and 292 men, was placed under Lieutenant Colonel H.T. Allen, 11th Cavalry.

Stations and troops on Line of Communications,  
March 29th.

17. Without going into details of the movements of the various detachments of the command that had been steadily advancing southward it will be sufficient to show the organizations and their approximate stations about that date as follows:

ORGANIZATIONS	Commanding Officer	Location	Remarks
Division Headquarters		Dublan	General Pershing at Namiquipa.
Hdqrs. 1st Prov. Cav. Brigade	Col. Lockett	Dublan	
Detachments:			
1st Sq., 13th Cavalry	Maj. Lindsley	San Jose de Babicora*	
2 Tps. 13th Cavalry	Maj. Tompkins	Namiquipa	
1st Prov. Sq., 11th Cav.	Maj. Howze	Namiquipa	
Hdqrs. 2d Prov. Cav. Brigade	Colonel Dodd	Guerrero*	
Detachments:			
7th Cavalry	Colonel Erwin	Guerrero*	
Troop A, 7th Cavalry	Capt. Nissen	Fortrillo Pass*	
Troop D, 7th Cavalry	Capt. Boice	Santa Ana*	
2nd Sq. 10th Cavalry	Colonel Brown	Quemada*	
1st Sq. 10th Cavalry	Major Evans	Rubio*	
2 Troops, 10th Cav.	Maj. Tompkins	Namiquipa	
Hdqrs. 2d Prov. Inf. Brigade	Col. Beacon	Dublan	
Detachments:			
Co. C, 16th Inf., with Wagon Cos. Nos. 1 & 2	Capt. Ball	Enroute Dublan	
Co. M, 16th Inf.	Capt. Creary	Corralitas	
Det. Cos. 16th Inf.	Maj. Moore	Colonia Juarez*	
Co. B, 16th Inf.	Capt. Smith	Boco Grande	
3d Bn., 16th Inf.	Capt. Shaffer	El Valle	Less 2 companies

\*Not on line of Communications.

Stations of Troops - Continued.

Organizations	Commanding Officer	Location	Remarks
Co. D. and one-half M.G. Co. 6th Inf.	Capt. Johnson	Galeana	
1 Co. and one half M.G. Co., 6th Inf.	Lieut. Monroe	Cruces	
2 Cos. 6th Infantry	Capt. Roach	Chocolate Pass	
Co. G, Engineers	Lieut. Fox	Boco Grande	
Co. H, Engineers	Capt. Garvis	Naimquipa	
Co. E, Engineers	Capt. Grant	Asencion	
Pack Train 1st Bn., 4th F.A.		San Fose de Babicora*	With Major Lindsley
1st Bn., 4th F.A.	Capt. Merrill	Dublan	
Ambulance Company No. 7.	Capt. Jones	Dublan	
Field Hospital, No. 7	Major Clayton	Dublan	
Signal Corps:	Capt. Black		
Hq. 1st Aero Sqdn.	Capt. Foulcois	Dublan	
Det. 1st Aero Sqdn.		El Valle	
Hq. Signal Det.	Capt Black	All stations	
Wagon wireless sets		Dublan and Nemiquipa	
Wagon Co. No. 3.	Capt. Bryson	Dublan	
Pack Train, No. 10		Dublan	
Pack Trains, Nos. 2 and 7		Namiquipa	
Pack Train, No. 11		Quemada*	
Hq. 1st and 3rd Sqdns. 5th Cavalry	Col. Wilder	Gibson's Ranch	
Hq. and 5 Cos. 24th Inf.	Col. Penrose	Dublan and war stations	
3 Cos. 24th Inf.	Capt. Gilmore	Columbus	
1st Bn., 20th Inf.	Maj. Sample	Columbus	
2nd Sqdn. 5th Cav.	Maj. Fleming	Columbus	

\* Not in line of communications.

Guerrero Fight.

18. Upon arrival at Bachineva on the 28th, Colonel Dodd received information which appeared to be trustworthy that Villa had been there two or three days before and had taken supplies and animals and impressed several men into his service. It was said also that he had made an inflammatory speech telling the people that the Americans were coming, and urging all

Mexicans to join his forces. Dodd also heard there that Villa had been severely wounded in a fight with Carrancistas at Guerrero on the 27th, and was then at Guerrero with 500 or 600 men. He very promptly decided to act, and started toward Guerrero that afternoon, continuing by a night march toward Guerrero with a view to reaching Villa's camp at daylight. Unfortunately his native guide led him by a very circuitous route, doubling the actual distance and making a march of fifty five miles necessary. When Dodd's column arrived near Guerrero the guide would not or could not give any definite information as to roads or trails, so that it was eight o'clock in the morning before the attack was begun.

19. Guerrero is located in the lower plain of the Guerrero Valley and, on account of high bluffs, is not visible from the east until one is directly over it. The bluffs are abrupt, in many places impassable, and are cut by impassable arroyos running well back into the upper plain. The main road from the east follows down a very steep spur or "hog-back", while on the west there are bluffs extending well back into the mountains, but not so steep or abrupt as those on the east. These are cut by deep and partly wooded arroyos, difficult of passage. Thus the place is not easily surprised by day.

20. Villa's forces at Guerrero on the morning of the 29th were under command of Colonel Candalario Cervantes and consisted of 230 men. At San Ysidro Generals Beltran and Rios had 130 men. Villa had left for the south on the night of March 27th with an escort of 150 men, under Fernandes and was not present at the fight. Under orders from Villa Cervantes was to move south and was making preparations to start that morning at 9:00 o'clock. The Mexicans did not suspect the presence of the American forces in the vicinity, being under the impression that they were still at El Valle and, when Colonel Dodd's column appeared on the bluffs east of Guerrero, the Mexicans hurriedly saddled and fled in all directions. Colonel Dodd's column had made a dashing campaign, having been continuously in the saddle since March 23rd, and the work had been very severe on both men and horses. The command had already marched 375 miles between March 16th and the time of arrival at Bachineva, and most of the time the animals had little forage, and the men were then living off the country. Under the circumstances a less enterprising commander might have hesitated to push forward upon the meagre report received by Colonel Dodd.

21. The following is Colonel Dodd's report of the fight:

"Guerrero, Chihuahua, Mexico,  
29th March, 1916.

General Pershing:

1. At between six and seven o'clock this morning we struck Villa's command consisting of about 500 men in the town of Guerrero. Villa, who is suffering from a broken leg and lame hip from gunshot wounds received in a previous engagement, was not present, and I understand was carried away in a buggy sometime yesterday.

2. The number known to be killed was 30, and in the connection it must be remembered that four-fifths of the Villistas are Yaquis,

who carry off their dead. Undoubtedly a much larger number than this was killed.

3. We captured Villa's two machine guns, a number of horses, saddles and arms.

4. Our casualties were four enlisted men wounded, none of thme seriously.

5. The attack was a surprise but owing to misrepresentation of guide failed to be the total success I anticipated. Had I had a good guide the entire outfit would have been "boxed". The attack resulted in the breaking up and scattering of Villa's troops, the greater portion of them being driven in a ten mile running fight into the mountains northeast of the railroad where after brisk skirmishing they separated into small bands, and our horses were too weak to follow them farther. These parties will probably reassemble somewhere in the vicinity of S. ANA, and I have notified the Commanding Officer at NAMIQUIPA to be on the lookout.

6. A large number of Carrancista prisoners, who were kept for execution it is understood, were liberated or made their escape.

7. In order to reach this point the command marched 17 hours out of 24 covering 55 miles and then kept up the fight for five hours.

\* \* \* \* \*

9. Elijio Hernandez, who commanded the Villa troops, and who was one of Villa's most trusted officers, was killed in the fight today.

10. I am sending this by messenger, but as I am promised that the telegraph line will be in operation tomorrow, shall wire it also.

\* \* \* \* \*

12. With Villa probably permanently disabled, Lopez seriously wounded and Hernandez dead and the blow administered this morning, the Villista party would seem to be pretty well disintegrated.

\* \* \* \* \*

16. Detailed report will be furnished later.

Geo. A. Dodd,  
Colonel, Cavalry."

Extract from Colonel Dodd's detailed report.

" \* \* \* \* \* when it became evident that the bandits had become alarmed and parties were leaving town on both sides, making it evident that attack must be inaugurated at long range, and at once, if at all, fire with machine guns was opened at "D" and with rifles at "E". At this time the progress made by the 2d squadron and its position was not all satisfactory. Shortly after firing commenced on the east side Winan's squadron reached arroyo "F", E Troop under Captain S. F. Dallam, 7th Cavalry, being advanced to arroyo "G", where excellent work was done, in the killing of General Hernandez, the commanding officer, capturing two machine guns and other arms, and securing some Carranza prisoners, who were being held by the bandits. No bandits escaped through the arroyo after Dallam had attained this position, while those who had already passed were pressed and driven westward. The balance of the squadron arriving at arroyo "F" encountered a large body of Villistas moving in an orderly manner, not firing

and carrying the Mexican flag, on account of which fire of our troops was withheld under conditions most favorable to us, and as had been planned would have been annihilation to this portion of the Villistas. This is a matter of deep regret, as not firing and carrying the national flag of Mexico was simply a ruse to escape punishment; a ruse resorted to by the escaping bandits on the east side while leaving town; but in this case fire was increased instead of being withheld, with satisfactory results. As a number of the bandits were seen to escape at the north end of town and then strike eastward, Lieut. Col. Selah R. H. Tompkins, having but one troop "C", dismounted at "H", was sent north and east to intercept the escaping party. He was immediately reinforced by Major A. L. Dale, 7th Cavalry, with I, K and L Troops, and later as the Villistas were moving towards the hills near Calera, B Troops under Captain W. B. Cowin, and the Machine Gun Troop under 1st Lieut. A. C. Wimberly, were sent as still further reinforcements, a running fight resulted and kept until the Villistas entered the mountains, which were very rough, broke into small detachments and scattered, exhaustion of horses and conditions prevented further pursuit."

22. The following order embodying a telegram from the Secretary of War was published to the command:

"HEADQUARTERS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U.S. ARMY,  
In the Field, Mexico, April 4, 1916.

General Orders,) )  
No. 17. )

1. The following telegram from the War Department is published for the information of the command:

"Fort Sam Houston, Texas,  
3-31-16.

General Pershing,  
Columbus, New Mexico.

Number eighty four period Following just received from Washington quote Secretary of War desires you to convey to General Pershing, Colonel Dodd, and command, his hearty commendation of exploit mentioned in your eleven seven six. Scott, Chief of Staff. Unquote. By direction of the Department Commander.

BUNDY."

2. All officers and enlisted men of the command are cautioned against a feeling of over confidence as to the final result to be achieved by this expedition. The Commanding General appreciates most highly the work already performed by this command and considers it exceptional in many respects to anything hitherto recorded in the annals of the army. All members of the command are urged to put forth renewed energy both as individuals and as organizations in the endeavor to accomplish successfully the mission entrusted to the expedition by our people.

By command of Brigadier General Pershing:

De R. C. Cabell,  
Lieut. Col., 10th Cavalry,  
Chief of Staff.

Pursuit Continued.

23. After the fight at Guerrero the detachments of Villa's command scattered to the four winds, some being reported as returning north to the mountains of Bachineva, others to Providencia, while others were hurrying south. Rumors, reported and even positive assertions by natives would have indicated Villa's departure in almost any direction and his presence in several places at once. On March 29th Colonel Brown was at Quemada, Major Evans at Tepehuanes, Major Howze at Namiquipa, Major Lindsley approaching San Jose de Babicora, Major Tompkins at Namiquipa, and Colonel Allen at Colonia Dublan.

Having arrived at San Geronimo Ranch, Colonel Dodd's report of the Guerrero fight reached me there on the 30th. Directions were at once sent him to scout the country thoroughly and made every effort to locate Villa or any of his followers left in that section. These instructions reached him at Providencia, where he had returned in the belief that much of Villa's force, if not Villa himself, had moved toward the mountains in that vicinity.

Major Howze's column, which had been gradually moving south, arrived at San Geronimo on the 30th. Upon information that Villa was then hiding to the west of Bachineva, Howze was sent to scout the mountains from the west, returning to Bachineva from the south, and Tompkins moved by a night march to Santa Ana, to cover the western slope, both columns uniting on the 1st at Bachineva.

Upon receiving in person at Bachineva, reports from these officers that no trace of any bandits had been discovered, it seemed probable that Villa had gone into the mountainous country southeast of Guerrero or possibly moved south. Howze was therefore ordered to Guerrero, from which place, in lieu of further instructions, he should govern himself according to information he might obtain, and Tompkins was directed to follow the Villistas that were reported to have been at Bachineva on the 30th under Beltran.

24. In case it should be ascertained that Villa was moving generally south, the plan was again to use parallel columns converging near the Durango line, in an effort to overtake or get ahead of Villa's forces before they could get that far south. Colonel Brown was to take the road farthest east, with Tompkins, in general, in the centre, Howze farther to the west while Dodd was to guard the trails leading into the mountains to the west. Colonel Brown had left Quemada on the 30th for San Diego del Monte, where he was joined by Major Evans, remaining there during the 31st, sending an officer to the railroad in a futile effort to reach Colonel Dodd or myself by telegraph. Leaving Evans to guard the pass, Colonel Brown, the following day, directed his course through the mountains by way of Agua Caliente where he unexpectedly encountered a band of Villistas. His report of the affair is as follows:

"After we had gone over the divide and were out on the main range at 1:15 p.m., came to Aguas Calientes without having intimation from our guide of the existence of this barrio. - \* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* Our advance guard and the enemy discovered each other simultaneously and commenced firing. I kept on with headquarters and Troops E & F

to the town which the enemy soon abandoned, retreating over a wooded hill and across our left front. Major Young took Troops G and H and struck them more or less in flank, following them some six or seven miles to the east through the main timbered range to El Mestemo, giving up the chase only at dark x x x killing two."

After spending the night at Namipavechic, the second of April was occupied in searching the vicinity for the trail of the Villistas. Leaving Namipavechic on the 3rd, the column went to San Antonio and, upon receiving a message on the morning of the 4th from General Cavazos that our assistance in catching Villa was not desired, he stopped at San Antonio until the 5th.

25. To go back to the other columns, Major Tompkins followed a Villista trail to Santa Maria on the 2d, thence through Agua Caliente to Namipavechic on the 3d. Having received reports at San Antonio on the 4th that Villa was moving in the direction of San Borja, Tompkins continued to Cusi for the night, and on towards San Borja the following day. Upon approaching that village he was handed a note from General Cavazos as follows:

"On the 3d of April I telegraphed you that I thought it prudent to suspend the advance of your troops until we both received orders on this subject from the Citizen Military Commander of the State. As I have just received knowledge that your forces are advancing in accordance with the itinerary which I have prepared for the troops under my own command, I would esteem it very much if you would suspend your advance until you receive the order to which I refer, by which means there can be avoided a conflict which may occur by reason of your advance. x x x Your attentive and true servant,  
General Jose Cavazos."

Upon meeting General Cavazos, permission to continue south was refused, Cavazos saying that Villa was dead and buried. As a clash seemed imminent, Tompkins retired four miles to Cieneguitas, where he camped for the night. At this place he heard that Villa had passed through Santa Maria de Cuevas the day before. He marched to Santa Rosalia on the 6th, remaining there on the 7th to shoe horses and rest his command.

26. Major Howze having proceeded by way of San Geronimo for supplies, camped six miles north of Guerrero on April 4th, Casi on the 6th, and Cieniguita on the 7th. At San Borja, it was confidentially reported to him that Villa was only slightly wounded; that Pablo Lopez, wounded, had been carried in a vehicle with the Villista column; that he had just died, which suggested to Villa to announce his own death; and that Villa with an escort of fifty men was following down the Sierra Puras mountains to Durango. Howze says: "I struck southward with the utmost vigor possible and near Casa Colorado struck Villa's trail six days old. We followed it through the mountain fastness, over the nearly impossible Gabilana trail and in three days gained nearly three on Villa. At a place called Aguaje he went into the Sierra Puras mountains devoid of food, without plains or cultivation, over a trail nearly if not quite

impassable for American animals. x x x x x I skirted the mountain wall as far as San Jose del Sitio.

en route to Los Estados on the 8th, the column met Colonel Cavazos with 200 men about noon, with whom a clash was narrowly averted, as shown by Major Howze's report:

"At about 10:30 a.m., April 8th, at a point about ten miles south of San Borja, my command was charged by the mounted forces of General Cavazos, his platoon in advance was reinforced by 50 or 60 men, and all took up the gallop, yelled and drew their rifles as they approached us. In the meantime our men were promptly being placed in an arroyo which afforded a splendid field of fire and excellent cover. I personally moved between the two lines waving my hat and calling in Spanish that we were Americans. About 100 of Cavazos' men reached a point within 50 yards of me before they stopped. If one shot had been fired, I feel convinced that we would have destroyed half of Cavazos' 300 men. The control which our officers exercised over their men and the display of splendid judgment by officers and noncommissioned officers in a delicate situation, saved what came near being a serious complication. Our officers were left generally with the convictions that General Cavazos was seeking conflict. His manner and tone were quite offensive."

Camping at San Jose del Sitio on April 9th, the natives were found to be generally unfriendly and, as expected, Major Howze's camp was fired into during the night. On April 10th, the march was continued south to Santa Cruz de Herrera, with the intention as Colonel Howze says, "of intercepting Villa should he debouch from the impassable mountains in his effort to get to Durango for the purpose of getting food." Colonel Howze was fired on several times en route that day and was viciously attacked at 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon near La Joya de Herrera, the band being completely dispersed, losing their commander, Captain Silva. On April 11th, Santa Cruz de Herrera was surrounded in an effort to capture another party of Villistas reported as occupying the town, with the result that Lieutenant Beltran (son of General Beltran) and one soldier were killed and a few arms captured. Camp was made that night a short distance up the Belleza river, and the following night at Heojolilan.

27. Major Evans had remained at San Diego del Monte guarding passes as directed, and, upon receiving information that a band of Villistas was passing northward, moved to Quemada on the 2d, thence to Tepehuanes through Santa Catalina to San Geronimo on the 5th, where he was given verbal orders to continue to Namiquipa and cover the Santa Clara-Oso country, which duty was performed by his various detachments until the reorganization of commands on May 9th.

Colonel Brown started from San Antonio on April 5th, camping near Cusi, leaving early next morning for Cieneguita. En route he was overtaken, by an aeroplane which delivered my instructions to move his column eastward and follow the Santevo-Tres Hermanas-Valle de Zaragose road to Parral, generally covering the eastern border of the territory through which our troops were searching bandits. Having passed Major Tompkins at Santa Rosalia, he entered La Joya on the 7th, where he learned that Cienega had been recently attacked by General Garza's command of de

facto troops and that ten bandits had been killed. Brown marched to Satevo on the 8th, reaching Tres Hermanas ten miles southeast the following day where he met General Garza, with whom he became on friendly terms. Leaving on the tenth, Brown passed through Sauz and Valle de Zaragosa and arrived at Medis Ranch the 12th.

From Santa Rosalia, Major Tompkins continued his march to Fresnites on the 8th. When a short distance from Fresnites, the following day, his column was fired into by a detachment of eight men of General Garza's command, and at San Juan at noon that day he met the force under General Garza moving to San Jose del Sitio. As Major Howze, who was to the west, would probably cover San Jose del Sitio, and knowing that Colonel Brown was coming from Satevo to Parral, Tompkins decided to direct his course at once toward Parral, where he intended to re-supply and be prepared to work north, if so ordered. Acting upon this decision, he marched to Conchos on the 10th, where he arrived in time to drive off twenty-five Villistas who were looting a factory. He was advised here that Fernandez with one hundred Villistas had lately gone to Valle de Zaragosa, from which he concluded that the general Villistas movement had Durango as its objective. From Conchos on the 11th he went to Santa Cruz de Villegas. These three columns were now probably south of any considerable force of the Villistas, although it is possible that one or two small detachments had passed into Durango.

28. Immediately after the Guerrero fight, the provisional squadron under Colonel Allen was hurried south. Leaving Dublan on March 30, and following the line of communications, it arrived at Naniquipa on April 2d. From there 100 men of the column scouted in a southeasterly direction through Los Tanques and Canyon del Oso on April 3d, reaching San Geronimo on the 5th, where it was joined by the remainder of the detachment. The column was sent to Lake Itascate, thence to Dolores on the following day, reaching San Antonio on the 8th. Upon information that Pablo Lopez was at Bustillos Ranch, personal instructions were given to Colonel Allen to proceed in pursuit. La Cienega and Bustillos ranches were both thoroughly searched without result, so the command proceeded to Carretas, where it struck what was thought to be Pablo Lopez's trail, but lost it a few hours later. Under his orders, Colonel Allen continued south by way of San Bernardino and San Lorenzo, camping on the 11th a few miles south of La Joya, reporting at Satevo on the 12th, where I had arrived the previous day at the advance camp of the aeroplane squadron.

29. At the beginning of April, Colonel Dodd, with the 7th Cavalry under Colonel Erwin, was occupying a line through Providencia and Minaca watching the passes leading west, while Lieutenant Colonel S.R.H. Tompkins with two troops was at Bachineva. These reconnoitering parties thoroughly scouted the country to the west and had frequent small skirmishes. A detachment under Captain Kendrick, consisting of Troops K and M, reconnoitering in the direction of Temosachic on April 7th, was fired into near Zarca Ranch by thirty Villistas, five of whom were killed with no loss to the detachment.

Colonel Dodd moved to Minaca on April 8th, with a command of 15 officers

and 175 men, to cover the field west of Howze, or pursue certain bands reported in the mountains behind Guerrero, according to circumstances. His movement brought forth objections on the part of General Luis Herrera, then commander of that district, on the ground that it would interfere with the Carrancista plans, but after receiving my message, conveyed to him by Major Ryan, General Herrera withdrew his opposition. For the time being, Dodd remained near Minaca, and the other detachments of his command continued on their duties as indicated above.

#### Parral.

30. The unprovoked and outrageous attack at Parral, April 12th, on Major Tompkins' command by the civil population aided by the Carrancista forces under their own field officers, was the culmination of a long series of petty acts of hostility which grew in number and viciousness as our columns moved south. The visit of an officer from the Parral garrison to Major Tompkins' camp two nights before the attack, was evidently for the purpose of ascertaining the size of his force and of misleading him into believing that the people of Parral were friendly. His command was permitted to enter the town unmolested and its presence met with nothing more than a mild protest until it started to leave.

A camp site had been selected just outside the town to which he was shown by General Lozano, the commander of the Carranza forces in that district. This camp site was a veritable trap, surrounded by hills on all sides, and a command once caught there would have been at the mercy of the attackers, but Major Tompkins wisely avoided it. As to General Lozano's part in this treachery it is probable that he and the members of his staff were kept in ignorance of the intentions of either the civilian element or the members of his own garrison, and he was thus in a position later to disavow the act.

General Luis Herrera, whose home is in Parral, upon leaving Chihuahua in March with a small command of Carrancistas, is reported to have threatened that he would attack the first troops he met. Early in April he visited my camp at San Geronimo and was not at all cordial. As already stated, he had opposed Colonel Dodd's movement on April 8th, claiming that our going south would not accord with his plans for the capture of Villa. It was current gossip among the Mexicans in territory south of the railroad through which our troops travelled, that Luis Herrera had announced that the Americans would be stopped at Parral. There is no doubt that he and his followers had determined to oppose us by force, either at that point or elsewhere in that vicinity. Luis Herrera and his father, the Presidente of Parral, are very influential in that section and the people do not hesitate to do their bidding.

Major Tompkins fired only after he was attacked and did everything possible to avoid a fight. After he was persistently pursued several miles he very properly deployed a troop at a time and inflicted severe damage upon his pursuers, killing 42 according to authentic reports of the fight received through native sources.

In his report of this affair Major Tompkins says:

"On reaching Conchos (Valle de Zaragoza) I camped, about 11.00 p.m. A Carranza captain who had come from Parral came into camp and

gave me information of Carranza and Villista troops. In addition he stated that he would send word to General Lozano, Carranga's Commander at Parral, of our advance to the south, so that the Carrancista commander would have men meet us, assign a camp and arrange for provisions. Upon reaching Parral no one met us. I took the advance guard and went to the General's quarters to interview him. He told us some information and said he would take us to a camp. He then mounted up, and, with several of his officers, led my column to the camp outside of town. As the pack train was leaving the edge of the town the rear guard was fired into, and a few moments later Carranza soldiers armed appeared on a hill to the south. I notified the General that we had been fired into and he exclaimed (profanity) and started back to town on the run. Men in the rear guard who saw him, report that he drew his saber and beat the crowd back, also that one of the Carrancista officers drew his pistol and shot down four members of the crowd in an attempt to disperse it. The firing continued and I put my rear guard in position to cover the retreat of the main body. At this moment a representative from General Lozano's command reached us and requested that I continue my retreat immediately. I answered that I would retreat out of his district as soon as the grain and forage which I had arranged for with Mr. Scott of Parral had reached camp and the horses fed. The representative retired with this message and I remained to await the answer. At this moment some of the Carranza soldiers on the hill to the south moved on my left flank to occupy a hill which commanded the position of the main body. I yelled at them to go back; they paid no attention. I then sent a squad to drive them back. As soon as this squad moved out the soldiers on the hill to the south opened fire on me and I answered. A few minutes later Sergeant Ridgley on my left was killed; the firing in my front became heavier; I could see that the soldiers and the town were both against me, so I decided to retire. I retreated and found that two men had been wounded when the command was formed. I retreated 16 miles, followed all the way by about 300 Carrancista soldiers. I covered my retreat by halting, dismounting and deploying my rear guard and the two troops in succession. During this retreat Private Ledford, K Troop, was wounded a second time and died in the saddle. I killed or wounded 12 of the enemy. (So reported by the Carrancistas). Upon reaching this place I decided to remain in position. I erected barricades, loopholed the walls and constructed a strong defensive position. The Carranza troops scattered to the hills to the south and southwest and continued the fire. The firing ceased at 6:50. Couriers who had gone back to the north for supports arrived here at 7:10 with Colonel Brown and Major Young's squadron of the 10th Cavalry."

Comprehensive telegraphic reports were forwarded to Department Headquarters as soon as possible giving the important details of the Parral affair. My own views in the premises as to the course to be pursued by the forces of the expedition were also given by telegraph as requested. The telegraphic correspondence is of record and need not be reiterated in this report.

After Parral.

31. At first it was thought best to retain the troops in the vicinity of Parral, but the strained relations between the two governments that resulted from this fight brought the whole matter into the sphere of diplomacy and it was soon deemed advisable to withdraw for the time being. Fortunately the dispositions made of the various columns, and the orders under which they were operating naturally brought them to the vicinity of Parral about the same time. The four columns in that section were united soon after the fight under command of Colonel Brown, making a force sufficiently strong to have given a good account of itself under any circumstances likely to arise immediately. But to have retained troops there would have required an extension of the line of communications 180 miles from San Antonio, and the road was difficult. To supply such a force with the transportation then available would not have been an easy task. These rapidly moving columns had out run the means of supply, and as there was neither food nor forage obtainable in that district, withdrawal was the best solution of the problem. There were no serviceable aeroplanes left by which to communicate with Colonel Brown, and as he had evidently taken the view that he should not withdraw, it became necessary to send Colonel Cabell, the Chief of Staff, there to investigate the situation and, if advisable, to direct the retirement of the forces. Upon his arrival the above conditions as to supply were found to exist, and as Colonel Brown had made every effort to obtain needed supplies and had been unsuccessful, the command was ordered to return to San Antonio.

Tomochic.

32. On April 17th, a rumor reached Colonel Dodd at Ninaca that a force of Villistas was at Yoquivo, where it had looted the town and captured a Frenchman and an American who were held as prisoners. Leaving Ninaca on the 18th, the command reached the vicinity of Yoquivo on the 20th, hoping to surprise the bandits the following morning, only to find that they had gone. At Yoquivo it was learned that Cervantes was in command, with Baca, Rios and Dominques as subordinates; that the force consisted of about 150 men; and that the two prisoners had been liberated. As Tomochic seemed to be their destination, Colonel Dodd promptly followed, arriving at five o'clock in the afternoon. Tomochic is a small town located on the Tomochic River, surrounded by rugged mountains, with elevations approximating 9,000 feet. The command approached the town by a well concealed trail from the southwest and, upon reaching the outskirts, it entered at the gallop and took possession. The enemy having occupied the hills on the north and south sides opened fire upon the column. Of this engagement, Colonel Dodd says:

"Those scattered on the hills north and south were dislodged or killed, while others withdrew to the mountains east. From the first point of observation "A", a large herd of horses and also what appeared to be a column of troops were noticed in the distance at "G". The indication being that the main body might be in that direction two troops (H, Wells and I, Gillem), accompanied by Captain Leary and all under charge of Major Dade, were sent rapidly in that direction, with

orders to attack any force found there and to capture or kill the herd. (The latter proved to be a herd of brood mares.) At the same time a machine gun under Sergeant H. H. Roberts, supported first by a platoon and later by an entire troop, "L" (Moffat), in order to secure a more raking fire on the trail up which some of the bandits were fleeing, was advanced to "H", where there was an abandoned adobe house. The machine gun at "E" was moved up and joined Major Dade. Firing on the part of the bandits at this juncture was very slight and discontinued entirely from the hills north and south. In a few minutes, however, perhaps ten, a heavy fusilade was received from the circular hills to the east. This was the main body of the bandits which, it was later found, had advanced upon the trail to the top of the mountains "H" about three miles, and returned as soon as the rear guard was fired upon. The bandits were not concentrated in any particular place but were scattered along the crest and side of the mountains, extending from about the point "I" (to the northwest) to "J" (at the southeast). They had a decided advantage in position, and there was no possible way of getting around them in the short time left before dark. It may be added that no other way of attack was possible than that made from the first, that is, directly and rapidly. Immediately the heavy firing began, the knoll "K", although dominated by fire from the hills, was occupied by 10 or 12 men of "E" Troop, and the headquarters party, all of whom did effective work. The troops sent toward point "G" encountered considerable fire from the hills to the east, but found only individual bandits or very small detachments to fire upon."

#### Organization of Districts.

33. Upon the retirement of these southern columns to San Antonio, various detachments of troops that had been moved southward along the line of communications were pushed to the front preparatory to the resumption of active pursuit, or for such other action as might be desired. Meanwhile it was known that Villa's forces, although scattered in different directions and under separate leaders, were still within the State of Chihuahua, and that Villa himself was in hiding in the mountains southeast of San Borja. In accordance with this view a plan of action was ordered by which the territory infested by these bandits was divided into five districts, each patrolled by a regiment of cavalry, with the larger part of the infantry and artillery well to the front in case their services should be required.

In pursuance of this plan, the following order was issued:

"HEADQUARTERS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U.S.ARMY,  
In the Field, Namiquipa, Mexico, April 29, 1916.

General Orders, )  
No. 28. )

1. As a result of the arduous and persistent pursuit of Villa by various columns of this command, his forces have suffered losses of approximately one hundred killed with unknown number of wounded,

and have been broken into smaller bands and scattered to different sections of the State of Chihuahua and elsewhere. The situation has changed to the extent that our troops no longer pursue a cohesive force of considerable size, but by surprise with small, swiftly moving detachments, they must hunt down isolated bands, now under subordinate leaders and operating over widely separated portions of the country. For this purpose the territory to be covered for the present is accordingly divided into districts and apportioned to organizations available for such duty.

2. The commander of each separate district will organize his own agents, and establish as far as possible his own service of information. Every assistance will be given from these headquarters in providing guides and interpreters and in furnishing information. It is also directed that this office and adjacent commanders be furnished with all information of importance that comes to the knowledge of district commanders, especially such as would influence the operations of troops in adjacent districts. Each district commander will act on his own initiative on any information that seems likely to lead to the capture of any of the participants in the Columbus raid, and will keep the Commanding General and, as far as practicable, the Brigade Commander, advised of all movements in his district.

3. All officers are reminded that this expedition is operating within the limits of a friendly nation whose peaceful inhabitants should be treated with every consideration. It is also desirable to maintain the most cordial relations, and cooperate as far as feasible, with the forces of the de facto government. Experience so far has taught, however, that our troops are always in more or less danger of being attacked, not only by hostile followers of Villa, but even by others who profess friendship, and precaution must be taken accordingly. In case of an unprovoked attack, the officer in command will without hesitation, take the most vigorous measures at his disposal to administer severe punishment on the offenders, bearing in mind that any other course is likely to be construed as a confession of weakness.

4. The following districts to be covered are embraced within the limits prescribed. The boundary lines are to be understood as indicating in general the territory over which district commanders are for the present to operate, but will not limit their efforts to secure information, often otherwise unobtainable, nor confine their activities when in actual pursuit of Villista bands. In locating their headquarters, district commanders, under direction of their Brigade commanders, will give due consideration to the question of supply.

Namiquipa District:

Commencing at a point north of Alamo on the thirteenth parallel, thence east to the Mexican Central Railroad inclusive, south to Sauz,

generally west through Tepehuanes, San Miguel, Madera to Tio Chico, north to the thirteenth parallel, thence east to Alamo.

Bustillos District.

Commencing at San Miguel, thence along southern boundary of Namiquipa district to Sauz, south to near Salas, west to San Andres, and San Antonio, and excluding both towns, thence southwest to Mal Paso, thence northward to Bachineva and San Miguel, including both towns.

Satevo District.

Commencing at San Antonio, thence east through and including San Andres to Mapula, thence along the Mexican Central Railroad to Jimenez, Parral to Santa Barbara, thence northwesterly to San Lorenzo and to San Antonio.

San Borja District.

Commencing at San Antonio, southwest to San Lorenzo and Santa Barbara, west to Guachochic, north to Carichic, northwest to Rancho de Santiago, northwest to San Antonio.

Guerrero District.

Commencing at San Miguel, thence south through Bachineva to Mal Paso, southwest to Rancho de Santiago, southeast to Carichic, south to Guachochic, west to the third meridian west of Chihuahua, north to a point west of Madera, thence east to Madera, thence southeast to San Miguel.

By command of Brigadier General Pershing:

DeR. C. Cabell,  
Lieutenant Colonel, 10th Cavalry.

OFFICIAL:

J. L. HINES,  
Major, Adjutant General,  
Adjutant.

34. Pursuant to the plan laid down in the foregoing order, cavalry regiments were assigned to those districts where they had had the most service and with which the personnel was most familiar:

<u>DISTRICT:</u>	<u>TROOPS:</u>	<u>DISTRICT COMMANDER:</u>
Namiquipa .....	10th Cavalry .....	Major Ellwood W. Evans.
Guerrero .....	7th Cavalry .....	Colonel George A. Dodd.
Bustillos .....	13th Cavalry .....	Colonel Herbert J. Slocum.
Satevo .....	5th Cavalry .....	Colonel Wilbur E. Wilder.
San Borja .....	11th Cavalry .....	Colonel James Lockett.

Ojos Azules.

35. On the evening of May 4th it was reported that Julie Acosta and Cruz Dominques, two Villista leaders, were in the vicinity of Cusi, with one hundred and twenty men threatening that town and the small Carrancista force in the vicinity. The people of Cusi sent two representatives to San Antonio requesting protection for their town. As these bandit leaders had previously given it out that they had a thousand men and that they intended to attack the American camp at San Antonio, and had also frightened the inhabitants in that district by their attitude, the time was opportune to teach them a lesson. Accordingly, Major Howze with six troops and the Machine Gun Platoon of the 11th Cavalry, numbers 14 officers and 319 enlisted men, were dispatched to Cusi with instructions to move against this band as circumstances might indicate. Howze reached Cusi about midnight, May 4th, and learned that the hostile band was then in camp at Ojos Azules. After procuring guides, he started in that direction, arriving at Ojos Azules at daylight. His arrival and the attack that followed were a complete surprise, resulting in the total rout of the band, whose losses were 61 men killed, as ascertained later, and a large number wounded,, without the loss of a single American. Major Howze's report of the fight is as follows:

"General Pershing:

We made an all night march to Ojos Azules, distance thirty six miles. Reached here at 5:45 a.m., unfortunately one-half hour after daylight. We surprised Julio Acosta, Cruz Dominques and Antonio Angel; jumped them. Had a running fight for two hours; drove their bands into the hills between here and Carichic. Killed 42 verified by officers, captured several and some 50 or 75 horses and mules. It is believed we killed Angel, although identification not complete. We rescued a Carrancista lieutenant and four soldiers just before they were to be shot. We followed the enemy consisting of about 140 until our horses were wholly exhausted, but the chase did not stop until the enemy left unhit had been broken up entirely. In fact, those who escaped us did so as individuals. Our approach was discovered by the Villistas' herd guard which fired at our Indians, and also alarmed the sleeping enemy which ran pell-mell, half-dressed, firing at us in their flight. The remarkable part is, although the clothing of several of our men was hit, not a single man was wounded, thanks to the utter surprise and confusion of the enemy. We lost three or four horses. I had to wait two hours at Cusihiuriachic for guides, hence my inability to get here earlier than 5:45 a.m., to do which we had to ride as hard as our horses could stand. It is needless to say that the officers and men behaved as would be expected. I intend to rest here.

HOWZE,  
Major, 11th Cavalry.

Ojos Azules, Mexico.  
May 5, 1916."

Major Howze's action showed enterprise and good judgment and resulted in the destruction and disintegration of Acosta's band. Since that time Acosta has never been able to assemble more than 20 men, and he has kept his band and himself hidden in the mountains back of Guerrero where he is reported at the present time.

#### Withdrawal to Namiquipa.

36. The regiments concerned in the order organizing districts had reached their designated localities and the work of scouring the country and pursuing individual bands had been begun. Meanwhile the relations between the two governments became very tense and various de facto officials began to circulate rumors of war and to announce that the Americans were to be driven out. On May 9th, instructions were received from the Department Commander directing the withdrawal of the command to Dublan. Although no information through local sources had reached me indicating any hostile movement at that time toward our line, the instructions received stated that the necessity for concentration was considered imperative. Having arrived at Lake Itascato, the Department Commander was advised that the situation did not seem to demand immediate withdrawal to Dublan, whereupon orders were received directing me to hold the troops where they were and make such tactical dispositions in the vicinity of Namiquipa as might seem advisable.

#### Restricted Activities - Cervantes' Death.

37. The abandonment of our advance stations left the command occupying the original line of communications with Namiquipa as the southern camp. Our cavalry troops covered the front with supports at San Geronimo and Providencia. As our troops vacated territory, the de facto troops became more aggressive, patrols from both sides frequently meeting, and only by the exercise of great discretion and forbearance on the part of our officers were clashes avoided. Troops along the line were occupied in the pursuit of small bands of Villistas, and in running down reports of de facto troop movements.

The activities of Colonel Cardenas, an important member of Villa's staff, had stirred up Rubio and vicinity and our troops had made several unsuccessful attempts to capture him. On May 14th, Lieutenant G.S. Patton, 8th Cavalry, of my staff, with a small detachment was sent to that section in automobiles to purchase corn. Upon reaching San Miguel Ranch near Rubio, several Villistas ran out, firing upon the detachment as they went. Lieutenant Patton and one of our men opened fire in return, killing three of the Villistas, one of whom proved to be Colonel Cardenas.

About this time, Candelario Cervantes with 25 Villistas boldly returned to the vicinity of Namiquipa and began to prey upon the peaceful inhabitants. Detachments were kept constantly in the field in his pursuit, following up all reports that appeared credible. On May 25th, a detachment under Lance Corporal Davis Marksbury, consisting of 8 men of the Machine Gun Platoon, 17th Infantry, 2 men of the Corps of Engineers,

and one man of the Quartermaster Corps from Cruces, happened to be about six miles south of there, sketching roads and hunting cattle, when they were attacked by a party of nine Villistas, and Corporal Marksbury was killed and three men wounded. The Villistas lost two killed who, upon proper identification, turned out to be "Colonel" Candelario Cervantes and Jose Bencome. Especial credit is due Private George D. Hulett, 17th Infantry for success in this small skirmish, who killed both these bandits as they rode by firing at him. The killing of Candelario Cervantes was particularly fortunate as, next to Villa himself, he was the most able and the most desperate of Villa's band.

On May 31st, accompanied by the Chief of Staff and one aide, I left Namiquipa for a conference at Dublan with General Gabriel Gavira, commanding de facto troops at Juarez. A meeting was held on June 1st, during which the discussion covered proposed cooperation between the forces of the two governments. An agreement was finally reached which limited the number of de facto troops to be stationed along the lines of railroad, and specified that no de facto troops should occupy towns along our line of communications. The agreement was tentative and was, of course, subject to the approval of higher authority in our respective governments. It is presumed that the Mexican government did not approve of the agreement, as nothing further has been said of it.

#### Events Prior to Carrizal.

38. The relations between the United States and Mexico had become very tense and the Mexican people were much aroused in the belief that war was inevitable. De facto troops were being assembled at points on the railroads in the east and west, threatening our line of communications. The commanding general of the de facto troops in the district of Alamada had issued instructions for his forces to hold themselves in readiness to operate against the Americans. A force of 10,000 men was reported in the vicinity of Ahumada, and a large number of troops had moved from the south of the city of Chihuahua. It was understood among the Mexican people that these troops, instead of being sent to pursue bandits, were actually for the purpose of driving the Americans out of Mexico. The commanding officer at Ahumada was in constant telegraphic communication with the local commander at Casas Grandes, and the latter was advised that the troops at Ahumada were preparing to attack the American lines and directing his cooperation. The Mexican population held themselves entirely aloof from us, and people who had been friendly became decidedly unfriendly. It was impossible to obtain the assistance of men who had hitherto been in our service as secret agents. The white population were alarmed and afraid to venture beyond our protection. Our small fleet of air-ships had been wrecked in the early days of the campaign and not one was available at this critical period. It therefore became necessary to rely upon the resources within the command to obtain information of the de facto troops. Frequent reconnaissances in all directions became imperative, in order to keep informed of any hostile movements of de facto bodies and be prepared to concentrate at any threatened point.

39. General Trevino, in command at Chihuahua, sent me a telegram to

the effect that if the American troops were moved south, east or west, they would be attacked, further showing the intense feeling existing at that time among all classes. The following are copies of his telegram and my reply:

Chihuahua Headquarters, June 16, 1916.

General Pershing,  
Casas Grandes.

I have orders from my government to prevent, by the use of arms, new invasions of my country by American forces and also to prevent the American forces that are in this state from moving to the south, east or west of the places they now occupy. I communicate this to you for your knowledge for the reason that your forces will be attacked by the Mexican forces if these indications are not heeded.

Courteously,

J. B. TREVINO, The General in Chief.

My reply was as follows:

Field Headquarters American Expedition,  
Casas Grandes, Mexico, June 16, 1916.

General J. B. Trevino,  
Chihuahua, Mexico.

I am in receipt of your telegram advising me that your government has directed you to prevent any movement to the east, south or west of the American forces now in Mexico period And that should such movement take place the American forces will be attacked by Mexican forces period In reply you are informed that my government has placed no such restrictions upon the movements of American forces period I shall therefore use my own judgment as to when and in what direction I shall move my forces in pursuit of bandits or in seeking information regarding bandits period If under these circumstances the Mexican forces attack any of my columns the responsibility for the consequences will lie with the Mexican government.

Respectfully yours,  
John J. Pershing, General,  
Commanding American Forces.

The local commanding officer of de facto troops delivered me a verbal message on the same date to the effect that "General Carranza had ordered that the American troops should not move in any direction except north." In reply I asked him to telegraph his superiors that I declined to respect such instructions, saying: "I do not take orders except from my own government.

#### Carrizal Fight.

40. Among other reconnoitering detachments, Captain Boyd with Troop G, 10th Cavalry, was sent eastward in the direction of Ahumada to thoroughly scout the country and obtain information regarding the troops and their movements. He was told that he could probably learn the facts at Santo Domingo or in that vicinity, and was cautioned not to bring on a fight. Captain Morey with Troop M, 10th Cavalry, was sent from Ojo Federico upon the same mission and with practically the same caution.

Captain Boyd and Captain Morey met at Santo Domingo Ranch, about 60 miles east of Dublan, on the evening of June 20th. They obtained from the American foreman in charge, who had recently visited Ahumada, much reliable

information concerning their mission without going to points garrisoned by de facto troops. Captain Boyd, however, decided to enter Carrizal and continue from there to Ahumada with Captain Morey under his command.

Arriving in the vicinity of Carrizal on the morning of the 21st, he was met by the commanding general and other officers at the outskirts of the town, and told that their orders would not permit him to go further to the east. Superior numbers of Mexican troops were in battle formation, both mounted and dismounted, at the edge of town, and all their preparations indicated that they would carry out their instructions and oppose Captain Boyd's progress by force. After some further discussion, Captain Boyd rode up within short range of the Mexican position, dismounted his troops preparatory to entering the town. At the moment of dismounting, he received a heavy fire from all parts of the Mexican lines. A reference to the accompanying map will show the various movements of Captain Boyd's force during the fight. The details have been given in special report and need not be repeated here. Captain Boyd's own men pushed forward with dash and carried the Mexican position, Lieutenant Adair leading. The list of losses will be found later in the appendices of this report. The memory of the splendid bravery of these two officers who lost their lives and of the men who personally followed them is cherished by this entire command.

In closing this brief report of Carrizal it should be emphasized that this expedition entered Mexico in pursuit of bandits, through the courtesy of the Mexican government, and, that the de facto military forces, in firing on our troops, committed a deliberate act of war. Also in declaring through the military commander at Chihuahua, that the American forces were to be attacked under certain conditions, the Mexican government accentuated its own responsibility in the premises. In other words, the Mexican Government itself was entirely responsible for the opposition offered to Captain Boyd's progress and, finally for the culminating act of open hostility to the United States which started the fight at Carrizal.

#### Preparations after Carrizal.

41. When the fight at Carrizal was reported, orders were prepared and immediate steps were taken to assume the aggressive with all available troops of this command. Superior instructions indicated such action, and the situation seemed to demand it. Further concentration for prompt movement became imperative, if we were to be ready to meet without delay what appeared to be a crisis. Without entering into the details of the plans, the troops south of El Valle were ordered north by telegraph, truck trains were assembled for such use as might be required of them, and the command as a whole was at once placed and held in position for quick action. Telegraphic reports of proposed plans were made at the time, and the particulars will be omitted.

- - - o O o - - -

## A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

### General Staff in the Field.

1. The importance and the necessity of a well organized general staff for any army in the field has been decidedly emphasized by the experiences of this Expedition. A Chief of Staff with a large practical knowledge of handling troops, considerable field service and an abundance of common sense is a valuable asset for a commanding general to have. An energetic chief of staff possessing these qualifications is indispensable even in a command of this size, and much more so with a larger force. Assisted by the junior members of the general staff, the specific duties of whom are well prescribed in our service regulations, the chief of staff is in a position to coordinate the work of the various departments and to relieve this commander of many minor details of administration, thus leaving the commanding general free to occupy his mind with military and possibly political questions that present themselves for solution. In the preparation of orders for the movements of troops, and for governing and controlling the supply departments, and in handling many other matters, such an officer is essential to maintain all parts of an army in the field, in smooth working order. During this expedition the above features have been exemplified in actual accomplishment by the Chief of Staff and his assistants. There have been many times when it was necessary for me to be far to the front in touch with advance columns, and during such times the entire control of the Expedition has been left to the Chief of Staff, who issued the necessary orders and followed out general lines of policy laid down for his guidance. A brief report by the Chief of Staff will be found among the appendices to this report.

### Adjutant General's Department.

2. Fortunately, when this Expedition was ordered there was available a well organized and fully equipped office with capable personnel on duty with the 8th Brigade at El Paso and ready to take the field; consequently the duties of the office have been efficiently performed from the start and the Adjutant General has been able to handle most of the administrative details without specific instruction.

In order to meet just such an emergency as confronted this command at the beginning, it is suggested that all brigades and divisions be provided with a well instructed personnel, furnished with full field equipment, all under a competent adjutant general of experience. Such an organization would always be available for use in a larger command or elsewhere as its services might be needed.

Based upon actual experience in the field, there might be prepared in the office of the Adjutant General a memorandum covering the various duties of such an office in the field and prescribing the features that the adjutant should anticipate and provide for. Such a memorandum is now being prepared by the Adjutant of this command. The recommendations contained in his report herewith are approved.

Inspector General's Department.

3. The Inspector General's Department was not represented with this Expedition until recently, so that nothing pertaining to that Department will be found among the Staff reports, but in order to keep constantly informed regarding the condition of troops, camps, transportation and the work of the staff and supply departments, a member of the command was appointed Inspector. These duties were performed by Colonel L.G. Berry, 4th Field Artillery, from March 14th, to April 30th, 1916. Colonel Berry inspected the troops and camps along the line of communication and the Base at Columbus, correcting errors and defects on the spot and reporting his action later together with the general results of the inspection. On April 30th, Colonel Berry was relieved and Colonel H. T. Allen, 11th Cavalry, with Colonel B. L. Tate, 5th Cavalry, as assistant, performed these duties in like manner up to the 21st of June when Colonel G.O. Cress, the present Inspector reported for duty from Department Headquarters.

JUDGE ADVOCATE'S DEPARTMENT.

4. Soon after entering Mexico it became evident that it would be impracticable for the Department Commander to detail general courts as the officers and troops were constantly on the move and the probability of their remaining at any one place, even temporarily, could not be foreseen. To meet this situation request was made, under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved March 2d, 1913, that authority be given the commander of the expedition to detail general courts, which request was approved May 6th, 1916. In this connection, the question was presented as to cases arising within the provisions of Article 58 of the Articles of War upon which the Judge Advocate General gave the following opinion:

"I am therefore of the opinion that, while war is not recognized as existing between the United States and Mexico, the actual conditions under which the field operations in Mexico are being conducted are those of actual war; that within the field of operations of the expeditionary force in Mexico it is 'time of war' within the meaning of the 58th Article of War, and that the crimes mentioned in that article should therefore be tried by general court-martial in accordance with its provisions. The opposite ruling would give immunity for the capital crimes specified in the 58th Article of War, since it could not have been intended that, under such conditions, United States soldiers would be turned over to the authorities of Mexico for trial."

Judge Advocate's Department.

Courts martial have been detailed as circumstances made it possible to assemble the requisite number of officers without interference with field duties. Between May 7th and June 30th, 19 cases were tried as follows:

- 5 trials for sleeping on post, in violation of the 39th Article of War.
- 1 trial for leaving post, in violation of the 39th Article of War.
- 3 trials for disobedience of orders, in violation of the 21st Art. of War.
- 2 trials for quitting guard, in violation of the 40th Article of War.
- 2 trials for desertion, in violation of the 47th Article of War.
- 1 trial for larceny of government property, in violation of the 60th Article of War.
- 2 trials for larceny of private property in violation of the 62nd Art. of War.
- 1 trial for assault with intent to kill, in violation of the 62nd Art. of War.
- 1 trial for insubordination, in violation of the 62nd Article of War.
- 1 trial for murder, in violation of the 58th Article of War.

The Quartermaster Corps.

5. When this Expedition was ordered it was found that the Quartermaster's Department had not anticipated the immense amount of preparation and organization necessary to establish promptly a base of supplies for an army in the field. Officers, clerks and other personnel had to be ordered from all points of the compass. Office supplies were lacking and there was a dearth of trained personnel necessary to receive, classify and forward supplies with intelligence. It would seem entirely feasible to have the personnel for such an organization prescribed and designated beforehand, ready to move upon receipt of telegraphic orders, with the material and office equipment necessary to begin business, all prepared and packed for shipment by express to any point. However, all sorts of material soon began to arrive and loaded cars whose contents were unknown filled all available side tracks. Trucks of various makes were hurriedly sent to Columbus in every conceivable state of unreadiness, with no adequate equipment for assembling them, and no organization for their management. Escort wagon bodies, in lieu of properly constructed truck bodies, were shipped from one point to be used on truck chassis from other points. There was no provision for needed repairs, and there was none for the installation of shops to meet the emergency. The hasty detail of officers, most of whom were entirely unfamiliar with such work, had to be made to handle the perplexing problems presented. Notwithstanding all this confusion and congestion, it was not long before supplies were moving to the front and, in the end, of course, these difficulties were overcome, but under other and more pressing circumstances, it might not have been possible.

6. Motor Trucks:- The truck trains during the progress of the campaign have been put to the most severe tests. Some of them operated at a distance of four hundred (400) miles from Columbus, having reached Satevo southwest of the City of Chihuahua. The deplorable character of the Mexican roads that run at random over the dry alkaline flats and sandy plains of the desert, or wind their way over the roughest mountain passes, materially increased the difficulties of truck trains. Contemplation of the

supply of an army under such adverse conditions might dishearten the most courageous, hence actual accomplishments under the circumstances is all the more creditable to the officers concerned. The successful handling of supplies by truck trains for an expedition operating over a long line of communication has been steadily and gradually developed to a degree never before attained in our service. The greatest praise is due the officers charged with these tasks, and the results again prove the well known resourcefulness of officers of the regular army. No doubt these experiences will be made the basis of energetic efforts in anticipation of possibly greater emergencies.

7. Rations:- Lack of transportation facilities during the early days of the campaign necessarily limited the supply of rations to the barest necessities. The continual change in the situation and the number of troops at different points along the line of communications made it difficult to anticipate necessities. There was as often too much as too little. Troops stationed along the line of communications were fairly well supplied, but troops operating at the extreme front for the first month literally lived off the country. When the advance columns left Dublin they had only what remained of the five days' rations carried by pack trains with which they started from Culberson's Ranch. Fortunately plenty of cattle were to be found in the country and a limited amount of corn and Mexican beans could usually be procured. Colonel Brown's squadron of the 10th Cavalry received no rations from the time it left Dublin on March 19th until rations were sent south by pack train to Santa Cruz near Parral about the middle of April. While supplying the current needs of the command in general, it was also imperative to provide against extraordinary field service as well as against the probability of impassable roads during the rainy season. In addition to providing regular rations, one hundred thousand rations were accumulated at convenient points and held for emergency. Later a greater variety was furnished, while at present the most liberal supply is being provided.

8. Forage:- Northern Chihuahua is essentially a grazing country yet, at the time of year during which the campaign was at its height, the grass was extremely dry and without substance, as there had been no rain since the preceding July. Certain sections of the theater of operations were absolutely barren and devoid of any forage whatever. An uncertain quantity of corn has been obtainable in some sections, and oats have been sent forward as far as transportation facilities warranted. Through private arrangement with the Mexican Northwestern Railroad, oats and hay are now received in abundance by rail from El Paso through Juarez.

9. Other Supplies:- In general, other supplies have also necessarily been restricted to the barest needs, and shipment from the Base has been authorized for only material that has been actually required to keep the Command in readiness for field service. Few replenishments have been possible during the period covered by this report, and troops have been

compelled to make repairs themselves as far as possible. It has been impracticable to provide the widely separated columns according to regulations laid down for supply in garrison, and, in cases where delay was probable on this account, simpler methods have prevailed. In order to avoid the necessity of formal requisitions, a plan that would meet the requirements was covered by instructions published to the command as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U. S. ARMY,  
In the Field, Namiquipa, Mexico, April 20, '16.

General Orders )  
                  )  
No. 25.         )

1. The following instructions are published for the information and guidance of all concerned:   x       x       x       x       x

2. When clothing is needed, organization commanders should submit simple lists of kinds and sizes to the station or organization Supply Officer, who will abstract the lists received. The supply Officer will then request the clothing required from the Depot that regularly supplies his station or organization. Upon its receipt he will issue the clothing to organization commanders. Commanders of organizations will certify to the original lists that the clothing has been issued and charged or will be charged as required by Regulations, and return the lists to the Supply Officer, who will return them so certified, to the Depot. Station Supply Officers will be held to a strict compliance with these instructions.

                  x                   x                   x                   x                   x

4. Each Depot Quartermaster will tabulate the detailed information (regarding strength in men, animals and supplies on hand) received from the commands supplied by him and keep this statement up to date at all times, so that a change in personnel will not interrupt the regular flow of supplies, and in order that constant and rapid changes of station of troops may not cause either lack, or congestion of supplies at remote points.

5. Until further directed, San Antonio is assigned as an Advance Depot from the Depot at Namiquipa. Dublin and Namiquipa are designated as Depots on the line of communications to be supplied from the Base at Columbus.

                  x                   x                   x                   x                   x

By command of Brigadier General Pershing:

DeR. C. Cabell,  
Lieut. Colonel, 10th Cavalry,  
Chief of Staff.

10. Accountability:- Considerable difficulty has arisen in accounting for certain Quartermaster property which, according to Regulations, is carried on memorandum receipt from post quartermaster, a system not feasible as applied to troops ordered on extended field service. Several quartermasters of ability and experience agree that the following suggestions by Captain Leon B. Kromer, Acting Chief Quartermaster of the Expedition, would meet this problem:

"1. Quartermaster property necessary for equipment of troops should be divided into two classes, viz:

(a) Required for field service.

(b) Additions to (a) required for garrison service,

At present both (a) and (b) are held on the property account of the post quartermasters when troops are in garrison. When the command is ordered into the field transfer of (a) has been made by the post quartermasters to the regimental supply officer, and this can not be done properly when troops leave in a hurry.

2. It is recommended that property under the heading (a) be held at all times on the property account of the regimental supply officer, and that Army Regulations be amended accordingly. This will permit the captain of the Supply Company of the regiment to be responsible, for example, for the wagons and mules pertaining to the regiment as well as the teamsters, who are now by law enlisted men of the regiment and under his command. Property of this class in the hands of organizations will in this case be held on memo receipt given to the regimental supply officer."

11. Recommendations:- Attention is invited to the excellent report of Major John F. Madden, Chief Quartermaster of the Expedition, and to the following recommendations contained therein which are unhesitatingly approved:

"1. That truck and wagon companies be organized, trained and maintained in peace for use in time of need; that this training be administered to selected officers and enlisted men, at a school of schools of Transportation, and that sufficient trained units be maintained to furnish all tactical units, each with its prescribed quota.

2. That the practice of giving increased pay to certain enlisted artisans of the Quartermaster Corps by issuing warrants to such men be discontinued; that in occupations which carry with them a normal wage over that of laborers on account of increased intelligence demanded, enlisted men rated in these occupations be given increased compensation but remain in the grade of "private, first class."

x x x x x

4. That a system of unit accountability be devised, so accounting for individual items of stores of all kinds shall

cease at the last Depot; that the system of issue of clothing be changed so all shall be issued on memorandum receipt and the "clothing allowance" be done away with."

Medical Department.

12. Beside the regimental contingents that accompanied their organizations into Mexico, there were two Field Hospitals and two Ambulance Companies with approximately their full complement of officers and men. One field hospital and one ambulance company have been located at the camp at Colonia Dublan, and one of each has been at various places with the changing sub-base farther to the front. A Cantonment Hospital was established at Columbus after the organization started and all cases that could not be handled by the Field Hospitals have been sent there for treatment. This Cantonment Hospital has also performed the functions of a Supply Depot for the Field Hospitals with troops. In turn, severe cases, especially those for which an operation is indicated, are transferred to the Base Hospital at Fort Bliss, Texas, for treatment.

During the early days of the campaign, it was often impossible to provide the rapidly moving columns with all the medical supplies generally thought necessary, but constant activity on part of the troops, coupled with the natural healthfulness of the climate at this season of the year, kept the number of sick at a minimum.

There have been but few venereal cases, some fever and some intestinal trouble. Only since the rainy season began, finding troops stationary in the various camps along the occupied line, has there been any sickness worth mentioning. Diarrhoea and dysentery became prevalent at a few stations about the end of the period covered by this report, no doubt due to water pollution, and it was necessary to drive a sufficient number of wells to provide pure water. After this was done, intestinal troubles cleared up, and the percentage of sick was reduced to its usual low rate.

13. The number of sick in the command, present and absent, has been about three per cent, although often much below that figure. Colonel George E. Bratton, Medical Department, writing in the absence of any Medical Officer familiar with the medical history of the Command up to June 30th, says of the water in Mexico:

" One would be safe in saying that all surface water, and shallow well water in Mexico is dangerous, for the Mexican peon is most careless as to the disposition of his excreta."

" All organizations brought their Lyster bags with them, and where these bags and the chlorination of the water was used very little sickness of intestinal type occurred. Unfortunately the chlorinated water is very objectionable to many persons, and after a few weeks use it was hard to keep the men on this water. Many of the men drank water from the streams and irrigation ditches and this infected water was undoubtedly the cause and starting point of later cases of diarrhoea and dysentery."

Medical officers as a rule have been very strict in their inspections and criticisms, and the camps all along the line are in excellent sanitary condition. Line officers, and men as well, have come to realize fully the importance of enforcing modern sanitary rules as a means of maintaining their organizations at the highest state of efficiency.

Although the detachments of the Medical Department, serving with regiments, have been short of the personnel prescribed for war service, there has been no lack of medical attention and the efficiency of the officers and men of this Department serving with this Command has been marked.

#### Corps of Engineers.

14. The Engineer troops assigned to the Expedition, consisting of Companies E and H, 2nd Battalion, under Major Lytle Brown, Corps of Engineers, reached Columbus, New Mexico, from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, March 14th. The early duties that fell to the engineers were a small amount of pioneer work with a maximum amount of work on roads. This road work made it obligatory to distribute detachments at convenient places both for actual labor and to supervise the work of troops and of native employees. It early became evident that to meet the demand of the heavy traction of truck trains considerable rebuilding would be necessary. The approaching rainy season was also given consideration, all information pointing to heavy and probably impassable roads during that period. While the roads all along the line of communication were kept in repair, work was begun at putting metal on several sections, especially the flats of the river bottom, in anticipation of early rains. At the same time it was deemed advisable to survey routes around the worst parts, locating these new stretches on higher ground that would be easily drained and therefore less difficult to maintain during the height of the wet season.

When it became clear that the Expedition would require the use of a good road indefinitely, the requisite funds were provided, road machinery and bridge material were purchased, native teams and labor secured and construction work was begun in earnest over the new route selected. This work has been carried on and, at the same time the

main road has been maintained in serviceable condition. Wooden bridges have been constructed at the important crossings of both the Casas Grandes River at Vado Fusiles and the Santa Maria River at El Valle, and culverts and causeways put in where necessary.

15. The difficulties of the situation at the beginning can hardly be imagined. The wheels of heavily loaded trucks sank deep into the friable alkali soil and cut great furrows that filled to the level with dust ground as fine as powder. New tracks were laid out only to have the operation repeated, requiring these ruts to be filled with gravel whenever possible as the only resource left. The rainy season brought about the opposite condition, and truck trains were often delayed by torrential rains, stuck to the hubs for days and compelled to remain so until the roads dried sufficiently for them to proceed. It soon became necessary to abandon the old road, but the rains had improved the sand stretches of the new sections, making them in turn passable during the wet season. Thus the question of utilizing available truck and wagon transportation at any season, has been solved. All that is needed from now on is maintenance and this can be reduced to a nominal expenditure.

The personnel of the Engineer battalion entered Mexico with no knowledge of road construction of this nature, as nothing exactly like it had ever come under the experience of any of its officers. Moreover, during the early part of the campaign, the official personnel included several very young officers without practical field experience of any sort. Thus the battalion commander was seriously handicapped in securing the progress that should have been his right to expect from his organization. This condition improved with time, and in the end a commendable state of efficiency has been reached throughout the battalion.

16. The actual expenditures on road work up to August 31, 1916, are shown below:

Direct Expenditures:

Disbursed by Quartermaster for labor . . . . .	\$ 99,000.00
Disbursed by Engineer Department . . . . .	34,000.00
Machinery and spare parts . . . . .	80,000.00
Lumber . . . . .	14,000.00
Culvert material . . . . .	<u>5,800.00</u>

Total cash expenditure . . . \$232,800.00

Cost of truck maintenance, depreciation and upkeep of trucks engaged on road work for three months, estimated. . . . .	<u>97,200.00</u>
--	------------------

For'd . . . . . \$330,000.00

Brought forward . . . \$330,000.00

Supplies furnished by Quartermaster, gasoline, oil, tentage, and the use of wagons and mules and their forage, estimated . . . . . 50,000.00

Total . . . . . \$380,000.00

Work Done:

Road built . . . . . 157 miles.  
Road repaired. . . . . 224 miles.

The proportionate cost of repairing and building is about as one to three. On this basis the roads built have cost \$1635 per mile and repairs have cost \$545 per mile. This estimate takes no account of the soldier labor used. That is estimated as valued as \$240,000.00, which would bring the total cost up to \$827 per mile for roads repaired and \$2481 for roads built.

17. Topographical work has not covered as much territory nor has it been as efficiently done as might have been expected, but the urgent demand of road work has made it imperative to employ the Engineers mainly on that duty. A mapping department has been in existence since the Expedition began, and the maps produced of the country actually traversed are excellent considering the time devoted to that class of work. A list of these maps is appended to Major Brown's report, and copies are forwarded herewith.

Attention is invited to the following from Major Brown's report:

18. The necessary staff organization for engineer operations along the line of communications was entirely lacking. This made it necessary to place pioneer troops on the line of communications, out of their proper place, and impose upon their officers, staff duty to such an extent as to prevent them giving proper attention to their troop duties. While such arrangements were probably unavoidable considering the nature of the Expedition, its hurried organization and its extraordinary mission, it should not occur in any future movement as extensive as this has been."

There were no engineer funds available for the conduct of engineer operations along the line of communications; while the cooperation of the Quartermaster Corps produced the necessary funds, such arrangement is highly unsatisfactory as may be seen without mention of reasons."

Upon completion of the new organizations recently provided by law for Engineer troops, there should be no lack of field equipment and funds to meet the exigencies of active service anywhere.

Ordnance Department.

19. It was some time after the troops entered Mexico before an Ordnance Officer was sent to the Base to take charge of the supply. A continuous flow of ordnance from the Base to the troops, hundreds of miles to the front, seems not to have been anticipated and provided for. At an early date the wear and tear upon ordnance of all sorts became noticeable, as was to have been expected under such conditions as were encountered by the Expedition. There was inadequate provision for quick replacement of ordnance and none for its repair. Adherence to regulations applicable to garrison service made it difficult for troops to procure supplies needed or to keep those on hand in serviceable condition. To meet the difficulty, orders were issued that ordnance should be shipped to the front as needed, using slips of paper as requisitions, if necessary, instead of following the impracticable method that prolonged peace imposes upon us.

A decided revision of ordnance regulations along practical lines is needed if efficiency in providing equipment for troops in active service is expected. In their efforts to maintain unit accountability of equipment in accordance with regulations, officers have been put to great inconvenience. They have been held responsible for ordnance they could neither keep on hand in the field nor transfer to any other responsible party, and have been unable under the regulations to obtain equipment for any excess in the present peace strength of their commands. In order to get much needed ordnance equipment in the hands of the troops promptly when fleeting opportunity existed and without the formalities of deliberate requisitions on the Base or other Ordnance Officer, a short-cut had to be taken, and the orders issued met the situation for the time being.

It is recommended that the Regulations regarding unit accountability be revised and that a rational system of supplying ordnance in the field, based on business methods, be adopted. The following order served its purpose for the time being:

"HEADQUARTERS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U.S. ARMY,  
In the Field, Namiquipa, Mexico, Apr. 20, '16.

General Orders )  
                  :  
No. 25            )

x                   x                   x                   x                   x                   x

II. The following information and instructions will govern in obtaining ordnance stores for this command:

- (a) The Ordnance Depot is located at the Base.
- (b) Ordnance officers have been designated at Dublan and Namiquipa. These officers will act as the agents of the Ordnance Officer at Base, and make no return for ordnance stores.

Stations north of Dublin will be supplied from the Base at Columbus, direct; stations north of Namiquipa from Dublin, Namiquipa and stations south, from Namiquipa, until further orders.

(c) Organization commanders requiring ordnance stores will submit to proper supply points, simple lists of number and kind of articles desired.

(d) The Ordnance Officer at the Base will furnish his agents, on memorandum receipt, such supplies as he may request, from time to time.

(e) Ordnance agents will issue the supplies called for on lists, taking a simple receipt therefor. They will also be furnished by organization commanders with certificates of loss, destruction or damage, setting forth the facts in the case, when practicable, approved by the Commanding Officer, or verified by a disinterested officer.

(f) The Ordnance agent will return to the Ordnance Officer at the Base, all receipts and certificates received by him for credit on his memorandum receipt and for use as vouchers to the accountable officer at the Base.

x x x x

By command of Brigadier General Pershing:

De R. C. Cabel,  
Lieut-Colonel, 10th Cavalry,  
Chief of Staff.

Signal Corps.

21. The Signal detachments for this Expedition had to be assembled from several different field stations along the border, so that organization was lacking and equipment was deficient. There was no field wire on hand and number 14 galvanized iron wire had to be substituted in laying the first ground telegraph lines. This wire was unsuited for such conditions, as it would not lie flat on the ground and was therefore easily disturbed and broken by animals and wheeled vehicles passing up and down the line. A supply of field wire was at last obtained, and, being carefully laid at considerable distance from the road, the above difficulties were eliminated. Some trouble was experienced at first in maintaining the line intact on account of interference by natives and very drastic measures had to be taken before the practice could be stopped.

Eventually the line was extended from Columbus connecting up all stations as far as San Antonio, Mexico, with a branch from there to Ojos Azules which was used as long as that point was occupied. The total distance over which this ground wire worked is 325 miles, which exceeds anything previously known in our service in the use of such a wire.

On account of the heavy rainfall during the summer months, and the unreliability of the ground wire during the wet weather, a permanent telegraph line on iron poles has been built from Columbus to Dublin. The number of words per day transmitted over the telegraph line wire at present reaches an average of 10,000. The radio sets often transmit as high as 2,000 words. The pack sets provided to accompany moving columns are of little value for use by Cavalry. In lieu of these small pack sets, there should be a larger type capable of reaching from 50 to 75 miles that could be carried on packs and accompany the Cavalry.

The atmospheric conditions in the high altitudes of the mountainous districts through which wireless communication is maintained are very difficult and uncertain, but our wagon sets, although often out of repair, have kept up communication with the Base almost constantly. The radio sets were able to work very efficiently from San Antonio, Mexico, to Columbus direct, a distance of 303 miles. The main difficulty experienced with these radio sets has been the impossibility of obtaining spare parts as much of the machinery is of foreign manufacture. The fact that spare parts are unobtainable in our country is pointed out as a very serious defect. As wireless communication is indispensable in operations under modern war conditions, the shortage of wireless machines should also be given consideration.

The work of the Signal Corps has required a high state of efficiency among its personnel, and with very few exceptions among some of the enlisted force, they have maintained a high standard and performed their duties faithfully and well.

#### Aeroplane Service.

Aeroplanes were used by this Expedition in active service for the first time in the history of our army. Eight aeroplanes only were available and they were old, having been in use beyond the ordinary period of serviceability. Their carrying capacity was small and their ability to combat adverse conditions was very limited. The organization of the squadron was very imperfect and incomplete, the equipment for repairs was deficient and there were few supplies on hand for replacement. Conditions in Mexico are different from any which our aviators had hitherto experienced. The great altitudes with treacherous air currents, and the prevailing high winds and dust storms, and an occasional snow storm made the work of the aviators hazardous indeed. Missions were not always accomplished, yet this was due to the inferior class of machine and equipment, and not from lack of willingness. Many important reconnaissances have been made, and communication has often been maintained with distant columns, when no other means existed. The original eight machines have all been wrecked or become unserviceable through use.

Under the difficulties of aviation experienced, the service rendered must be considered as most exceptional. The personnel has displayed the most commendable spirit, and personal efficiency is of the highest order. Officers have literally taken their lives in their hands without hesitation, although several aviators have had narrow escapes. Unstinted praise for the aviators who have served with this Expedition is universal throughout the Command. Attention is invited to the report of Major Foulois to be found among the appendices, the last paragraph of which is quoted as being especially pertinent:

"The experience gained by the commissioned and enlisted personnel of this command while on active duty with the Punitive Expedition, has been of the greatest valor, and it is believed that the knowledge gained by all concerned should result in more rapid and efficient development of the aviation service in the United States Army."

#### CONCLUSION

The splendid services that the regular troops comprising this Expedition have performed under most adverse conditions again proves that for natural ability, physical endurance, unflinching persistence, general efficiency, and unquestioned loyalty and devotion to duty the well trained officers and men of the regular army are unexcelled by the troops of any other nation.

Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

RECEIVED  
MAY 10 1918  
HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. ARMY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

LIST OF APPENDICES

Staff Reports

- A. Chief of Staff.
- B. Adjutant General.
- C. Quartermaster.
- D. Medical Department.
- E. Chief Engineer.
- F. Ordnance Officer.
- G. Signal Officer.
- H. Aviation Squadron.

Miscellaneous

- I. Stations of Troops, June 30, 1916.
- J. Engagements to June 30, 1916.
- K. Arms and ammunition captured.
- L. Villista Leaders, Columbus Raid, killed or captured.
- M. Casualties among Columbus raiders.
- N. Villa's Itinerary to June 30, 1916.

Maps

- 1. Routes followed in pursuit of Villa.
- 2. Guerrero
- 3. Parral
- 4. Tomochio
- 5. Ojos Azules
- 6. Carrizal

1. Compilation of road notes, all sources,
2. Guerrero and vicinity,
3. Yogavio,
4. Tomochic,
5. Columbus to Palomas,
6. Palomas to Boca Grande,
7. Ascencion to Corralitos,
8. Gibson's Ranch to Boca Grande,
9. Corralitos to Colonia Dublan,
10. Espia to Ascencion,
11. Chocolate Pass to camp near Galeana,
12. Proposed, from Boca Grande to Columbus,
13. Namiquipa to San Geronimo,
14. Cruces to Santa Cruz de Villagas,
15. Vicinity Lake Itascate,
16. Colonia Juarez and vicinity,
17. Columbus to Gibson's Ranch,
18. Boca to Espia,
19. Culberson's Ranch to Casas Grande,
20. East of camp at Namiquipa,
21. North of camp at Namiquipa,
22. El Valle and vicinity,
23. West of Namiquipa,
24. El Valle to Gallego,
25. Engineer camp at Canyon to El Valle,
- 26., Dublan to Corralitos Station,
27. Headquarters camp at Namiquipa,
28. Big Bend and vicinity,
29. Dublan and vicinity,
30. Angostura and vicinity, to Carmen,
31. Northwest to Namiquipa,
32. Between Colonia Dublan and El Valle,
33. Vicinity to San Joaquin,
34. Colonia Dublan to Galeana,
35. Galeana to El Valle,
36. El Valle to Cruces,
37. Cruces and vicinity,
38. Namiquipa and vicinity,
39. Section, San Geronimo, Bachiniva and San Pedro,
40. Section, Bachiniva, Rubio, Namipavechi,
41. From Vuelta de Almos to Dublan,
42. Section Colonia Diaz - La Bajada - Ojo Federico,
43. Compliation Columbus to Parral, roads examined by our forces,
44. Bay of Chihuahua, with data added Columbus to Parral,
45. Elaboration of War College Map,
46. Elaboration of S. D. 5 mile to inch map.

(APPENDIX A)

PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U.S. ARMY  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF.

Colonia Dublan, Mexico, October 5, 1916.

From: Chief of Staff.  
To: Commanding General.  
Subject: Report.

1. ARRIVAL AT COLUMBUS:

On March 12th, I received a telegram from General Pershing appointing me Chief of Staff of the Punitive Expedition, and directing me to proceed to Columbus, N. M. and establish the Headquarters. I arrived at Columbus at 4:00 A.M., 13th, secured rooms for officers in an unfurnished Cantonment officer's quarters and prepared them for use.

The Commanding General arrived 10:00 P. M. the same day.

The troops at Columbus consisted of the 13th Cavalry, Battery C, 6th F.A.; 6th and 16th Infantry; 1st Batn. 4th F.A.; Companies "E" and "H" 2nd Batn. Engineers; Ambulance Co. No. 7; Field Hospital No. 7; and Wagon Companies 1 and 2. Other troops were enroute. The 7th and 10th Cavalry and Bart. "B" 6th F.A. were approaching Culberson's Ranch by marching.

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE EXPEDITION:

Early on the 14th, of March, General Orders No. 1 was published organizing the Punitive Expedition, U.S. Army, into a Provisional Division, and appointing the Staff:

The Division consisted of:

- (a) The 1st Provisional Cavalry Brigade:
  - 11th and 13th Cavalry (less 1 troop);
  - Battery "C", 6th F.A., attached.
- (b) The 2nd, Cavalry Brigade:
  - 7th and 10th, Cavalry;
  - Battery "B", 6th F.A. attached.
- (c) The 1st. Provisional Infantry Brigade:
  - 1st Batn. 4th F.A. (attached)
  - Cos. "E" and "H", 2nd Batn. Engineers (attached)
- (d) Ambulance Co. No. 7; Field Hospital No. 7.

- (e) Signal Corps Detachments;  
1st Aero Squadron; Detachments Signal Corps.
- (f) Wagon Companies 1 and 2.

All these troops were at Columbus, except the 11th Cavalry, enroute by rail from Fort Oglethorpe, Ga. and those composing the 1st. Provisional Cavalry Brigade, which were marching from Douglas east along the border to Culberson's Ranch, where all arrived on the 15th.

In addition to the organization of the Division, General Order No. 1 clearly stated the purpose of the Expedition to be the capture of Villa and his bandits, and emphasized its peaceful attitude toward all other mexicans, a policy strictly adhered to during the entire time it has been in Mexico.

### 3. PREPARATIONS FOR THE MARCH:

March 14th, was spent in preparing the troops at Columbus for the march. The troops of the 1st Provisional Cavalry Brigade had not arrived at Culberson's Ranch.

General Order No. 2 was published, limiting the baggage carried on Field Trains to Equipment "A" and directing at least 4 days field ration No. 1 and two days' forage to be carried, in addition to the two days' reserve ration on the person.

### 4. THE START:

March 15th, Field Order No. 1 was issued and in compliance with it a detachment of the Expedition under the Commanding General crossed the line into Mexico at 12:00 noon, and camped at Palomas, 5 miles south of the border.

The Commanding General then left for Culberson's Ranch to take personal charge of the Cavalry column there, leaving me in charge of the march of the troops at Palomas and Columbus to Ascencion.

A carefully written program for this March, giving the proposed camps of the different units of the Command was given me by the General and this program was followed to the letter.

### 5. THE MARCH TO DUELAN:

March 16th, the 13th Cavalry, with Wagon Cos. 1 and 2, left Palomas with orders to camp at Boca Grande; then in succession at Es Pia and Ascencion.

March 17th Field Order No. 2 sent the 16th Infantry from Palomas, and one squadron 11th Cavalry, and Hq. and Co. H, 2nd Batn. Engineers, and 5 trucks from Columbus to Boca Grande; the 1st Batn. 4th F.A., Ambulance Co. No. 7 with one troop 11th Cavalry to Gibson's Ranch. A pack wireless set (which never worked) was sent with each column.

March 18th, the remainder of the troops at Columbus marched to Boca Grande, all troops that had arrived there the day before going on to Espia, and the next day to Ascencion.

The early morning of the 18th, I received a letter by mounted messenger from General Pershing saying he had reached Dublan with the 1st Provisional Cavalry Brigade, and that all troops should be moved promptly there.

From Boca Grande that night I sent Lieutenants Collins and Shallenberger, Aides, in autos with Taylor Brothers on to Dublan and ordering troops south to Boca Grande to continue their march to Dublan. Daily thereafter I went in an auto from the camp to the rear troops to the camp ahead of the leading troops and returned to the next camp of the rear troops, looking up roads and camping places and doing anything necessary to insure the continuous rapid march of the troops.

March 21st I left Ascencion and joined the Commanding General at Dublan.

The 115 miles from Columbus to Dublan was made by the Cavalry in 5 days, by the Infantry and Artillery in 6 days.

6. OTHER ORDERS, AND THEIR PURPORT WERE AS FOLLOWS:

- G.O. No. 4, March 17th, Establishing the censorship.  
G.O. No. 6, March 22nd, Handling the mail and appointing a censor.  
G.O. No. 9, March 25th, Regulations for Camp Guards, Out Posts, and Guards for Wagon and Truck Trains. The guard for each such train was fixed at 50 rifles, at which it has remained. That this has proven adequate is evidenced by the fact that there has been no real attack on a train so guarded, nor has a single man been killed or wounded on a train.  
G.O. No. 13, March 30th, Gave directions for leading while on the march and grazing and watering.  
G.O. No. 14, March 31st, Forbade unnecessary marching of troops through towns or halting therein.  
G.O. No. 19, April 5th, Gave disposition of the sick. Those south of Dublan were to be sent to field Hospital there and transportation of all sick on truck trains authorized.  
G.O. No. 20, April 5th, Established the ration as the reserve ration, supplemented by local purchases or from Depots and not to exceed the garrison ration.  
G.O. No. 21, Instructions for training recruits.  
G.O. No. 23, April 6th, Instructions for care, pasturing and disposition of worn out animals.  
G.O. No. 24, April 19th, Divided the Line of Communication (then 300 miles long) into four sections and designates Commanders for each section.  
G.O. No. 28, April 29th, Organized the occupied territory into five districts for the purpose of hunting down isolated bands of bandits into which Villa's force had been dispersed.  
G.O. No. 31, April 30th, Re-organizes the Division (made necessary by the arrival of other troops.)

G.O. No. 42, June 17th, Prescribes drills and training for all troops, with particular reference to battle efficiency.

#### 7. DUTIES PERFORMED.

Owing to the exigencies of this particular campaign the Commanding General has found it necessary to be separated from his headquarters a large part of the time.

In March and April during the active pursuit of Villa and his bands he was at the front in personal charge of the operations directing the movements of the many columns.

During this period I was not with him, but was left in general charge of that part of the Expedition not actively engaged in the pursuit. He always left me general directions as to his wishes and when possible sent me from time to time further instructions.

These instructions I was careful to carry out to the letter. On one occasion, being out of touch with him for several days, owing to the failure of the wireless to operate, I was thrown on my own resources and compelled to take action without obtaining his orders. The dates of this separation from him were as follows:

1. March 15th to 21st.

When I was, under his explicit orders, in charge of the march from Columbus to Dublan.

2. March 24th to 29th.

When I had charge of the troops at Dublan and north and of forwarding supplies south.

3. April 1st to 9th, and 11th to 16th.

Same as above and at Namiquipa.

4. April 19th to 23rd.

Auto trip to near Parral to deliver orders to troops there. On this trip I was given 5 Dodge cars with 18 men and sent from Namiquipa to Santa Cruz, 18 miles north of Parral, with orders to inquire into the situation there and give directions as to the return of the troops north.

On arrival at Santa Cruz I found four Squadrons, one each of the 10th and 13th Cavalry and two of the 11th Cavalry, all under general charge of Colonel W.C. Brown, 10th Cavalry. They were generally on very reduced rations and were able to procure about eight pounds of corn per animal, with no hay and no grazing. They had been there the eight days since the Parral fight and Col. Brown stated that he intended to withdraw to a point on a small railroad 50 miles north-east.

Since the Carrancistas were at this time not permitting the use of any railroads and the proposed locality was devoid of supplies and notwithstanding Col. Brown's assertion that probably half his horses could not make the return march to San Antonio, I, acting upon my instructions from the Commanding General, ordered them to at once march on San Antonio, 160 miles north. I then left them at 6:00 A.M. April 21st, and reached San Antonio at midnight. There, fortunately, was a truck train; which was loaded with grain and rations, and started at daylight for Satevo, 80 miles south. This train met the troops at Satevo with needed supplies and these troops reached

San Antonio with loss of few animals. I made in autos, 400 miles in three days.

5. From April 24th to May 30th, I was with Commanding General and headquarters performing the ordinary duties of my office.

5. From May 30th to June 25th, O was the only Staff Officer (except one Aide) with the Commanding General on his trip north to Columbus and during his stay at Dublan. Although he was in telegraphic communication with all parts of his Command, the situation, particularly as to supply was changing so frequently that it became necessary to take over much of the work of the rest of the Staff and especially of that of the Division Quartermaster. The headquarters joined the Commanding General at Dublan June 25th.

#### 8. THE THREATENED ATTACK FROM SONORA:

On April 12th, while the Commanding General was far south and out of touch with me and I was at Namiquipa, came a report that 8000 Mexican troops in Sonora were moving east through Pulpit Pass with apparent intention of attacking the Line of Communications.

With Captain Burt, Assistant Chief of Staff, I started in auto to Dublan.

At El Valle that night, I directed Col. Wilder, 5th Cavalry at Mormon Lakes to send one Squadron west to intercept these Mexicans and find out their intentions, but to avoid a rupture if possible.

The next day I reached Mormon Lake and Dublan, where I found that owing to a misconception of Southern Department orders, send direct to Dublan three officers, Col. Wilder, Col. Sands, and Col. Lockett each assumed that he was in charge of the defense of the Line against the supposed force coming from Sonora; also that the Southern Department being unable to locate the Commanding General or even myself had placed the northern end of the Line under command of Major Sample, Base Commander, had ordered suspension of all truck and wagon train traffic and had sent 10 or more trucks to each station north of Dublan with orders to ~~abandon~~ the station on approach of the Sonora force.

I wired Department Headquarters that I would take charge of the situation in General Pershing's name.

This was approved by Department Headquarters. I then sent out other cavalry troops west to reconnoiter, and an aeroplane from Columbus toward Pulpit Pass, directed the troops at each station to dig in, hold on and report approach of Mexicans, assuring them of prompt support.

Within two days it developed that no Mexicans were coming from Sonora and the ordinary routine was resumed. During this time I was sending two telegrams daily to General Pershing through El Paso and Chihuahua, reporting the situation. None of these were received by him.

#### 9. THE ORDER TO WITHDRAW AND ITS REVOCATION.

May 9th, at San Antonio the Commanding General received an order to at once withdraw all troops at least as far north as Namiquipa, and to start at once.

At this time troops were moving into the five districts referred to above and were continually occupying many stations, along a line of more than 300 miles from Columbus and many of them far off the main route.

Their supply was difficult and every truck and wagon was engaged in it.

After receiving his orders of the Commanding General, the order involving the movement of some forty different units at many different localities was gotten out in two hours and the backward movement of all started that afternoon. The movement included the evacuation of Advance Depot at San Antonio and a large part of that at Naniquipa.

By the night of the 11th, this movement was well under way, all trains loaded and moving north. The rear troops at Lake Itascate, 33 miles north of San Antonio and 61 miles north of Carretas, the southernmost station occupied.

At 9:00 P.M., May 11th, an order was received from Department Headquarters to suspend the movement. This necessitated a complete reversal of all plans, including the return of supplies south. The troops were easily stopped where they found themselves; but the reversal of the trains taking supplies north was a serious matter.

Owing to the long distances, the rough roads, the amount of gasoline used by truck trains and the fact that a truck must return to the shop for repairs at frequent intervals, this movement north, its stopping, and its reversal of truck trains resulted in an average loss equivalent to two weeks use of all truck trains. The final result being the necessary reduction of the ration to the reserve ration for a considerable period.

DeR. C. Cabell,  
Colonel, 10th Cavalry,  
Chief of Staff.

(APPENDIX B)

HEADQUARTERS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U.S. ARMY,  
Colonia Dublan, Mexico, October 5, 1916.

**From:** The Adjutant.  
**To:** Commanding General, Punitive Expedition.  
**Subject:** Report of Adjutant, Punitive Expedition.

1. In compliance with your verbal order I left El Paso, with you, on March 13th, 1916, and proceeded same day to Columbus, New Mexico, as Adjutant of the Expedition into Mexico - later known as Punitive Expedition.

2. This office was located as follows: Columbus, March 13 - 15, Palomas, Mexico, March 15 - 18, Boca Grande, Mexico, March 18 - 19, Espia, Mexico, March 19 - 20, Ascension, Mexico, March 20 - 21, Ojo Federico, Mexico, March 21 - 22, Colonia Dublan, Mexico, March 22 - to April 8, Namiquipa, Mexico, April 8 - to June 21, El Valle, Mexico, June 21 - 23, Colonia Dublan, Mexico, June 23 - 30.

3. During the period March 13 to June 30, 1916, I performed the duties of Adjutant, censor, and in charge of newspaper correspondents, and during a portion of this period the duties of Judge Advocate.

1st Lieutenant M. C. Shallenberger, 16th Infantry, A.D.C., has been my assistant since April 26th, 1916.

4. The clerical force of this office comprised four enlisted men and one civilian stenographer and on April 20th another civilian stenographer was employed.

5. The duties of Chief Clerk were performed during the whole of this period by Bn. Sergeant-Major M. J. O'Brien, 6th Infantry. Sergeant-Major O'Brien has been most faithful and efficient in the performance of his duties and I desire to commend him to you and recommend his advancement, in any way that may be possible, on account of his loyalty and efficiency.

6. On account of the great dispersion of the command the correspondence has been very voluminous.

In addition to the correspondence this office has prepared the orders for the command, the war diaries for the headquarters and collected and classified those for the different units; kept march tables under the direction of the Chief of Staff; and compiled strength reports.

The records of the Division Quartermaster were also kept by this office prior to April 15th.

7. On account of the distance between these headquarters and the units of the command, great difficulty was experienced, especially in the first days of the expedition, in communications with the different columns. This made it very difficult to forward and receive reports and to get accurate

information as to the strength of the various columns.

This was caused largely by the expedition's having mobilized at two points not in easy communication with each other, and by the two regiments of cavalry mobilizing at Culberson's Ranch having been divided into several independent columns at Colonia Dublan prior to the arrival at that point of Expedition Headquarters.

8. When orders for this expedition were received the only available clerks were those at the Headquarters, 8th Brigade. They consisted of three enlisted men and one civilian, the latter too feeble to accompany the expedition. Authority was granted to hire such clerks as were necessary but it was not feasible to procure them and had civilians without army experience been procured they would have been of little or no value, especially at the beginning of the expedition, when competent clerical assistance was most needed.

It was therefore necessary to draw the clerical force from among the enlisted men of the command.

It is becoming very difficult to procure competent enlisted clerks among the line organizations on account of the draft on these units by the Quartermaster Corps for clerks, where they receive increased pay and have better opportunities for advancement.

It is therefore recommended that sufficient trained personnel, either enlisted or civilian, be kept assembled and organized at some point, probably Department Headquarters, where they will be available for such an emergency.

Similarly the necessary material should also be assembled and kept packed ready for shipment.

J. L. HINES,  
Major, Adjutant General.

(APPENDIX C)

BASE OF COMMUNICATION, PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U.S. ARMY,

OFFICE OF DIVISION QUARTERMASTER.

Columbus, New Mexico, August 4, 1916.

From: The Quartermaster, Punitive Expedition, U.S. Army in Mexico.

To: The Commanding General, Punitive Expedition, U.S. Army in Mexico.

Subject: Operations of Quartermaster Corps with Expedition to July 31, 1916.

1. In accordance with your telegraphic order of the 31st ultimo, the following report of the work performed by the Quartermaster Corps with this Expedition is submitted.

\*\*\*\*\*

1. FORMATION OF DEPOTS.

1. I arrived at Columbus, New Mexico, accompanied by three civilian clerks, the evening of March 15th, 1916, to find the Expedition had started southward the previous day, that part assembled at Columbus being at Palomas, Mexico, some twelve miles south on the Columbus - Ascension road. The troops at Columbus comprised the battalion of the 20th Infantry designated for service at the Base, and the bands of the several regiments making up the Division. The troops, with the exception of the Band of the 13th Cavalry, were but lately arrived and unfamiliar with local conditions; time had not permitted the formation of any of the Base Depots of the machinery of operation of a Supply Column.

2. Kindred formations had not yet been created for the same lack of time. I proceeded to Palomas immediately on arrival at Columbus, and there received the orders of the Division Commander from the Chief of Staff, returning to Columbus the same evening. These orders were to remain at the Base until the Depot there and the Supply Column operating therefrom were in thorough working order; to send Captain Lawrence D. Cabell, Q.M. Corps, to Division Headquarters as Field Quartermaster and to set forward as rapidly as possible, rations, grain and other stores called for, to the Column which would push steadily to the south in accomplishment of the mission given it. Transportation with the Columbus Column, as limited to field and combat trains of units, with Wagon Companies #1 and #2, as

A Supply Train, also with command. All wagons had been loaded at Columbus to capacity, with rations and grain (about 6 days) and it was the expectation the Supply Column would have taken up its function before this supply was exhausted. It was particularly important that progress should not be hampered by lack of supply.

3. Here it may be well to state the summary of the situation given me at the time I received my detail to the Expedition, at Headquarters, Southern Department, on March 13th, 1916. One column was to operate southward from Hachita, New Mexico, another from Columbus, New Mexico; bases were to be established at both these points and a double Line of Communication established; the Bases were in turn to be based on the General Depot of the Quartermaster Corps at El Paso, the El Paso and Southwestern Railroad being used to set forward supplies to the railhead depots; the Supply Columns were to be composed of Auto Truck Companies and the Supply Train of Wagon Companies. I was to proceed to El Paso and there consult with the Depot Quartermaster, thence to Hachita, and with subordinate officers and personnel to be sent to me, to there establish one Base Depot, then to go to Columbus for a like purpose and when all was clocked out to a satisfactory degree, the Expedition would make its first march. On arrival at El Paso I received the order of the Division Commander to come to Columbus first, as quickly as possible, and on arrival at that point I found the Expedition started, the Base at Hachita ordered discontinued and the single Line of Communication with Columbus as the railhead, decided on. All troops allotted to the Expedition had not yet arrived, none of the personnel for the Quartermaster Corps operations ordered to report had joined save the two wagon companies.

4. The Auto Truck Companies had not yet been created, and naturally, time not permitting, no provisions for shelter of stores already ordered, enroute and arriving, had been made. The appointed task therefore was to receive, classify and care for all supplies for about 12,000 men and 8,000 animals, to create and organize Auto Truck Companies, shops for repair of motor and animal drawn vehicles, provide shelter for supplies of other departments pertaining to their depots of the Base Section of the Line of Communication, establish a Remount Depot and Veterinary Hospital, and at the same time begin the supply of the Column already one day's march from the Base and moving further away constantly.

5. Normally Columbus is a small place. There is a siding, loading chutes and limited corral space for the shipments of small amounts of cattle. There is a small town at this point of some five hundred inhabitants. This town had been devastated by the Villa raid early in March and had not yet recovered, so the facilities of the town, meager at best, had been practically wiped out at the time in mind. The station of the Border Patrol at this point was composed of some wooden and adobe shelters used as barracks and stables, and of these about one quarter had not been completed. All

completed cover was in use sheltering troops left at the Base, and the property of the units already departed across the Border. The bulk of the shelter required for the Base had to be fresh creations and devised with all possible speed.

6. The first task was the unloading of cars and classification of contents. On the evening of March 15th last, the one siding here was a solid jam of freight cars containing supplies hurried from several points to meet anticipated calls for rations, forage, equipage and other supplies, it being borne in mind this vicinity can be depended on for nothing. These cars arrived in advance of bills of lading and invoices, and in some cases prior to receipt of the railway bills, so contents were unknown. Gangs of laborers were obtained from El Paso and were set to work unloading contents of cars along the side track and roughly classifying same in suitable piles. Consolidation of check lists several times each day afforded the sole means of discovering what had arrived, and in consequence, what was available for issue. This rapid unloading of cars was necessary to keep tracks clear for arriving troop trains, which otherwise would have blocked the main line. At this time the railroad company began the construction of a spur to relieve the congestion of cars. This spur was completed March 20th. A second spur was begun March 25th and finished April 1st, the two spurs having a capacity of fifty eight cars.

7. The presence of these large labor gangs greatly added to the difficulty of the situation, as men arrived penniless, without clothing and blankets to protect them, and had to be fed, sheltered and equipped as a first operation. The same remark applies in a lesser degree to all classes of civilian employees arriving here. They all expected to have the facilities of a well equipped town at their disposal, or to be taken care of in every particular, without effort on their part. In the formative stage of the Base, the above characteristics of all arrivals greatly hampered progress. Eventually as camps and messes were established and storehouses built, thus decreasing the need for large gangs of men, the number of laborers sank to the present normal figure of eighty five, thus materially lightening the burden complained of.

8. Another burden, due to the presence of the large force of civilians, was the preservation of public order and the suppression of theft, the latter being easy of accomplishment on account of the amount of property piled in the open, easy of access in darkness and in such quantity that small pilferings were not immediately noticeable. It was found absolutely necessary to protect property and to preserve order, so employ forty seven watchmen, these being organized as a police force of three shifts of fifteen men each, with a Chief of Police (head watchman), roundsmen and police officers. These men were all sworn in as Deputy Sheriffs for their own protection, and as the usual vicious and lewd following of a camp became attracted here, more than justified their existence. This force of watchmen has been reduced in proportion with the laborers, the present number being twenty-eight.

9. It became apparent in the early stages of organization of the Base Depot, the construction of storehouses, shops, offices, corrals, and bridges would have to be taken up without delay. This work progressed until at present there are 67025 square feet for the storage of property, 10266 square feet devoted to office use, 22405 square feet for shops of all kinds, 7512 square feet set aside for hospital use, four storage tanks for gasoline of 10000 gallons with power driven pumps for discharging stationary tanks and cars and three bridges. A veterinary hospital for the accomodation of 346 animals is in operation and 18000 square feet of corrals are available for handling remounts. These with the buildings formerly belonging to the Border Patrol are adequate for shelter under present conditions, but, as the camp grows in size, they will have to be constantly added to. Effort has been made to keep cost of construction down by the use of types of buildings most inexpensive in this locality and offering the greatest possibility for salvage when the Base is abandoned.

10. Covering the operation of the Intermediate and Advance Depots, detailed information is not available at this time covering these points. The Advance Depot was established at Colonia Dublan (Embarcadero), 115 miles south of Columbus on March 20th, 1916. This magazine became the Intermediate Depot about April 5th, 1916, when the Advance Depot was set forward to Namiquipa, Mexico, 232 miles south of Columbus. Here the Advance Depot remained with its southermost distributing point at San Antonio, Mexico, 303 miles south of the railhead, until June 23, 1916, when it was withdrawn to Dublan and merged with the Intermediate Depot at that point. At both Advance and Intermediate Depots, purchases locally, of ration articles, forage and wood were made to the full capacity of the surrounding country. This policy was also pursued at all stations along the Line of Communications wherever possible. At Acolonia Dublan in particular, the above described service was a material aid as local merchants at that point were able to renew their stocks at intervals via the Ferrocarril Nor Oeste de Mexico, but this source was never dependable enough to make it more than an adjunct to the Supply Column of motor trucks operating over the Line of Communication.

\*\*\*\*\*

APPENDIX "A" - List showing names of officers of the Quartermaster Corps on duty with the Expedition, dates of reporting for duty and of departure for duty elsewhere.

APPENDIX "B" - List showing names of permanent civilian employees of the Quartermaster Corps on duty with the Expedition, dates of reporting for duty and of departure for duty elsewhere.

APPENDIX "C" - Resume of construction at Base Section Depot.

## II. SUPPLY COLUMN.

1. The Supply Column in the initial stages of the southward movement consisted of several trucks previously in service with the Border Patrol and at the El Paso Depot of the Quartermaster Corps, reinforced by several Jeffery trucks, which later comprised the Field and Combat train of the First Aero Squadron. The trucks of the First Aero Squadron were in all ways efficient and proved an invaluable aid in the emergency which existed until the first truck companies arrived, were organized and outfitted for the road. The Quartermaster Corps trucks were of various makes and all were unsuited for road service. The first four companies, (two of Jefferys and two of Whites) to land in Columbus, came with bare chassis, the idea being to equip these vehicles with escort wagon bodies after arrival here. These bodies were also due to arrive from various depots at a distance from Columbus, in a "knocked down" state. No provision had been made to provide the bolts needful to attach bodies to chassis, not to anticipate needs in the way of minor equipment, without which no train can properly function in road work. Escort wagon bodies, when unloaded, were found to not assemble without shop work, in the way of drilling and smithing. It had not been possible to start shops or to assemble stock and the village smithy in Columbus was entirely inadequate to quickly handle the fifty four truck constituting the first shipment. In this company the machine shop truck and accompanying enlisted personnel of the First Aero Squadron rendered valuable service, superintended by Captain B. D. Foulis, Signal Corps, U.S. Army, the Squadron Commander, who volunteered for this service. By working by reliefs continuously Company No. 1, which arrived at Columbus March 18th, was gotten into service thirty six hours later and Company No. 2, which arrived March 19th, was in service forty eight hours thereafter. Much credit is due Captains H. A. Hegeman and James Furloe, Quartermaster Corps, for the energy and capability they showed in beginning service with these companies, manned as they were, with civilian personnel, never organized, unused to hardship and discipline, and without experience in any of the requirements, except truck driving knowledge. From experience gained with these first two companies it was possible to inaugurate the entry of succeeding companies into service much more smoothly, by causing such units to be detained at El Paso and there, where ample shop facilities were at hand, to be fully fitted before being reported at the Base for duty. This method was employed until companies began arriving fully fitted from the factory, which latter practice is the only one to be commended for future use. Thus the Supply Column gained in March three companies, April seven companies, May two companies and in July four companies. Since May 23rd, three companies have been constantly in use with the Engineers Battalion and on station duty, and on July 18th, Company No. 4 had transferred to it all trucks not repairable, and was then disbanded. From record, in the period March 17th to July 31st, the Supply Column has forwarded to the Expedition:

Subsistence stores	5365478 - lbs.
Clothing	251574 - lbs.
Equipage	632632 - lbs.
General Q. M. Stores	1317809 - lbs.
Ordnance Stores	326368 - lbs.
Signal Corps Stores	93264 - lbs.
Engineers Stores	262956 - lbs.
Medical Stores	56292 - lbs.
Mail	<u>138600 - lbs.</u>
Total	8544973 - lbs. Net.

(To which at least 10% should be added for tare)

and in addition 638 persons, of whose transport, record has been kept. The maximum length of the Line was attained about April 5th, when deliveries were made at San Antonio, Mexico, 303 miles south of the Base. It is now delivering cargo to El Valle, some 187 miles from Columbus. These deliveries have been made with reasonable promptness over roads, which, though fairly good in the beginning, rapidly became bad, and are now as poor as can be imagined. Deliveries were made over poor roads in all conditions of weather. From record, the average cost of delivery has been \$0.86 per ton mile. Viewing the entire operation at close range one is led to the belief, were road conditions better and the fleet of trucks in use sufficiently large at all time to permit regular and system overhaul, the ton mile cost would be considerably below the above quoted figure. Exigencies of the service did not permit either of these phases to enter, which in a way is an advantage, as the deductions made from data gathered in this operation, may be depended on to represent conditions about as near adverse as is possible, unless those frankly impossible are in mind. It can be asserted with conviction as a result of observation of motor transport operating with this Expedition, that this method of forwarding supplies is eminently practicable and comparatively inexpensive under ordinary normal conditions, that it is dependable enough to be worthy of adoption for general use and that it would be the policy of wisdom to continue and expand the motor units now in service, to perfect their organization and training, from now on, so that when again the Army is called on for service akin to this expedition, it will have ready and at maximum effectiveness, this modern and proven aid to its efficiency.

2. Although good results, under the circumstances, were obtained with civilian personnel, it is evident, as a result of this experience, no dependence can be placed on this source for personnel for operations except those of a relatively minor kind. The best personnel, all things being considered, was found to be that composed of soldiers, specially selected for this duty. As to organization, daily service has demonstrated the following to be the best:

- 1 Company Commander,
- 1 Subaltern,
- 1 Truckmaster,
- 1 Machinist,
- 1 Machinist's Mate,
- 1 Clerk (Freight & Records)
- 1 Mess Steward,
- 2 Cooks,
- 1 Assistant Truckmaster for each section  
of 9 trucks,
- 1 Chauffeur and 1 student chauffeur for  
each truck.

The above furnishes ample manning detail, provides for absentees and in general makes the company an entity for service, administration and defense. Such a company, given a reasonable amount of preliminary training, under capable officers, can be depended on to function in a thoroughly satisfactory manner.

3. The benefit of organization and training was also clearly shown in the operation of the Supply Train (Wagon Companies 1, 2, 3, & 4) which worked primarily in front and rear of the Advance Depot in the carriage of forage principally. The section (Companies 1 & 2) under command of Captain J. H. Bryson, Quartermaster Corps, was particularly efficient. There against the advantage of permanent units was apparent and the lack of sufficient personnel under present organization quite clear. The best organization for a wagon company is:

- 1 Company Commander,
- 1 Subaltern,
- 1 Wagonmaster,
- 1 Clerk (Freight & Records),
- 1 Wagonsmith, and 1 Shoemingsmith
- 1 Saddler,
- 1 Mess Steward,
- 2 Cooks,
- 1 Assistant Wagonmaster, for each section  
of 9 wagons.
- 1 Wagoner, and 1 apprentice wagoner for  
each wagon.

The above lends itself to the independence of function in all respects, which makes the unit best suited for the varying service demanded of it.

4. I am certain the type of wagon can be improved very much and think experiment along these lines worth the trial. The most desirable vehicle would be one of a capacity of about a ton and a half of charge, the tractive effort being four mules, or a motor truck, or a tractor. Such an interchangeable vehicle I am certain can be produced and would soon justify itself. Experiment along this line had been begun and should be continued.

APPENDIX "D" - List of Truck Companies, showing make date of arrival.

APPENDIX "E" - Statement by truck company of mileage, ton mile cost, etc.

APPENDIX "F" - List and amounts of articles furnished transported by Supply Column.

APPENDIX "F-1"- List of Horses, Mule, Ambulance & Escort Wagons and Pack Train Materiel.

APPENDIX "G" - Report on Motor Transportation.

### III. RATIONS.

1. During the period of active operations, the ration furnished troops approximated, as near as possible, that set forth in Tables of Organization, page 9, under No. 1. Fresh beef, vegetables, beans, flour and sugar were purchased locally whenever possible, but, with the exception of beef and beans, the visible supply of foodstuffs in the theatre was very limited, so main dependence had to be placed on stores bought from elsewhere. When active operations ceased, the field ration, established, was that prescribed for garrison use, less butter, which commodity could not be handled on account of climatic conditions. Field bread was supplied to all troops except those at distance from depots. Sales stores, in limited quantities, were kept on hand at all depots and at the majority of stations. Supply in this particular fell far short of demand on account of limited transportation. As far as known none of the food supplies sent to the Expedition were other than entirely satisfactory in quality. The quantity sent, after ration supply was satisfied, was the maximum possible with available transportation.

\*\*\*\*\*

### IV. FORAGE.

1. Oats comprised the grain ration, 10 lbs. per animal being the average. Corn was purchased locally with which to make good shortage in the supply of oats at times when transportation was not adequate to meet demands made on it, over the extended Line of Communications. Grazing facilities were early exhausted and supply of hay became necessary. This call was met by shipment over the Line of Communication and by local purchase, principally the latter. Prairier hay in limited quantities was used, but that obtained was of unpleasing quality and was later discarded in favor of alfalfa, which was found to be entirely satisfactory in every way. This alfalfa hay was that cut locally, to the extent of visible supply, augmented by shipments imported by local merchants from the United States and sent by the Supply Column from the Base. In any operations in

this or a similar theatre, it is doubtful if stock can be subsisted on the grain ration alone, plus grazing or hay obtained locally, so provision should be made, when tonnage to be transported is estimated, for a supply of this class of fodder, despite the added burden to the Supply Service by this addition.

\*\*\*\*\*

V. CLOTHING.

1. As far as known, clothing was satisfactory in quality. Complaint was made the slicker of oiled fabric was unservicable, the waterproofing compound oozing out and smearing the garments of the wearer. This defect has been corrected in the latter pattern of waterproofed slicker which is designed to replace the older pattern.

\*\*\*\*\*

VI. SERVICES OF OFFICERS.

1. I wish to commend to your attention the work performed by the Officers of the Quartermaster Corps under my direction, on duty with this Expedition. With one exception, I found all to be earnest, conscientious and capable in the performance of their respective duties. Particularly do I wish to invite your attention to the capable way in which the affairs at the Base Depot have been administered by Major Whitman, and similar service at the Depot at Colonia Dublan by Captain Baskette. Caprain Furlow is entitled to praise for the extremely able manner in which he managed the affairs of the truck company under his command, and conducted the work assigned to it. Captain Lee rendered invaluable aid from the beginning in charge of the repair work of the Motor Division at the Base. Captain Kromer was all that one could desire as an assistant in my office at Division Headquarters and on several occasions, while in charge of this office in my absence, has demonstrated his especial ability in an administrative and executive way. Captain Bryson is entitled to special credit for his management of his section of the Supply Train, as heretofore referred to.

2. There are two officers who reported at the Base on March 16th, 1916, and served with me during the formative stage and continuously there since. They, by their energy, thoroughness, knowledge and good judgement, made possible the functioning of the Supply Service in the earlier phases of organization. Since then no day has passed in which they have not equalled their first efforts. These officers are Captains Pearson and Hanson, and I earnestly invite your favorable notice to them.

3. Efficient service has also been rendered by the Officers of the Line detailed for duty with the Quartermaster Corps, in connection with service at depots and with truck companies. Without their aid it would have been difficult to have continued organization and supplied

what was necessary. In fine, if this Expedition has not been served in an acceptable way, this result has been due to no lack of zealous effort on the part of the officers under my control during the period covered by this report.

\*\*\*\*\*

## VII. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1st. That truck and wagon companies be organized, trained and maintained in peace for use in time of need; that this training be administered to selected officers and enlisted men, at a school, or schools, of Transportation and that sufficient trained units be maintained to furnish all tactical units, each with its prescribed quota.

2nd. That the practice of giving increased pay to certain enlisted artificers of the Quartermaster Corps by issuing warrants to such men, be discontinued; that in occupations which carry with them a normal wage over that of laborers on account of increased intelligence demanded, enlisted men rated in these occupations be given increased compensation but remain in the grade of "private, first class."

3rd. That a vehicle be devised which can be used interchangeably as field wagon, mule drawn, and a trailer behind a tractor.

4th. That a system of unit accountability be devised so accounting for individual items of stores of all kinds shall cease at the last depot; that the system of issue of clothing be changed so all shall be issued on memorandum receipt and the "clothing allowance" be done away with.

5th. That it be made a requirement that in all shipments by rail, car load lots have contents of cars plainly marked on the outside of each.

6th. That the Army Service Motor Truck be built on special design, manufactured as is the Escort Wagon, the type to be that determined to be best suited for military use after extended experiment.

\*\*\*\*\*

2. It is not practicable at this time to submit cost data. The records from which the true figures would have to be obtained are scattered along the Line of Communications at the various Depots and stations. Those available would but give a partial insight into this phase of this Expedition and only for part of the time of its existence. The compilation of cost data, and the lessons to be deduced therefrom, had best be left until the entire operation is in the past, at which time it will be possible to accurately ascertain its cost. For this reason it is thought fit to conclude this report with the recommendation cited above.

JOHN F. NADDEN,  
Major, Quartermaster Corps, U.S. Army.

APPENDIX "D" OPERATIONS OF QUARTERMASTER CORPS, PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U.S. ARMY.

\*\*\*\*\*

ENTRY INTO SERVICE OF MOTOR TRUCK COMPANIES.

<u>COMPANY NO.</u>	<u>MAKE</u>	<u>DATE ARRIVED</u>	<u>IN COMMISSION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1.	JEFFERY	March 18, 1916	March 20, 1916	- Used as separate unit until March 27th, when organized as Company unit. Captain Hegeman, Commanding.
2.	WHITE	March 19, 1916	March 21, 1916	- Used separate units until April 2, Organized as Company unit. Captain Furlow, Commanding.
3.	PACKARD	March 27, 1916	March 28, 1916	- Organized as Company unit. Fitted at El Paso. Captain Drake, Commanding.
4.	JEFFERY	March 29, 1916	April 1, 1916	- Organized as Company unit. Fitted at El Paso. Captain Pope, Commanding.
5.	JEFFERY	April 3, 1916	April 4, 1916	- Organized as Company unit. Capt. Whitman, Commanding.
6.	JEFFERY	April 1, 1916	April 2, 1916	- Organized as Company unit. Lt. McMullen, Commanding.
7.	JEFFERY	April 16, 1916	April 18, 1916	- Organized as Company unit. Captain Jones, Commanding.
8.	WHITE	April 12, 1916	April 15, 1916	- Organized as Company unit. Capt. Harper, Commanding.
9.	WHITE	April 12, 1916	April 14, 1916	- Organized as Company unit. Capt. Lister, Commanding.
10.	PACKARD	April 19, 1916	April 21, 1916	- Organized as Company unit. Capt. Hollyday, Commanding.
13.	LOCOMOBILE	May 19, 1916	May 27, 1916	- Organized as Company unit. Captain Tobin, Commanding.
14.	F. W. D.	May 23, 1916	June 3, 1916	- Organized as Company unit. Captain Game, Commanding.
16.	F. W. D.	July 13, 1916		- Borrowed from El Paso to meet Emergency. Lieut. Franklin Commanding. Returned July 28, 1916.
53.	WHITE	July 19, 1916	July 25, 1916	- Organized as unit, Company. Lt. Scowden, Commanding.
57.	WHITE	July 23, 1916	July 30, 1916	- Organized as unit, Company. Capt. Whitside, Commanding.
59.	WHITE	July 25, 1916	July 31, 1916	- Organized as unit, Company. Lt. Matthews, Commanding.
61.	WHITE	July 28, 1916	July 31, 1916	- Organized as unit, Company. Captain Bump, Commanding.

(APPENDIX "D")

Office Division Surgeon, Prov. Div.  
Dublan, Mexico, October 7, 1916.

From: Lieut. Col. T. S. Bratton, Medical Corps,  
(Acting Division Surgeon, Punitive Expedition, U.S. Army, from  
June 18th to June 30th, 1916.)

To: The Chief of Staff.

Subject: Report on the Operations of the Medical Department to include  
June 30th, 1916.

1. Organization and Equipment.

All regiments entered Mexico with various members of sanitary troops attached, and more were added from time to time, being forwarded from the Base along the Line of Communication. The regimental equipment also varied, but the essentials were brought by every regiment. The amount and character depended on the transportation available. In the Cavalry regiments as the distance into Mexico increased, much of their equipment had to be left along the Line of Communication. In general, all regiments had some manner of regimental infirmary, - pack mule, with pack mule equipment and from one to three ambulances.

Besides the regimental sanitary troops, there were with the Expedition the following divisional Sanitary organizations:

Field Hospital No. 7, Field Hospital No. 3, Ambulance Company 7 and Ambulance Company #3 and at the Base there was established a Cantonment Hospital.

Field Hospital No. 7 left Columbus, March 19th, and arrived at Dublan March 23. On April 25, Field Hospital No. 3 relieved Field Hospital No. 7 at Dublan and the latter hospital proceeded south to Namiquipa where it stayed until June 18th, when it returned with the troops to El Valle. Field Hospital No. 3 remained at Dublan, this place being a supply point and convenient as a re station for patients under transportation north to the Base. As the character of this hospital became more that of an evacuation hospital, cots were procured and added much to the comfort of the patients.

Ambulance Company No. 7 entered Mexico March 18th and accompanied the troops south. On or about May 15th this company was completely motorized and became most useful in transporting patients from the zone of the advance to the Base at Columbus, stopping at Field Hospital No. 3 at Dublan overnight for rest and such treatment as might be necessary. Up to this time the patients were transported by motor trucks. Part of the mules and ambulances of Ambulance Company No. 7 were assigned to regiments whose ambulances had become unfit for use. Seven of them were kept intact with the intention of using them as an ambulance company, supplemented by such other ambulances as might be handy for this purpose. Ambulance Company No. 3 remained at Columbus.

2. Care and Treatment of the wounded.

All cases were temporarily cared for by the regimental sanitary officers, but, as most regiments were moving rapidly the sick and wounded were transferred to the first rest station along the line of communication, to be cared for by the station surgeon until they could be transported by Ambulance Company #7 or by truck train back to Field Hospital No. 3 at Dublan, or to the Base at Columbus. Regiments were thus freed of their sick so that they could continue their military operations unhampered; and, as there was no reliance to be placed on the protection of the wounded under the Geneva Convention, the sick could not be left except with our own people. Ambulance Company No. 7 transported the more severely wounded or sick, and the truck trains the lighter cases. And, considering the length of line of communications and the difficulties of the roads, this was done with great success.

3. Infectious Diseases.

The most prevalent up to June 30th were diarrhoea and dysentery. Much of the early diarrhoea and dysentery was undoubtedly due to the lack of, or proper balanced diet. A diet of hard tack, bacon and underdone beans is sure, sooner or later to bring on intestinal trouble. Such a diet many of the troops had to live on for days at a time; in fact, some of them lived on much less if reports are correct. This was due to the fact that bodies of troops had to follow bandits at such a rate of speed that supplies could not be carried, and the troops had to live on the country which could furnish little more than beans. The effect of such a diet was a series of intestinal disorders.

4. Food.

During the active work of the troops the reserve rations was furnished supplemented by such articles of the garrison ration as could be supplied which, owing to the difficulties of transportation was not much. Bakeries were started early at Dublan and Namiquipa which gave troops passing through these places some field bread, but hard tack was the rule. Many organizations on obtaining flour, built their own ovens out of adobe mud and made biscuits. As the organizations began to locate more permanently, opportunity was furnished to supply them with more liberal rations.

5. Water.

One would be safe in saying that all surface water, and shallow well water in Mexico is dangerous, for the Mexican peon is most careless as to the disposition of his excreta.

All organizations brought their Lyster bags with them, and where these bags and the chlorination of the water were used, very little sickness of intestinal type occurred. Unfortunately the chlorinated water is very objectional to many persons and, after a few weeks use it was hard to keep the men on this water. Many of the men drank water from the streams and irrigating ditches and this infected water was undoubtedly the case and starting point of later cases of diarrhoea and dysentery.

6. Shelter.

The shelter tent has been the only official means of shelter, but where the troops have remained any length of time, especially those at the stations along the line of communication, they have erected shacks, adobe huts and brush shelters which have added much to their comfort.

7. Mortality.

From disease .....	4
Injuries .....	5
Killed in action.....	<u>18</u>
Total .....	27

8. As the Division Surgeon is preparing a final report, based on the Experiences of the Medical Officers of the Expedition, no recommendations are made at this time.

T. S. Bratton.

RETURN TO  
RECORD SECTION, ROOM 82,  
THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE

(APPENDIX E)

Ojo Federico, Mexico,  
11 August 1916.

From: Major Lytle Brown, Corps of Engineers, Division Engineer  
Officer.

To: Commanding General, U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Dublan, Mexico.

Subject: Report of Engineer Operations during Punitive Expedition.

1. The engineer troops, under my command, consisting of headquarters and companies "E", "C" and "H", second battalion of Engineers, left Fort Sam Houston, Texas, March 12, 1916, under orders from Headquarters Southern Department to proceed to El Paso and report to General John J. Pershing. Instructions from Department to General Pershing directed that one company was to be left at El Paso in contemplation of work on the Mexican North-western Railroad. Telegraphic instructions from General Pershing directed that headquarters and companies "E", and "H" proceed to Columbus, New Mexico and that company "G" be left at El Paso. On March 14th the headquarters and companies "E" and "H" reached Columbus, N. M., and joined the expedition.

2. In the forenoon of March 16th verbal orders were received to send one company to Gibson's Ranch, thence via Boca Grande to Ascension to make the road via that route practicable for automobile truck traffic. Company "H", Captain Ernest Graves, left Columbus and marched to Gibson's on March 16th, camped there that night and marched on the Boca Grande the following day. The well at Gibson's was put in order and the necessary road reconnaissance done. At Boca Grande the company joined the Infantry column marching from Falomas. One day was spent in pioneer work on the seven miles of bad road through Boca Grande Pass, and the company moved on to Espia overtaking there the Infantry advance on March 19th. On March 20th, company "H" took its place as pioneers at the head of the Infantry column and marched to Colonia Dublan, pioneering the road en route, and camping with the other troops at Ascension, Ojo Federicoc, and Vuelta de Alamos. It arrived at Colonia Dublan March 23rd.

3. Permission was asked on March 18th to bring battalion headquarters and company "E" over the same route and this was done. Company "E", Captain U. S. Grant, 3d, got as far south as Vuelta de Alamos by March 24th when it was directed to return to Ascension and conduct pioneer operations continuously over the road sector Espia - Colonia Dublan.

4. It having been learned that no use of the railroad was to be made by the expedition, recommendation was made to bring company "G" 1st Lieut. Milo P. Fox, from El Paso and assign it for pioneer operations in the sector Columbus - Espia. This company took station at Boca Grande March 27th. The scheme was for one company to precede the Infantry column south as pioneers and that the road as far south as Dublan would be kept passable by companies "E" and "G".

5. Before any troops left Columbus 1st Lieut. H. B. Brand, Jr., Corps of Engineers, was placed in charge of the map work at battalion headquarters with instructions to prepare control sheets of the country shown on existing maps south of Columbus; it being the intention to supply these control sheets to the Cavalry and other troops for elaboration. When the 13th Cavalry on March 15th left Columbus on its way south Lieut. Earl Gesler, Corps of Engineers, with a detachment of six mounted men of company "H" was attached to it for purposes of engineer reconnaissance. Lieut. Gesler rejoined his company at Colonia Dublan. An order was issued at Colonia Dublan March 25th appointing Lieut. Brand topographical officer of the expedition which order was in effect until May 9th.

6. Battalion headquarters was moved to Dublan on March 24th and attached from that time forward to expedition headquarters. It moved in the latter part of March to Namiquipa and remained there until the return of the expedition headquarters to Dublan the latter part of June. Such map data as was collected by the engineer companies and officers of other commands was turned in at battalion headquarters for compilation and issue. The results of this work will be submitted to expedition headquarters in a separate inclosure. The extraordinary amount of road work imposed on the command throughout the expedition almost completely nullified efforts to conduct topographical work of any extent or with any degree of system. The existing maps, while of small scale, very inaccurate, and devoid of topographical features, met, when supplemented by a large number of guides, perfectly familiar with the country, all the needs of the expedition. All existing maps were elaborated as far as the information warranted at battalion headquarters. During the months of May and June, Lieut. Engle, 7th Cavalry, was detailed for duty in connection with the map work at battalion headquarters.

7. By the first of April all practicable road routes from Columbus to Colonia Dublan had been reconnoitered, and likewise by the first of May all practicable routes from Colonia Dublan as far south as San Antonia had been examined with a view to more permanent work than that of pioneering. The adopted route was Columbus, Vado Fusiles, Ojo Federico, Corralitos Station, Dublan, Chocolate Pass, Charcos, San Joaquin, Carbajaleno, El Valle, Cruces, Namiquipa, San Geronima, Las Varas, La Grulia, Dolores, San Antonia. Later developments made El Valle the most southern point. Until the last of May much pioneer work was done as follows: Company "E", on the sector Columbus - Dublan, Company "G" on the sector Dublan - El Valle, Company "H" on the sector El Valle - Namiquipa. During the month of May various companies

of the 24th Infantry did considerable work under engineer direction, particularly those of Major Newman's battalion between Vuelta de Alamos and Colonia Dublan. Large forces of natives and native teams hired from Quartermaster funds worked on the line at various points south of Ascension, particularly on the sectors Vuelta de Alamos (Big Bend) and Dublan, Dublan and El Valle and Namiquipa.

8. As the rainy season approached bridges were built over the Casas Grande at Vado Fusiles and over the Santa Maria at El Valle. That at Vado Fusiles was a timber bridge 180 feet long built by Company "E" and that at El Valle was a timber bridge 150 feet long with stone causeway 450 yards, built by Company "G".

9. As it became evident by June first that the expedition would be in Mexico during the rainy season, heavy road work was begun. Mexican laborers were hired at El Paso and sent along the Columbus Dublan Line, road machinery was bought, extensive truck transportation was assigned for road work and work was concentrated on a single line, which was to be graded and drained, in course of time top dressed with the best available material found in site. By the seventh of July the following road machinery was on hand; six Holt Tractors, two Phoenix Tractors, two Knox Tractors, one Buckeye Tractor, thirty-six bottom dump trailers, six graders, 12 feet blade, eight graders 6 feet blade, three graders elevating three steam road rollers, three tractor drawn road rollers, eighteen water tanks on trailers, and numerous road drags. The road sectors worked were as follows: Columbus to High Pass north of Ojo Federico, Company "E" forty-six miles; High Pass north of Ojo Esderic to Corralites Station, fifty-six miles, Company "G"; Corralites Station to El Valle seventy-three miles, also duplicate lines Vuelta de Alamos (Big Bend) Dublan, twenty-four miles, Company "H". By August 10th the grading in the first section had covered thirty-eight miles and the drainage thirty miles with some top dressing; in the second section the grading had reached fifty-seven and the drainage twenty-five miles; in the third section the grading eight miles the top dressing, Vuelta de Alamos- Dublan, twenty-four miles, and arroya crossings over all arroyos Dublan--El Valle, sixty five miles.

10. There was established an engineer field depot at Columbus from the personnel of the engineer battalion on the 26th of March. This depot handled the questions of material and labor in connection with the engineer operations mentioned in this report.

11. The following points have come to my notice during the expedition, (a) The necessary staff organization for engineer operations on the line of communication was entirely lacking. This made it necessary to place the pioneer troops on the line of communications, out of their proper place, and impose on their officers staff duty of such extent as to prevent them giving proper attention to their troop duties. While such an arrangement was probably unavoidable, considering the nature of the expedition, its hurried organization, and its extraordinary mission, it should not occur in any future movement as extensive as this has been. (b) There were no engineer funds available for the conduct of engineer operations along the line of communications; while the cooperation of the Quartermaster Corps

produced the necessary funds, such arrangement is highly unsatisfactory as may be seen without mention of reasons. (c) The correction in future of the deficiencies set forth in (a) and (b) of this paragraph will prevent many deficiencies resulting therefrom, which have been observed by me, but as they have their origin indicated in the above will not be dwelt upon.

Lytle Brown,  
Major, Engineers.  
Division Engineer.

Inclosures in triplicate.

Compilation of road notes all sources.

Sketch of Guerrero and vicinity.

- " " Yeguive.
- " " Tomochic.
- " " Road Columbus to Palomas.
- " " " Palomas to Boca Grande.
- " " " Ascension to Gorrallites.
- " " " Gibson's Ranch to Coca Grande.
- " " " Corralites to Colonia Dublan.
- " " " Napia to Ascension.
- " " " Chocolate Pass to camp near Galeana.
- " " " Proposed from Boca Grande to Columbus.
- " " " Namiquipa to San Geronimo.
- " " " Cruces to Santa Cruz de Villagas.
- " " Vicinity Lake Itascate.
- " " Colonia Juarez and Vicinity.
- " " Road Columbus to Gibson's Ranch.
- " " Road Boca Grande to Espia.
- " " Northwestern Chihushua Culberston's Ranck to
- " " Casas Grande.
- " " Country East of Camp at Namiquipa.
- " " Country North of Camp at Namiquipa.
- " " El Valle and Vicinity.
- " " Country West of Namiquipa.
- " " Road El Valle to Gallego.
- " " Road Engineer Camp at Conyon to El Valle.
- " " Road Dublan to Corralitos Station.
- " " Headquarters Camp at Namiquipa.
- " " Big Bend and Vicinity.
- " " Dublan and Vicinity.
- " " Route, Angostura to Carmen.
- " " Country Northwest of Namiquipa.
- " " Country between Colonia Dublan and El Valle.
- " " Vicinity San Joaquin.
- " " Route Colonia Dublan Galeana.

Sketch of Route Galeana to El Valle.

" " Route El Valle to Cruces.

" " Cruces and Vicinity.

" " Namiquipa and Vicinity.

" " Section San Geronimo, Bachineva and San Pedro.

" " " Bachineva, Rubio, Namipavechi.

" " Route from Vuelta de Alamos to Dullan.

" " Section Colonia Diez-- La Bajada - Ojo Federico.

Compilation Columbus to Parral showing all roads examined by

U. S. Expeditionary Forces.

Map of Chihuahua. With data added Columbus to Parral.

Elaboration of War College Map.

" " S. D. 5 mile to inch Map.

(APPENDIX F)

Colonia Dublan, Mexico.  
August 16, 1916.

From: Captain E. S. Hughes,  
Ordnance Department.

To: Commanding General, Punitive Expedition.

Subject: Report on Ordnance.

1. In compliance with the verbal instructions of the Chief of Staff, Punitive Expedition, I herewith submit a report on Ordnance, its supply and repair.

2. PAPER WORK:- Each supply officer, battalion and regimental, should, if it is not feasible to carry field desk be supplied with one copy of each of the necessary ordnance and quartermaster forms, as invoice and receipt blanks, inventory and inspection report, report of survey, to be used as a guide, and a triplicating book of a size easily carried in the pocket or saddle bags. With this book and sample forms the supply officer can make requisitions, invoices, receipts, or any other necessary form using the printed copy as a guide. (Enclosure One is, in the rough, my idea of what he should carry.) Any requisition that he submits should be a consolidation of those submitted to him by the various unit commanders. This is important for if, after requisitions submitted directly to the supply officer by the several company commanders are filled and shipped direct, the amount of space when transportation is limited, is out of all proportion-- and if the shipments are consolidated, the regimental supply officer has no way of knowing for what organization the articles are intended.

If after one requisition is submitted and not filled for, say, twenty days, another one should be submitted giving the needs of the troops to date, and every time an organization stops for a day or two, immediate advantage should be taken to draw supplies.

The present system of ordnance accountability, General Orders 52, War Department, 1915, contemplates the immediate issue to organizations having unit accountability, or any property they may need, on a certificate of the commanding officer of that organization that the replacements are necessary and that he will furnish the proper vouchers therefor. If the organization has no unit equipment the replacing articles are immediately invoiced. As a result, with absolutely no delay, the necessary equipment is furnished; then when conditions are such that proper vouchers can be prepared, the surveys, inventory and inspection reports or statement of charges are made out and submitted.

There is only one departure from regulations that I recommend and that in that the certificate (see enclosure 2) be accepted and adopted as a simple report of survey and that it constitute a proper voucher for dropping property in time of war. As it is now the report

of survey is the hardest voucher to prepare, and with conditions as they were during April it was impossible for the organization commanders to prepare a regular survey at the time. As a consequence they had to wait for a lull in the campaign and then submit surveys for property lost all the way from Columbus to Parral and under all sorts of conditions, which necessitated a mass of certificates and affidavits. Now if this certificate be made a report of survey and considered a final voucher and not the certificate required by par. 48, G.O. 52, most of the organization commander's troubles will be over so far as ordnance accountability is concerned. It will be fairly easy to keep a penciled notation of property to be charged against enlisted men so that the proper statement can be made up any time and the inventory and inspection report is no trouble when the inspector is present.

#### ADVANCED SUPPLY DEPOT.

At every advanced depot there should be at the very beginning one officer familiar with ordnance department routine, one ordnance sergeant and one man to act as clerk, messenger, and to do various odd jobs, and one armorer and one saddler. These men should be supplied with four storage tents, one ordnance field desk and tools and repair parts, hammer, saw, nail-puller and four paulins.

At Namiquipa with the assistance of two soldiers detailed from neighboring organizations who used the arm repair chest and saddler's tools, I made a lot of repairs that saved equipment that would otherwise have been thrown away.

I recommend that an automobile repair shop be authorized. The truck to contain a bench at each end and sides lined with pigeon holes, spare parts for rifle and pistol, repair parts for canteen, cups, belts, bayonet scabbards, boles, bayonets, in fact, all necessary material for repairing horse and personal equipment. There can be a compartment underneath the truck for leather and one on top for spare stocks for rifles.

In this truck, which will include a store tent with collapsible poles, will travel one armorer and one saddler. The truck will go from camp to camp and repair on the spot all equipment the different organizations bring to it or the repair tent.

This is not so necessary when the supplies can be furnished the organizations direct; but, under conditions similar to those existing at Namiquipa during the first part of the campaign, when troops had no tools, spare parts, repair materials-- would have been invaluable.

Whether or not this idea is accepted, there should be a stationary repair shop, such as the one I have established at Dublan, at all concentration and mobilization camps, at all bases and wherever there are two or more regiments for duty.

#### SUPPLIES FOR DEPOT PAPER WORK.

Every shipment of any supplies from any arsenal, depot or base to the advanced base, should be accompanied by memorandum copies of the invoices so that the officer at that point can watch for and deliver them.

All stores should be accompanied on the same train by the papers in the case, for when troops are moving rapidly and time is limited, it is imperative that the issuing officer know immediately what he has on hand without delaying to count and list property received.

In first supplies received should be, in my opinion, as listed below in order shown. As I have no records available at present, my Namiquipa return being in Columbus, I can only estimate roughly the per centage or replacements necessary.

(1) Spare parts for 1000 arms, plus fifty gun stocks and two hundred, each, front and rear guard screws.

(2) 100% replacements of halter tie ropes every three weeks, or two weeks if horses are not getting salt or hay regularly.

(3) About 5 gallons of hydrolene and 5 of engine oil #1 for each battery of field artillery, should be included in the first shipment and other oil on requisition. Oil should be shipped as follows: Neatsfoot in one half gallon and sperm in pint expendible tin containers, packed in straw or sawdust to avoid the enormous waste to which it is subjected, due to leakage, if not packed in that way.

As troops in the field are without empty containers, when they want only a small amount of oil they must either do without, or else take more than they need---which is pure waste.

(4) One hundred pounds each of saddle soap and castile soap and one hundred sponges per mounted regiment should be included in first shipment. In order to avoid the great waste of soap due to everybody dipping into it with wet sponges, as it comes in one pound or ten pound tins, or four pound cakes - it is recommended that a mixture made as follows be issued.

8 pounds castile soap  
8 pounds saddlers soap  
2 quarts neatsfoot oil  
4 quarts water

Dissolve the soap in boiling water and just before the water boils out, add the oil. After a thorough mixing, set out to coll. This mixture has these advantages:

- (a) It can not be used for toilet purposes.
- (b) It can be carried in any kind of a container, with or without cover, and issued in any quantity desired - preventing waste.
- (c) It can be used without sponges, a great advantage when sponges are scarce.
- (d) It cleans leather well and leaves it with the proper amount of oil and good polish.

4. Meat cans, knives, forks, spoons, canteens and cups; about a 1-1/2 replacement for stock.

5. Saddle blankets: This article of equipment, due to the fact that the men are on the march most of the time and unable to properly care for them, wear out very rapidly. About 10% replacement should be on hand at the advanced depot early in the campaign.

6. Magazine pockets, cartridge belts, 1st aid pouches, wear out rapidly and early replacement should be provided for.

7. The last of the necessary items are awl-blades, shoeing rasps, needles, thread, wax and rivets - 3/8" and 5/8".

#### EQUIPMENT.

I believe the halter tie rope to be the best for the purpose. It is light and inexpensive. If 1/2" rope is shipped in bulk and a small percentage of swivel snaps supplied to replace those lost, the replacements can be easily taken care of. I recommend the shipment in bulk on account of the saving in space. A coil of 1/2" rope contains 1000 feet and weighs 83#. 110 halter tie ropes, the equivalent of the coil, weight with box, about 100# and occupy more than twice the space and also cost more made up. The troops can make up the tie ropes themselves.

The new shoulder bandoleer, model 1912, should be issued to all mounted troops.

It is recommended that when troops take the field, they turn in to the nearest supply officer, all the ordnance they do not carry with them, instead of storing it. In this way there will be released for re-issue immense quantities of stores that otherwise would remain out of circulation, deteriorating in store house or under canvas, on account of being packed hurriedly and without proper care. If every organization is required to retain its unit equipment on taking the field, it simply means that when recruits join bringing their equipment with them, it can not be turned in because the proper equipment for them is on the bottom of some pile, at some base, where it will not be found until the close of the campaign, if ever.

Everett L. Hughes.

(1 enclosure)

Enclosure #1:

I certify that the following articles of the Unit Accountability Equipment of \_\_\_\_\_ have become unserviceable, lost, damaged or destroyed, as shown below, through no fault or neglect of any person, and was the result of the exigencies of the service, and that they are needed for immediate use.

ARTICLES	CIRCUMSTANCES LOSS ETC.
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

\_\_\_\_\_ (name)  
 \_\_\_\_\_ (rank)

Having knowledge of the facts, I certify that the replacements are necessary.

\_\_\_\_\_ (name)  
 \_\_\_\_\_ (rank)  
 Disinterested officer.

I acknowledge to have received the above property at \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_ (name)  
 \_\_\_\_\_ (rank)

(APPENDIX G)

Columbus, N. Mex.  
August 22, 1916.

File 54-E

From: Signal Officer, Punitive Expedition.  
To: Commanding General Punitive Expedition.  
Subject: Report of Signal Corps Operations.

1. In accordance with instructions from the Chief of Staff in letter of the 7th instant, the following report is submitted concerning operations of the Signal Corps, with the Punitive Expedition in Mexico.

2. The lines of information provided by the Signal Corps for the troops in Mexico consisted only of telegraph service along the Line of Communication, supplemented by radio service as an alternation means of Communication along the same route; no combat field wire lines were laid nor were any messages transmitted by visual signaling by the Signal Corps. In addition to the main wire line several branch lines were laid to the east and west of the line of communications furnishing telegraph service to detached bodies of troops.

FIELD WIRE LINES.

3. When the troops of the Punitive Expedition first started into Mexico from Columbus, no field wire was available. The section of Company H, Signal Corps being unable to construct lance lines with sufficient rapidity to keep up with the marching column, the No. 14, G.I. wire, without insulation, was laid on the ground, and operated by buzzers. During dry weather the buzzers operated satisfactorily over the base iron wire on the ground about 40 miles, and by providing several relay points, thru communication was established, but proved not to be reliable on account of many interruptions. The iron wire is not sufficiently flexible to lay flat on the ground, and although it was placed at a considerable distance to one side of the road, mounted troops and pack mules, spreading out on the march caught the wire and frequently broke or dragged it into the road where it was broken by troops and wagons; cattle also broke the wire. One day the wire was broken 33 times due to these causes, so that communication was possible only a small percentage of the time.

4. Radio communication proving unsatisfactory and the uninsulated wire on the ground being very unreliable for the reasons stated, a supply of field wire was shipped by express as soon as possible from Fort Bliss and Fort Sam Houston. The special stranded field wire used by the Signal Corps is not a commercial article and could not be purchased in the open market. The insulated field wire was laid at least 80 feet to one side of the road and flat on the ground, from Columbus to Colonia Dublan, via Gison's Ranch, Boca Grande, Espia, Ascension and Bid Bend. Early in April it was extended

to Namiquipa via Mormon Lake, Galeana, El Valle and Cruces; this section of 122 miles of field wire line was laid under the personal direction of Captain Black in four days. Later in April the field wire was extended from Namiquipa to San Antonio, Chihuahua, the total wire distance from Columbus being 306 miles. Buzzers only were used, the relay points being at Ascension (later at Ojo Federico), Colonia Dublan, El Valle and Namiquipa.

5. Due to the change of road used for the Line of Communications in June, field wire was laid along the new route from Columbus via Palomas, Vado de Fueiles, La Bajada, Ojo Federico, and south of Colonia Dublan via San Joaquin. This change of road, together with the branch lines of Providencia, Bachineva, Raspadura, El Rojo, San Diego del Monte and half way to Ojo Azules, made a total of 527 miles of field wire laid by the Signal Corps for the Expedition. None of the field wire was laid from wire carts. During the first month the iron wire and field wire was laid from escort wagons and lance trucks; later all wire was laid and recovered using motor trucks. All field wire laid along the first route of the Line of Communications was recovered, and nearly all of the wire south of El Valle; a few miles of wire had to be abandoned south of San Antonio and some field wire was abandoned on account of insulation having been burned off by prairie fires, rendering it of no value.

6. Detailed reports concerning the number of interruptions to the field wire line and analysis of the causes were submitted at the end of each month. The principal causes of interruption to the lines were malicious cutting by Mexicans, breaking of the wire by mounted troops, pack trains and cattle, and grounding of the line where the insulation had been burned off by prairie fires.

7. The Q. M. motor trucks placed at each telegraph office greatly facilitated line repairs. If lighter and faster trucks had been available for this service, considerable economy would have resulted in both first cost and maintenance of operation, in addition to the advantage of shortening the time of line interruptions.

#### PERMANENT TELEGRAPH LINE.

8. Beginning June 21st, the Signal Corps constructed a permanent telegraph line from Columbus to Colonia Dublan, using standard iron poles and No. 9 G.I. wire. There were two construction parties, one from Columbus in charge of 1st Lieut. Onley Place, and from Colonia Dublan in charge of 1st Lieut. S. C. Hegill. This permanent construction was completed July 19th. The line is operated with standard relays and local sounders direct from Columbus to Headquarters at Colonia Dublan, without intermediate relay. Field wire remains in use from Colonia Dublan to El Valle.

9. The volume of telegraph business handled by the Columbus office averaged 10,000 words per day, the maximum being nearly 12,000. The radio station at Columbus, during the most busy period sent and received about 2,000 words per day.



17. First Lieut. D. H. Bower, Signal Corps:- Reported for duty April 14th, stationed at Namiquipa for about two weeks. From May 9th to August 16th, he served at Columbus as Adjutant of the Provisional Battalion of Signal Troops, and Supply Officer, Signal Corps Field Depot.

18. First Lieut. Olney Place:- Joined the Punitive Expedition with Field Company I, Signal Corps, March 24th, 1916, in charge of lance line construction First Section, and later commanding the Provisional Wire Company from April 25th to June 15th, after which he was in charge of the detachment constructing the permanent military telegraph line south from Columbus, until completion of the line in July. Since then he has been instructor for Signal troops at Columbus.

19. The maximum number of enlisted men of the Signal Corps at any one time present for duty with the Punitive Expedition, was 247. These men arrived at Columbus in small detachments from five Signal Corps, companies; B, D, H, I, and First Provisional. Field Company I is the only organization having its headquarters and records with the Expedition. Therefore, it was necessary for administrative purposes to prepare separate records for the detachments of each company and all were considered as forming a Provisional Battalion of Signal troops. These records and all administrative paper work was conducted at Columbus, leaving officers and enlisted men along the military telegraph lines free to devote their entire attention to technical duties.

20. All officers and enlisted men of the Signal Corps with this Expedition made every effort to maintain reliable telegraph service, and many cases have come to my attention of exceptional devotion to duty under most trying conditions.

#### WIRE COMPANY.

21. The latter part of April, upon instructions from the Commanding General, a Provisional Wire Company was organized, consisting of four wire cart sections, under command of Lieut. Place. This Provisional Wire Company remained at Headquarters of the Expedition until June, when the organization was temporarily discontinued, in order to use the personnel for the construction of the permanent telegraph line between Columbus and Colonia Dublan.

#### TELEPHONE SERVICE.

22. A field telephone switchboard was installed at Columbus in March, supplying administrative telephone service for the Supply Depots at the Base of Communications. This switchboard also furnished telephone service for the Border Patrol in the New Mexico District, there being a total of 32 telephones connected by 16 miles of wire. A camp telephone switchboard was installed in July at Headquarters of the Punitive Expedition, Colonia Dublan, there being nine telephones on this system.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

23. For a similar expedition, involving a Line of Communications of several hundred miles in length, not along a railroad, the following recommendations concerning Signal Corps Line of information are submitted:



Galiente reported in to Casas Grandes, several days later, having incurred slight damage to his aeroplane, which had to be repaired.

The aeroplane which had been landed near Pearson, was so badly damaged that the pilot abandoned it, and returned to Casas Grandes on foot.

Upon reporting to the Division Commander at Casas Grandes, instructions were received to make an aero reconnaissance south toward Cumbre Pass, in the heart of the Sierra Madre Mountains, for the purpose of locating troops moving south toward Lake Bablorn. Aeroplane #44, Capt. T. F. Dodd, pilot, and Capt. B.D.Foulois, observer, proceeded south, at noon, March 20. Proceeded south about twenty-five miles, from Casas Grandes, but were unable to rise over the foothills of the Sierra Madre Mountains, due to constantly encountering whirlwinds and terrific vertical currents of air, which, on account of the low power of the aeroplane, effectually prevented the aeroplane rising to an altitude sufficiently high to allow of crossing the mountains, which at this particular locality, rise to a height of over 10,000 feet above sea level.

On this same date aeroplane #48, Lieut. T. S. Bowen, pilot, while making a landing was caught in a whirlwind, which completely wrecked the aeroplane. Lieut. Bowen, escaped with a broken nose, and minor injuries.

-March 21, 1916-

Orders received to locate troops under Colonel Irwin in the Galeana Valley. Aeroplane #44, Capt. T.F.Dodd, pilot, and Capt. B. D. Foulois, observer, located these troops at Galera Lopena, landed, and reported to Colonel Irwin. Returned to Dublan, with report from Colonel Irwin, as a result of this reconnaissance and report from Colonel Irwin, six trucks of this Squadron, loaded with supplies, were sent to Colonel Irwin's column.

-March 22, 1916-

Orders received to communicate with troops moving south on the Mexican North Western Railroad, and Colonel G.A.Dodd's command in the Galeana Valley.

Aeroplane #42, Lieut. W.G.Kilner, pilot, Lieut. I.A.Rader, observer, and aeroplane #45, Lieut. J.E.Carberry, pilot, flew to the Galeana Valley located Colonel Dodd's troops, landed and reported to Colonel Dodd. Returned to Dublan, with reports from Colonel Dodd, to Division Commander. Aeroplane #44, Capt. T.F.Dodd, pilot, Lieut. A. Christie, observer, and aeroplane #53, Lieut. C. G. Chapman, pilot, flew south into the Sierra Madre Mountains, in an endeavor to locate the troops, moving south on the Mexican North-Western Railroad. These aeroplanes were driven into the heart of the Sierra Madre Mountains, as far as the northern end of the Oumbre Pass tunnel, but due to terrific vertical air currents and whirlwinds, which at times drove the aeroplanes within twenty feet of the thre tops, the pilots were unable to cross the Sierra Madre mountains and were compelled to return to Dublan.

As a result of this failure to accomplish the reconnaissance as directed the Squadron Commander submitted the following memorandum to the Division Commander.

x

x

x

x

x

On this same date, a detachment was sent to salvage such parts of aeroplane #41, which was wrecked near Pearson on the evening of March 19, as were serviceable. This detachment returned same date, and reported that it had been fired upon, by Mexicans, in the vicinity of Pearson.

- March 23, 1916 -

Received orders to communicate with Colonel G. A. Dodd's troops in the Galeana Valley.

Aeroplane #44, Lieut. A. R. Christie, pilot, aeroplane #45, Lieut. J. E. Garberry, pilot, and aeroplane #53, Lieut. C. G. Chapman, pilot, flew to El Valle, landed and reported to Colonel Dodd. These aeroplanes and pilots, were unable to return to Dublan, until March 25, due to high winds, dust storms and snow storms. Detachment from Squadron proceeded to Pearson, Mexico, this date, and returned to Dublan, with such parts of aeroplane #41, as could be considered serviceable.

- April 5, 1916 -

Seven flights made this date by four aeroplanes, between Dublan, El Valle, Namiquipa, and San Geronimo, carrying mail and despatches.

Aero Squadron headquarters changed to San Geronimo.

Orders received this date to locate Colonel W. C. Brown's column, reported in the vicinity of San Antonio. Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A. Dargue, pilot, Capt. E. D. Foulis, observer, left San Geronimo on this reconnaissance. Flew to San Antonio and located a pack train of Colonel Brown's column, returning toward San Geronimo. Landed aeroplane and received information that troops were proceeding toward Cusihuirachic. Flew to Cusihuirachic Canyon, and located troops entering Canyon. Landed and reported to Colonel Brown. Flew back to San Geronimo, with report from Colonel Brown to Division Commander.

- April 6, 1916 -

Four flights made this date, by three aeroplanes, between Namiquipa, San Geronimo, and Cusihuirachic, carrying despatches to troops. Aeroplane #44 badly damaged on landing at San Geronimo. All serviceable parts salvaged, remainder of aeroplane condemned and destroyed.

- April 7, 1916 -

Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A. Dargue, pilot, and Capt. E. D. Foulis, Observer, from San Geronimo to Chihuahua City with despatches from Mr. Marion H. Letcher, American Consul. Aeroplane #45, Lieut. J. E. Garberry, pilot and Capt. T. F. Dodd, observer, from San Geronimo to Chihuahua City, carrying duplicate despatches to American Consul. Both aeroplanes arrived at Chihuahua City at same time, causing considerable time and excitement. By pre-arrangement aeroplane #43 was landed on south side of city, aeroplane #45 on the north side. Lieut. Dargue, in aeroplane #43, was directed to fly his machine to the north side of the town in order to join #45. As he started off, four mounted rurales opened fire on the machine, at a distance of about one half mile. Capt. Foulis, having started into town, hearing the firing, proceeded in the direction of the rurales and stopped their firing. Capt. Foulis was then arrested by the rurales and taken by them to the city jail, followed by a mob of several hundred

men and boys. En route to the Jail Capt. Foulois succeeded in getting word to an American bystander, requesting that he notify the American Consul of his arrival in the city and that the Consul take the necessary steps for the protection of all aviators and machines that had arrived in the city. Upon arrival at the city jail and after considerable delay, Capt. Foulois succeeded in getting in touch with Colonel Mirands, Chief of Staff to General Gutierrez, Military Governor of Chihuahua. Colonel Miranda then took Capt. Foulois to see General Gutierrez, who soon ordered Capt. Foulois' release. Capt. Foulois then requested that a guard be placed over the two aeroplanes, which request having been granted, Capt. Foulois, in company with Colonel Miranda, then proceeded to the north side of the city to locate the other three aviators and aeroplanes. Upon arrival at the landing place, only Lieut. Dargue, with aeroplane #43, was found, Lieut. Dargue reported that he had landed alongside of aeroplane #45; that Capt. Dodd, had then proceeded into Chihuahua City to locate the American Consul and deliver his duplicate despatches; that after Capt. Dodd had left, a large crowd of natives, Carranzista soldiers, and officers, had collected and proceeded to crowd around the machine, making insulting remarks; that several natives burned holes with cigarettes in the wings of aeroplane #43; that others had slashed the cloth with knives in several places, and extracted bolts and nuts on both machines. The two pilots left with the machines, Lieuts. Dargue and Carberry, felt that the mob would ultimately wreck the machines and decided to fly the machines to the smelters of the American Smelter and Refining Company, located about six miles from Chihuahua City. Lieut. Carberry got away safely without encountering any further difficulties, Lieut. Dargue, in aeroplane #43, got away in the midst of a shower of stones, thrown at him by the mob. He had only flown a short distance when the top section of the Fuselage flew off and damaged the stabilizer, causing him to make immediate landing which he accomplished safely. He then stood off the crowd without further damage to the aeroplane or himself until the arrival of the guard. Captains Foulois and Dodd spent the remainder of the day with the American Consul in arranging for supplies to be sent to the advance troops by railroad. Lieuts. Dargue and Carberry spent the remainder of the day repairing the damage done by the mob on the two aeroplanes.

-April 8, 1916-

Aeroplane #43, Lieut. Dargue, pilot, Capt. B. D. Foulois, observer, and aeroplane #45, Lieut. Carberry, pilot, and Capt. T. F. Dodd, observer, from Chihuahua City to San Geromino with despatches from American Consul to Division Commander.

Orders received to move Aero Squadron base to San Antonio, Mexico.

X

X

X

X

X

-April 10, 1916-

Order received this date to locate troops in vicinity of San Borja, Mexico.

Aeroplane #45 Lieut. H. A. Dargue, pilot, Capt. B. D. Foulois, observer, reconnoitered the area from San Antonio to Ojo Azules -Ojo Caliente - San Borja -Santa Maria - Tres Ibrmanos - Satevo- Carretas and return to San Antonio. No troops discovered within this area.

Aeroplane #45, Lieut. J.E. Carberry, pilot, and Capt. T.F. Dodd, observer, reconnoitered the area from San Antonio - Ojo Caliente - Santa Maria - Satevo, - San Lucas - Santa Cruz - Manula - Santa Isabel and return to San Antonio. No troops discovered within this area.

Orders received this date to move Aero Squadron base to Satevo.

X X X X

Aeroplane #53, Lieut. C.G. Chapman, pilot, on reconnaissance trip to Santa Rosalia (south of Chihuahua City, on Mexican Central Railway). Upon landing at Santa Rosalia, Lieut. Chapman, was taken by Carranza troops, to the Commanding Officer of the Carranza garrison. During his absence from the aeroplane, his field glasses, goggles, and considerable ammunition were stolen from the aeroplane by the Carranza soldiers. Squadron truck train, arrived at Satevo at 11:00 p.m. this date. In passing near the village of Cienagas (about 15 miles north of Satevo) the Squadron train was fired upon by a Villista band. No casualties.

- April 12, 1916 -

Six flights made this date, by three aeroplanes, between Satevo - San Geronimo - Namiquipa and south toward Parral.

Aeroplane #53, Lieut. C.G. Chapman, pilot on reconnaissance flight south toward Parral, for the purpose of locating troops moving in direction of Parral.

- April 13, 1916 -

Aeroplane #42, Lieut. L.A. Rader, pilot on reconnaissance flight south toward Parral, for the purpose of locating troops in direction of Parral. No troops located.

X X X X

Aeroplane #45, Lieut. J.E. Carberry, pilot, Capt. B.D. Foullois, observer, to Chihuahua City with despatches for the American Consul. Received first information regarding fight at Parral.

- April 14, 1916 -

Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H.A. Dargue, pilot, Lieut. E.S. Gorrell, observer, on reconnaissance flight from Columbus, N.M., to Boca Grande - Pulpit Pass - Oraca Pass - Carnastas - Jones - Ascencion and return to Columbus, N.M. Reconnaissance made for the purpose of locating a large Carranzista force, reported to be moving east toward our line of communication. No hostile troops were located within the area covered. Distance of flight 315 miles. American aeroplane record for non-stop flight with two men.

Aeroplane #52, Lieut. L. A. Rader, on reconnaissance flight south from Satevo, toward Parral, to locate troops in vicinity of Parral. Located Major Robert L. Howze's command in vicinity of Ohito, near Durango State line. Pilot was compelled to land on very rough ground, and damaged aeroplane.

Being in a hostile country, 100 miles from the nearest base, and unable to make necessary repairs, the aeroplane was abandoned, and the pilot, proceeded with Major Howze's column.

Aeroplane #45, Lieut. J.E. Carberry, Pilot, Captain B.D. Foulois, observer, from Chihuahua City to Satevo with despatches from Mr. Marion H. Letcher, American Consul, and despatches from General Gutierrez, Military Governor of Chihuahua.

Capt. B.D. Foulois and 14 enlisted men, 1st Aero Squadron, from Satevo to Chihuahua City, in automobile and truck, with despatches for American Consul, and General Gutierrez, Military Governor.

Due to intense feeling in Chihuahua City over the clash between the American troops and troops at Parral, the Detachment of enlisted men was placed in concealment in the outskirts of the city. Capt. Foulois, accompanied by Cpl. Arthur Westermarck, (Chauffeur), proceeded to the American Consulate, delivered the despatches for the American Consul and Military Governor, and left the City without difficulty. Returned to Division Headquarters, at Satevo, same date.

- April 15, 1916 -

Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A. Dargue, Pilot, Lieut. E.S. Gorrell, Observer, on reconnaissance from Columbus, N.M., to Boco Grande - Pulpit Pass - Dublan - from Dublan to Namiquipa - from Namiquipa to Satevo. Total distance 415 miles, with two stops.

Three other flights made this date, between Satevo - San Antonio - and Namiquipa, carrying mail and despatches.

Aeroplane #42, dismantled, condemned and destroyed. Lower wings of this aeroplane placed on aeroplane #45, to replace wings damaged in flight to Chihuahua City.

x x x x

- April 19, 1916 -

Aeroplane #43, Lieut. H. A. Dargue, pilot, Capt. R. E. Willis, observer, on reconnaissance flight from San Antonio to Chihuahua City ~~xxxx~~ West of Chihuahua City the aeroplane motor failed, causing a forced landing in the hills. The aeroplane was completely wrecked. Lieut. Dargue escaped uninjured, Capt. Willis was pinned under the wreckage, sustained a severe scalp wound, and considerably bruised about the legs and ankles. As the aeroplane was completely wrecked, it was burned up, on the spot. The two aviators, with their personal equipment, started to walk to San Antonio, their nearest base, a distance of about 65 miles. After constant suffering and hardship, due to lack of food and water, they reached San Antonio, on April 21st.

x x x x

- April 20, 1916 -

Orders received for the Squadron to return to Columbus, N.M., to secure new aeroplanes. Of the eight aeroplanes taken into Mexico on March 19, 1916, but two were still in commission on this date. These two aeroplanes (Nos. 45 and 53) were in such condition as to be unsafe for further field service. They were therefore flown to Columbus, this date, and ultimately condemned and destroyed.

x x x x



( APPENDIX I )

Stations of Troops, Punitive Expedition, June 30, 1916.

ORGANIZATIONS.	Commanding Officer.	LOCATION	REMARKS
Headquarters Punitive Expedition	Pershing	Dublan	
Hdqrs. 1st Prov. Cav. Brigade	Wilder	El Valle	
5th Cavalry (less Tr. F.)	Wilder	El Valle	Casuals at Dublan
Tr. F, 5th Cav.	Ely		On duty line of communications.
11th Cavalry	Lockett	Dublan	
13th Cavalry (less Tr. I)	Slocum	Angostura*	
Tr. I, 13th Cavalry.			Not with Expedtn.
Hdqrs. 2d Prov. Cav. Brigade	Dodd	El Valle	
7th Cavalry	Erwin	Dublan	
10th Cavalry (less 3d Squadron)	Evans	Dublan	
Troops I, K, M	Luhn	Ojo Federico	
Troop L	Hazzard	Vade de Fusiles	
Hdqrs. 8th Inf. Brigade	Beacom	El Valle	
6th Infantry	Smith	El Valle	
16th Infantry	Allaire	El Valle	
24th Infantry	Ballou	Dublan	
Line of Communication Troops			
17th Infantry (less 1st & 2d Bn.)	Alexander	San Joaquin	
1st Battalion (less Co. A.)	Saffarran	Ojo Federico	
Co. A.	Wagner	Vade de Fusiles	
2nd Battalion	Hardaway	Columbus	
Hdqrs. Divisional Artillery Troops	Berry	Dublan	
1st Bn. 4th F.A. less Batteries A and C.	McMaster	El Valle	
Batteries A and C	Apple	Dublan	
Batteries B & C, 6th F.A.	Pulis	El Valle	
Hdqrs. 2d Battalion Engineers	Brown	Dublan	
Co. E.	Sherman	Vade de Fusiles	
Co. G.	Finch	Ojo Federico	
Co. H.	Graves	El Valle	

( APPENDIX I )

Stations of Troops, Punitive Expedition, June 30, 1916.

ORGANIZATIONS	: Commanding : Officer.	: LOCATION	: REMARKS
HdQRS. Signal Corps Troops	:Chandler	:Columbus	:
1st Aero Squadron	:Foulois	:Columbus	:
1st Aero Squadron Detachment	:	:Dublan	:
Wireless sets	:	:Columbus	:
Wireless sets	:	:Dublan	:
Wireless sets	:	:El Valle	:
Detachment Signal Corps	:	:All Stations:	:
HQRS. Sanitary Troops	:Bratton	:Dublan	:
Ambulance Company #3	:Coffin	:Columbus	:
Ambulance Company #7 (less Mtr.	:	:	:
(ambulance	:Bastion	:El Valle	:
Motor Ambulance Co. #7	:Jones	:	:En route El Valle
Field Hospital #3	:Baker	:Dublan	: to Columbus.
Field Hospital #7	:Hart	:El Valle	:
Corps Civilian Guides & Scouts	:Schallenberger	:Dublan	:
Apache Scouts	:Shannon	:El Valle	:
Wagon Companies			
Number 1 and 2	:Bryson	:Dublan	:
Number 3 and 4	:Logan	:El Valle	:
Auto Transportation			
Truck Train #1	:Taylor	:Galena	:
Truck Train #2	:Bailey	:Ojo Federico:	:
Truck Train #3	:Cavanaugh	:	: On Road work
Truck Train #4	:Pope	:Dublan	:
Truck Train #5	:Hilgrade	:	: On Road work
Truck Train #6	:Furlough	:	: On Road work
Truck Train #7	:Jones	:Columbus	:
Truck Train #8	:Harper	:Dublan	:
Truck Train #9	:Lister	:Columbus	:
Truck Train #10	:Holliday	:Dublan	:
Truck Train #13	:Tobin	:Columbus	:
Truck Train #14	:Game	:Columbus	:
Truck Train #2 Special	:Whitside	:Columbus	:
Pack Trains.			
Numbers 2 and 11	:	:	:With 7th Cavalry
Number 3	:	:	:With 5th "
Number 6	:	:	:With 11th "
Number 7	:	:	:With 10th "
Number 10	:	:	:With 13th "

\* Not on line of communications.

( APPENDIX J.)

ENGAGEMENTS OF TROOPS OF PUNITIVE EXPEDITION  
UP TO JUNE 30, 1916.

DATE	PLACE	U.S. TROOPS	CHARACTER OF ENEMY	NUMBER OF U.S. TROOPS		NUMBER OF ENEMY (a)		LOSSES OF U.S.		LOSSES OF ENEMY			
				Off	E.M.	Off	E.M.	K	W	K	W		
Mar. 29	Guerrero	7th Cavalry Dodd & Erwin	Villistas	25	345		(b)	5		56	35		
Apr. 1	Agua Caliente	10th Cavalry Brown	Villistas	14	258					3	(c)		
Apr. 7	Agua Zarca	7th Cavalry Kendrick	Villistas	2	95					3	2		
Apr. 10	La Joya	11th Cavalry Howze	Villistas	10	255			1	3	7	(c)		
Apr. 12	Parral	13th Cavalry Tompkins	Carran-zistas	8	120			2	6	40	(c)		
Apr. 20	Green Road Verde River	7th Cavalry Brown	Villistas	1	45						3		
Apr. 22	Tomochic	7th Cavalry Dodd	Villistas	10	145			2	3	32	25		
May 5	Ojos Azules	11th Cavalry Howze	Villistas	14	319					61	50		
May 14	San Miguel de Rubio	6th Infantry Patton	Villistas	1	14						3		
May 25	Alamillo Canyon	17th Infantry Cpl. Marksbury	Villistas		11			1	2	2	(c)		
June 9	Santa Clara Canyon	13th Cavalry Rethorst	Villistas	1	20					2	(c)		
June 21	Carrizal	10th Cavalry Boyd	Carran-zistas	3	87			9	12	42	51		
Total casualties.										15	31	251	166

(a) The strength of enemy and casualties obtained from official reports or from officers who participated.

(b) The Villistas stationed at San Ysidro are included.

(c) Number unknown.

(d) Three missing.

(APPENDIX K)

Arms, Ammunition and Property Captured by Punitive Expedition.

The following tabulation shows the number of arms, ammunition, etc., captured from the Villistas in the course of the operations Punitive Expedition, U. S. Army, during the period from March 25, to June 30, 1916.

Date	Place	U.S. Troops	Machine Guns	Rifles	Pistols	Ammunition	Horses	Mules	Saddles
March 29	GUERRERO	7th Cav.							
		Dodd	2	44			13	23	3
		Erwin							
April 1	AGUA CALIENTE	10th Cav.							
		Brown		7					
April 4	NAMIQUIPA	6th Inf.							
		Lauber		14	5	400			
April 7	AGUA ZARCA	7th Cav.							
		Kendrick		5					
April 10	LA JOYA	11th Cav.							
		Howze		7					
April 20	GREEN ROAD - VERDE River	7th Cav.							
		Brown		3					
April 22	TOMOCHIC	7th Cav.							
		Dodd		3			10	15	7
May 5	OJOS AZULES	11th Cav.							
		Howze		44			75		
May 25	ALAMILLO CANYON	17th Inf. Cpl.							
		Marksbury		2					
May 27	EL ROSAL CANYON	Namiquipa							
		Vol. Espinosa	11	380					12
June 1	ENCINO CANYON	13th Cav.							
		Turner		94				3	3
June 10	SANTA CLARA CANYON	13th Cav.							
		Rethorst		2					
Total . . . . .			13	605	5	400	98	41	25

NOTE

- Rifles:- Many of the above number were turned over to friendly home guard; others were broken up on the spot, and others that were useless, were given to troops as souvenirs.
- Horses:- Most of these horses were returned to their owners in the vicinity of the place of capture; others were turned in for use of native scouts.
- Mules:- The next above remark applies to the mules.
- Saddles:- Most of these were worthless and were given to natives.

(APPENDIX L)

List of Villista Leaders at Columbus Riad, killed and wounded in Action.

"General" Francisco Villa,	Wounded at GUERRERO, March 27th.
" Juan Pedrosa,	" " " " "
" Pablo Lopez,	Executed at city of CHIHUAHUA.
"Colonel" Manuel Baca,	Killed at SANTO TOMAS, April 22nd.
" Ramon Tarango,	Killed at GUERRERO, March 29th.
" Candelario Cervantes,	Killed at ALAMILLO, May 25th.
" Enriquez,	Killed at COLUMBUS, March 9th.
" Mauro Dominguez,	Killed at GUERRERO, March 27th.
" Alberto Camargo,	" " " " "
" Antonio Castillo,	" " " " "
" Elisee Alvarez,	Executed at EL ESTADO.
"Lt.Col." Pablo Sanchez,	Killed at COLUMBUS, March 9th.
" Cruz Chavez,	" " " " "
" Carmen Ortiz,	" " " " "
" Elijio Hernandez,	Killed at GUERRERO, March 29th.
" Cipriano Vargas,	Killed at COLUMBUS, March 9th.
" Jose Bencome,	Killed at ALAMILLO, May 25th.
"Major" Emilio Pedross,	Wounded at GUERRERO, March 27th.
" Pablo Vasquez,	Killed at COLUMBUS, March 9th.
" Pablo Chavez,	" " " " "
" Trinidad Castillo,	" " " " "
" Jesus Baeza,	" " " " "
"Captain" Francisco Antonio Perez,	" " " " "
" Silvino Sato,	Wounded at GUERRERO, March 27th.
" Jose Gonzales,	" " COLUMBUS, March 9th.
" Arcadio Baldanio,	" " " " "
" Julian Aguirre,	Killed at COLUMBUS, March 9th.
" Francisco,	" " " " "

( APPENDIX M )

Casualties in Action Among Participants Columbus Raid.

1. The number of Villistas who participated in the Columbus raid based on information received from native sources, is four hundred and eighty-five. The Casualty list of Columbus raiders in actions from March 9, to June 30, includes their losses at Columbus.

Date	:	Place	:	Killed:	Wounded
March 9	:	Engagement at Columbus, N.M.	:	90(a):	23
March 19	:	" " NAMIQUIPA (c)	:	1 :	
March 20	:	Skirmish at LAS ANIMAS (c)	:	6 :	(b)
March 27	:	Engagement at GUERRERO (c)	:	15 :	(b)
March 29	:	" " "	:	56 :	35
April 1	:	Skirmish at AGUE CALIENTE	:	3 :	(b)
April 3	:	Engagement at CIENEGUITA (c)	:	26 :	(b)
April 7	:	Skirmish at AGUA ZARCA	:	3 :	2
April 10	:	Engagement at LA JOYA	:	7 :	(b)
April 20	:	Skirmish GREEN Road VERDE River	:		3
April 22	:	Engagement at TOMOCHIC	:	32 :	25
May 5	:	Engagement at OJOS AZULES (d)	:	30(a):	20
May 25	:	Skirmish at ALAMILLO	:	2 :	(b)
June 9	:	" " SANTA CLARA CANYON	:	2 :	(b)
Total,			:	273	108

- (a) Includes Villistas who died as a result of their wounds
- (b) Number of wounded unknown.
- (c) Between de facto troops and Villistas.
- (d) Only 30 Columbus raiders estimated killed out of total of 61.

Of the total number of 485 Villistas who attacked Columbus, N.M., March 9th, 1916, two hundred seventy three have been reported killed; one hundred eight wounded, who were not captured; nineteen are held in confinement by U. S. troops; and one hundred and fifty six are still at large, of whom sixty have been amnestied by the de factogovernment, leaving thirty seven unaccounted for.

(APPENDIX N)

ITINERARY OF FRANCISCO VILLA, MARCH 8 TO JUNE 30, 1916:

From information obtained through native sources after very careful inquiry by the officers of the Intelligence Department of the Expedition, the following facts have been compiled regarding the attack on Columbus, March 9, 1916, and the flight of Villa thereafter:

The Attack of Columbus, N.M., March 9, 1916.

March 8,- The Villa forces left the Bocas Grandes Ranch Camp at 5:00 p.m., March 7, and followed a trail leading almost due north for about six miles, thence east for three miles to a ravine, arriving there at about 10:30 p.m. The purpose of this move was to eliminate the chances of their presence being known. Lieut-Colonel Gipriano Vargas, of Villa's staff and one other officer were detached on patrol duty during the afternoon to proceed to Columbus, for observation purposes. The advisability of attacking Columbus, N.M., was discussed by the leaders in view of the escape of the three cow-boys from the Bocas Grandes Ranch and the probability of their warning the garrison. Villa has already disclosed his attitude as opposed to proceeding with the expedition. Villa has decided on no definite plan as yet and awaits the return and report of Vargas. The dry camp in the ravine was left at about 5:00 a.m., and after an hour's march in a southeasterly direction the Bocas Grandes River was reached at a point about five miles east of Bocas Grandes Ranch, near the junction of the Bocas Grande-Palomas road and river, where camp was made. At about noon the Vargas' patrol arrived with the information that the American garrison at Columbus consisted of only about thirty men, that at 3:30 a.m. that morning he had no encountered outguards and that no one had been seen enroute. Despite this favorable report of the condition at Columbus, Villa was undecided, fearing that the attack, if made, would not be the surprise he had planned. Many of the other leaders were also opposed to the attack, but remained mute construing their Chief's opposition to the attack as a feint to test their own courage. Villa being pressed for a decision by a number of leaders who favored the attack, at about 2:00 a.m. consented to attack Columbus at daylight March 9; the necessary orders for the march were issued and the plan of attack discussed by the assembled leaders.

March 9,- The Villa force left the Bocas Grandes River camp at about 4:00 p.m., March 8, and marched by trail leading generally northeast in direction of Columbus, N.M. The march formation adopted at Cruces was retained except that the distance between detachments was reduced. The formation and estimated strength of each detachment are as follows:

Advance Guard.

"Colonel" Candelario Cervantes	80 Men
<u>Main Body.</u> (in order of march)	
(a) "Colonel" Nicolas Hernandez,	60 Men
(b) "General" Francisco Villa, Hdqrs. Staff and Escort.	80 Men

<u>Main Body:</u> (Cont'd)	Fow'd	220 men
(c) "General" Pablo Lopez,		100 men
(d) "General" Juan Pedrosa,		40 men
(e) "General" Francisco Beltran,		<u>125 men</u>
	Total	485 men.

Rear Guard:

The rear guard consisted of a detachment of ten men belonging to Beltran's band, (included in the above total).

The march was continuous until about 1:00 a.m., March 9, when an arroyo was reached and a short halt ordered. Thereafter the march was conducted slowly and quietly across country in the same general direction until the point of the Advance Guard at 3:30 o'clock a.m., reached a point about 500 yards south of the railroad track and about 2,000 yards west of the Columbus knoll. The command to dismount was here given and Villa ordered assembled the leaders to whom he gave his order for attack as follows:

(a) Cervantes you advance in line of skirmishers with your right on the knoll (pointing) and occupy it with your detachment. One-half of my escort will report to you for instructions for such use as you deem proper.

(b) Pablo Lopez you form in line of skirmishers on Cervantes' left. Guide your center on the railroad track.

(c) Fernandez will form in line of skirmishers facing east on Lopez's left and will attack the town from the north.

(d) Beltran you will form on the left of Fernandez and attack from the north enveloping the enemy.

(e) Pedrosa will remain with the horses with one-half of my escort as a reserve.

(f) I will be found with the reserve.

At 4:15 a.m., the command had formed in line of skirmishers facing east, and, with a parting word from Villa, "Go ahead, boys," and the counter sign "Viva Mexico" the line advanced. Cervantes' detachment and one-half of the Villa escort advanced with its right on the knoll just west of the town. At 4:45 a.m., the knoll was occupied and fifteen minutes later, when the advanced skirmishers reached the houses in the town a brisk fire commenced on all sides. At daylight the Villistas could see that the number of American soldiers greatly exceeded the number that had been reported to them. Their retreat commenced at 6:30 o'clock a.m., by men carrying away the wounded to the rear where their reserve and mounts were located; these were followed by individual skirmishers and then by groups. The threats of Villa who had remained with the horses through the action were insufficient to stop them and return to the fight. At 7:15 o'clock a.m., practically the entire Villa force except Cervantes and Fernandez and a small detachment had retreated. The leaders were charged with their own wounded, and as these arrived from the town they were strapped and tied to their mounts. Cervantes joined at about 7:30 o'clock a.m., when the retreat of the Villistas into Mexico began in earnest, but with great confusion. Villa, in person, with an escort of about thirty men occupied a

ridge about three miles southeast of Columbus in order to cover the retreat of groups that had been delayed. The retreat was continued to the north bank of the Bocas Grandes River at a point about one mile west of Vade de Fusiles, which was reached at about 1:00 p.m. Orders for a halt were here given; the horses were unsaddled and an effort made to check the losses. Villa, in person, made the check assisted by Manuel Baca and Ramon Tarango; he there announced that about one hundred men were unaccounted for as killed, wounded or missing. Twenty-six wounded had been brought away and among them were "General" Pablo Lopez and Lieut-Colonel Chavez; both were so seriously injured that they had to be carried on litters. Chavez was thought to be especially in a critical condition; the bullet having lodged on his left side. Villa himself extracted it with his pocket knife. The march was resumed at 2:30 o'clock p.m., in the direction of Los Papolotes, (Shown as Twin Mills on map). The leading elements of the straggling force continued the march all that night via La Bajada to Ascencion. The wounded were taken as far as the first pass north of Bajada (about twelve miles north of Ascencion on the Ascencion-Bajada-Twin Mills road). The principal Villa forces rested at different points along the road in the mountains between Hirsh's Hole and the pass four miles south of Twin Mills.

March 10,- "General" Juan Pedrosa, with about thirty men had been detailed to march to Ascencion with all haste in advance of the column and procure wagon transportation for the wounded. Two wagons were started from Ascencion at daybreak and met the wounded at La Bajada. Lieut-Colonel Cruz Chavez died in the afternoon at Ascencion. The retreat thus far entailed great hardships for all, but especially for the wounded. The men were comfortably billeted in the Pueblo; all of the available food and forage was confiscated, and for the first time in three days was there sufficiency of food for men and horses.

March 11,- Villa and his band of stragglers left Ascencion at 8:00 a.m., considerably rested after the strenuous march to and from Columbus, and marched to Vuelta de Alamos, (five miles west of Corralitos Ranch). Vuelta de Alamos was reached at 4:00 o'clock p.m. Fernandez with a detail of twenty men is ordered to Corralitos Ranch for the purpose of seizing wagons to transport the wounded. These wagons reached the main Villa camp at Vuela de Alamos during the night March 11 - 12.

March 12,- The main detachment left Vuelta de Alamos at 8:00 a.m. this date and marched to Corralitos Ranch, arriving there at about 10:00 a.m. In the afternoon Villa sent a letter by messenger to the Carranza commander at Casas Grandes, apprising him of the fact that he was at Corralitos Ranch and that during the night following he, Villa, with his forces, would pass in the vicinity of Casas Grandes enroute to Galeana. The letter contained the additional information that the Carranzistas and Villistas should consider themselves as brothers-in-arms against a common foe, the United States of America. The Villistas being now united for the first time since the retreat commenced from Columbus, N.M., a reorganization of their forces was effected on the afternoon of this date.

March 13,- The villa forces left Corralitos Ranch at 8:00 p.m., March 12, with the following formation:

Advance Guard.

"Colonel" Candelario Cervantes commanding, 50 men

Main Body.

(a) "General" Nicolas Fernandez, 50 men

(b) "General" Francisco Beltran, 100 men

(c) "Colonel" Martin Lopez, 80 men

(d) "General" Juan Pedrosa, 40 men

(3 wagons and one light vehicle containing 23 wounded not included in total).

(e) "General" Francisco Villa and Escort, 60 men

Total 380 men

Rear Guard.

A detachment of ten men from Villa's escort, (included in the above total).

The peaceful attitude of the Carranza garrison at Casas Grandes was assured as their out-post at Embarcadero (R.R. stock yard about one mile north of Colonia Dublan) had been withdrawn to the main garrison. El Charco, a point about twelve miles north of Galeana was reached at day break; after a short halt there the march was continued to Vado de los Chinos, four miles north of Galeana, where beef cattle had been slaughtered by Villa's advance scouts. In the afternoon the march was resumed to the Pueblo of Galeana. That night Villa conferred with Fernandez over the exceedingly bad condition of the mounts of the entire force; it was brought out that unless fresh mounts were soon made available, a large number of men would be dismounted. Villa stated to Fernandez that a general round-up of fresh mounts was urgent; that as the district of Namiquipa and Cruces had been, in the past, heavily drawn on for mounts, it was well to make a search for them in other places. The country to the west of Galeana presented to both a favorable field. Fernandez received instructions detaching him with about twenty men from the main column at Galeana with orders to march to Rubio by way of La Cantara-Las Animas-Santa Clara-La Quemada road; at Rubio he was to use his influence to induce Perez and Cardenas to join.

March 14,- The Villistas moved out of Galeana at 9:00 o'clock a.m. The wagon train bearing the wounded which had proceeded the main column by about three hours was overtaken in the immediate vicinity of El Valle; the pueblo of El Valle was reached at about 6:00 o'clock p.m. Upon arrival the wounded were assigned to quarters at the school house and left in charge of one Vega, the school teacher. The men were billeted with the most prosperous natives.

March 15,- The Villista force remained at El Valle all of this day resting the grazing. Villa helped himself to all the provisions, horses and cattle available in the pueblo. In the afternoon he delivered a short address, which in general terms can be quoted as follows: "Gentlemen, I have wanted you all present here to inform you that the Americans are about to come into Mexico to fight us. War has already been declared and I desire to see how many of you

will join me; how many of you will take up arms. I have soldiers with me from all of the pueblos except from your own and it is essential that your pueblo be held above criticism. Fear nothing, I promise you not to fire a single cartridge against Mexicans, and if, one day, I do so you may say that I am a barbarian." He took advantage of the gathering and impressed into service about forty men.

March 16,-Cervantes scouts brought the information during the night 15 - 16 that a Carranza force estimated at 500 under Colonels Cano and Salas was marching on El Valle to attack. This Carranza force occupied Namiquipa soon after Villa's departure for the United States and had been stationed there since. There was some anxiety felt for the defenseless wounded and among them the disposition of "General" Pablo Lopez presented a difficult problem. Villa ordered a detachment of ten men under an officer to take charge of Pablo Lopez and join Fernandez at Las Animas. In order to avoid the Carranza force he ordered that El Valle be evacuated that afternoon not later than 6:00 p.m. The Villistas cleared the pueblo at that hour and had marched not more than two miles, to a ranch called La Boca, in the direction of Cruces, when the Carranza and Villista forces came into clear view of each other. The Villistas anxious to avoid a conflict changed direction to the southwest and followed an arroyo leading to the foothills; neither force opened fire. It was obvious that the Carranzistas were equally anxious to avoid a fight, no effort being made on their part to engage in pursuit. The Villistas were permitted to continue their march in the direction of El Arco a point twelve miles southwest of El Valle, undisturbed. El Arco was reached, at about midnight where camps was made for the night.

March 17, - Villa left El Arco camp at 7:00 o'clock a.m. and marched southeast along the eastern slope of the Sierra Madre Oriental in the direction of the pueblo of Cruces. Cruces was occupied about 5:00 o'clock p.m., and the men billeted in the houses for the night.

March 18, - The Villistas at this time are uncertain as to whether Namiquipa is occupied by a Carranza force. Their departure from Cruces is accordingly timed as to permit them plenty of time to reconnoiter enroute. Namiquipa was to be occupied at all hazards, but if it became necessary to fight for its possession the Villistas preferred to undertake the attack at night. Cruces was left at 8:00 a.m. and the short route via Cienega de Los Amoles selected. Cienega de Los Amoles was reached at 11:00 o'clock a.m., where a halt was made to permit patrols to visit the vicinity of Namiquipa. The patrols returned about 5:00 p.m. with information that the entire Carranza garrison had moved south two days before. The march to Namiquipa was resumed and the pueblo was reached at about 11:00 p.m. without incident.

#### The Engagement at Namiquipa.

March 19, - During the night information reached Villa that the Carranza force that has been seen marching entering El Valle while his own force was leaving there, was returning and enroute to Namiquipa. As Villa's desire at

this time appears to have been to avoid a clash with Carrancistas, he gave orders to leave the pueblo before their arrival. At 9:00 a.m., Namiquipa had been abandoned by the Villista detachment under the direct command of their respective leaders and their advance detachment had hardly reached the foot-hills near Los Carritos, about four miles to the east, when information reached Villa that the Carranza forces under Colonel Salas had cleared the pueblo of Namiquipa and was pursuing to attack him. The Carranza force was estimated at two hundred, while Villa's strength exceeded 400. Under these new conditions Villa felt justified to give the order to return immediately to meet the Carrancistas, contrary to his announced pledge not to fight Mexicans. The encounter took place on the plateau just west of Los Carritos and in a fire fight lasting not more than two hours the Carranzistas were completely routed. The Villistas plunder consisted of about 100 rifles, 2 machine guns, 100 horses with equipment and the capture of about sixty prisoners, most of whom were released after the engagement.

March 20, - The Villistas left Namiquipa a second time on this date at about 8:00 o'clock a.m., and marched to El Rosal Canyon (Lajan's Well) south of El Oso Ranch via Rivera-El Oso Ranch road, where camp was made. That night the fugitives from the Las Animas fight brought information of the defeat of "General" Fernandez at Las Animas, and that "General Pablo Lopez had escaped to the mountains in the vicinity of the Santa Clara Ranch. (Villa's itinerary continued on page 106).

Fernandez Itinerary From Galeana to Las Animas.

March 14,- The Fernandez detachment left Galeana at about 9:30 a.m., delay in leaving due to difficulty in providing provisions for the march, Villa had already left for El Valle on the Galeana-El Valle Road. Fernandez arrived at Ojo Caliente about dark where camp for the night was made.

March 15,- The detachment left Ojo Caliente at about sunrise and marched to San Lorenzo, arriving there at about 5:00 o'clock p.m.; about fifty mounts were collected enroute.

March 16,- Fernandez remained at San Lorenzo resting the men and grazing the horses. A Villa courier reached Fernandez during the night with the information that "General" Pablo Lopez with a small escort would join him at San Lorenzo and to wait for him there.

March 17,- The Fernandez detachment continued in camp at San Lorenzo; "General Pablo Lopez joined with a detail of ten men.

March 18,- The detachment left the camp at San Lorenzo at about 8:00 a.m., and marched to a stock farm named Juan Largo about six miles south of San Lorenzo. The detachment continued the search for mounts. Camp was not made until about 11:00 p.m.

March 19,- The detachment moved out of camp at Juan Largo at 6:00 a.m. and marched to Las Animas, arriving there at about noon.

March 20,- Preparations were being made to leave Las Animas at sunrise when the Carranzistas under Colonel Cano attacked Fernandez with a much superior force. A messenger was immediately sent to notify "General" Pablo Lopez, billeted at a nearby ranch, of the approach of the Carranzistas. Lopez forced himself on a mount without assistance and made good his escape. With a small detail he took refuge in a cave between Tepehuanes and Santa Catalina. Fernandez was completely routed but a considerable portion of his detachment was able to escape with the fresh mounts that had been gathered up to that time. Fernandez retreated to the south by the way of El Oso-Los Tanques-Las Varas Road and on March 27, joined Villa's main column just before the fight at Guerrero. For a time Villa feared that Fernandez had been lost and at San Diego del Monte, detached his Chief of Staff, "Colonel" Manuel Baca, with a detail of men to make inquiry for him.

Villa's Itinerary (continued).

March 21,- The main column under Villa left El Rosal Canyon (Lugan's Well) at 7:00 o'clock a.m., and marched to camp that night called La Cartuchera, by way of the El Rosal Canyon trail; distance marched about twelve miles. The trail was found quite rough and progress was very slow.

March 22, - The La Cartuchera camp was left at 8:00 a.m., and camp made that night at La Quemada. Distance marched about fifteen miles. "Colonel" Julian Cardenas with about twenty followers was waiting here for Villa's arrival, when he joined. Meat was plentiful but no bread.

March 23,- La Quemada Camp was left at 8:00 a.m. and marched to Rubio, arriving there at 8:00 p.m. Corroborative information reaches Villa here that "General" Pablo Lopez was safe in a cave in the Santa Clara mountains. "General" Jesus Maria Rios joins enroute with about 30 followers, having marched from Bachineva for the purpose.

March 24,- Horses and men are rested and grazed; the continuous march to and from Columbus, N.M. had been strenuous and as a consequence the men and horses were in very poor condition. With the addition of Cardenas and Rios's detachments and recruits a reorganization of the forces is necessary and ordered.

March 26,- In order to escape observation on the march from Rubio to San Diego del Monte, as the country to be traversed is a level plain Villa decides on a night march; he leaves Rubio camp at about 5:00 o'clock p.m. and marches to San Diego del Monte, arriving there at about 1:30 a.m. The march formation and estimated strength were as follows:

Advance Guard.

Villa Staff and Escort - strength estimated at	60 men
"Colonel" Julian Cardenas detachment attached to escort	20 men
<u>Main Body. (in order of March)</u>	
(a) "Colonel" Candelario Cervantes,	60 men
(b) "Colonel" Jesus Maria Rios,	30 men
(c) "General" Juan Pedrosa,	50 men

<u>Main Body (continued)</u>	Fow'd	220 men
(d) "Colonel Martin Lopez,		80 men
(e) "General" Francisco Beltran,		120 men
(f) "General" Nicolas Fernandez detachment "Pedrito" in charge		<u>30 men</u>
	Total	450 men

Rear Guard.

A detachment of ten men furnished by "General" Francisco Beltran's detachment, (included in above total).

March 26,- The Villa detachment left San Diego Del Monte at 7:00 a.m. and marched across country in a southwesterly direction to Agua Calientes. In order to conceal his movements and not to emerge in the Guerrero plain before dark, Villa, at about 11:00 a.m. ordered a halt at an arroyo about twelve miles southwest of San Diego del Monte. The detachment remained there until about four o'clock, when the march was resumed in the same general direction. Agua Caliente was passed at about 7:00 o'clock p.m. The object of the march was now announced; a simultaneous attack was to be made at day-break on Guerrero, Minaca and San Ysidro. The direction of the line of march changes to the westward in the direction of Guerrero at about 8:00 o'clock p.m. and maintained until midnight.

BATTLE OF GUERRERO.

March 27,- The march continued due west in the direction of Guerrero to a point about two miles north of the Mexican Northwestern Railroad and about ten miles southeast of San Ysidro, where at about 12:30 a.m. the halt and dismount order was given. Villa then assembled his leaders and give the following attack orders:

1. To Beltran and Martin Lopez: You will attack the Carranza garrison at Minaca, estimated at 80 men before dawn.

2. To Rios and "Captain" Pedrito in temporary command of the Fernandez detachment: You will attack the Carranza garrison at San Ysidro, estimated at 50 before dawn. (the actual strength of the enemy at San Ysidro is estimated at about 250).

3. To Cervantes and Pedrosa: You will attack the Carranza garrison at Guerrero, estimated at 100 men before dawn, one-half of my escort will report to you for duty.

4. I will be with the horse holders near the grave-yard in the vicinity of Guerrero with the remainder of my escort in reserve.

Beltran and Lopez immediately left the column with their detachments and marched in the direction of Minaca; the detachments designated to attack San Ysidro and Guerrero continued on the march and upon arriving at the railroad crossing about five miles from San Ysidro, the detachment designated to attack San Ysidro also left the column. The principal detachment, under Villa, continued the march across country to the vicinity of Guerrero.

The Minaca engagement proved to be a very minor affair. The Carranza garrison there was asleep and readily surrendered when they saw themselves covered on all sides by Villistas.

The Guerrero Carranza garrison was also asleep. Information having been obtained from a native as to the location of arms and ammunition of the Carranza

garrison, the Villistas without awakening the Carranza garrison, entered the barracks and captured three machine guns (two of these were later captured by the U.S. Troops) and a supply of ammunition. The Carranza garrison surrendered after a fire fight lasting five hours; firing having commenced at about 4:00 a.m.

At San Ysidro the conditions were not found so favorable. The Presidente of San Ysidro had entertained the Carranza commander, General Cavazos at a dinner and dance the night before the Cavazos in order to do honor to the occasion and marched there from Guerrero, his permanent Headquarters, with a considerable portion of his force. The small Villista force sent here to attack encountered superior numbers and were easily repulsed. The force of Villistas retreated in the direction of Guerrero to the reserve in the grave-yard, where Villa, in person, was observing the Guerrero fight, closely pursued by the Carranzistas. The day was just breaking but there was sufficient light to enable Villa to distinguish the retreat of his San Ysidro force and the danger of the mounts belonging to his detachment engaged at Guerrero, falling into the hands of the Carranzistas. Realizing that quick action was required he led his band of forty "dorados" held in reserve in a charge against the Carranzistas under Cavazos. The charge resulted in repulse of the Carranzistas who thought themselves attacked by a much superior force. Villa entrusted further pursuit to officers of his escort and was returning to his original post near the grave-yard when a bullet struck him on the left leg, midway between the heel and knee. The bullet entered from the rear, penetrating the shin bone.

At 10:00 o'clock p.m. Villa was removed from Ciudad Guerrero and taken to a ranch in the suburbs of the pueblo, with an escort, of ten "Dorados." "General" Juan Pedrosa and the other important wounded remained in Guerrero.

March 28,- The day at Guerrero following the engagement between Carranzistas and Villistas was utilized in collecting horses to mount the Carranzistas captured, about eighty in number, who joined the Villistas.

At about 9:00 o'clock p.m., this date, the following Villista detachments left Guerrero under "General" Nicolas Fernandez, as guard for the train of wounded which consisted of three vehicles one for "General" Juan Pedrosa and Major Emilio Pedrosa; one for "Colonel" Mauro Dominguez and "Major" Alberto Camargo and one for two other officers. The detachment marched in a southeasterly direction following a ranch road.

Villa Headquarters, Staff and Escort,	50 men
"Colonel" Julian Cardenas,	15 men
Escort for "General" Juan Pedrosa,	15 men
"General" Nicholas Fernandez detachment,	<u>50 men</u>
Total	130 men

Villia's itinerary continued on page 108.

DISPOSITION OF VILLA FORCES IN GUERRERO DISTRICT  
WHEN ATTACKED BY AMERICAN TROOPS AT CUIDAD GUERRERO.

The disposition of the Villistas in the district of Guerrero at midnight 28 - 29, the night prior to attack of Ciudad Guerrero by American troops was as follows:

- (a) At Ciudad Guerrero, "Colonel" Canderario Cervantes  
Commanding.
- |                                 |                |
|---------------------------------|----------------|
| "Colonel" Candelario Cervantes, | 100 men        |
| "General" Julia Acosta          | 50 men         |
| "Colonel" Martin Lopez,         | 80 men         |
| Total                           | <u>230 men</u> |
- (b) At San Ysidro, "General" Francisco Beltran,  
Commanding.
- |                              |                |
|------------------------------|----------------|
| "General" Francisco Beltran, | 120 men        |
| "General" Jesus Maria Rios,  | 30 men         |
| Total                        | <u>150 men</u> |

THE ENGAGEMENT AT GUERRERO BETWEEN U. S. TROOPS AND VILLISTAS.

March 29,- The celebration of the Villista victory at Guerrero continued well into the early hours of this date. Precaution of outguards had been disregarded by the Villistas for the reason that the arrival of the Carranzistas was not expected for several days, while it was considered improbable that the American troops reported at El Valle on the 27th instant, should appear in their vicinity. The Villistas had saddled and orders to assemble given them when at about 8:00 p.m. the natives called attention to a mounted force on the table land to the south of the pueblo at a distance of about two miles. Cervantes, the commander of the Villistas, was immediately notified and gave orders for each detachment leader to conduct his forces to Arisiachic independently by the most practicable route.

DISINTEGRATION OF VILLA FORCES.

The situation forced on the Villistas by the appearance of the U.S. Troops caused their forces to be divided into three detachments, each of which was pursued by detachments of U.S. Troops. That these Villistas failed to unite subsequently for joint operations was due to the presence of the American troops.

The leaders of the three Villa detachments and their estimated strength on March 29, at about 6:00 p.m., were as follows:

- (a) "Colonel Cervantes" including "General" Julia Acosta's  
detachment 200 men
- (b) "General" Francisco Beltran, including "General" Rios'  
force and "Colonel" Martin Lopez 170 men

- (c) "General" Nicolas Fernandez, and Villa's escorts,  
in command of Julian Cardenas with wounded, in-  
cluding "General" Villa 130 men.

The detachments under Cervantes at Ciudad Guerrero being unprepared to fight, engaged the U.S. Troops, only in a running fight and retreated to the mountains in the vicinity of Arisiachio.

"Colonel" Martin Lopez became separated from Cervantes at Guerrero with not more than twenty of his men, retreated in the direction of San Ysidro, where "General" Francisco Beltran and "General" Jesus Maria Rios were stationed; the information given by Lopez to Beltran and Rios on the arrival of the American troops was also a complete surprise to them. Neither of the three leaders had any idea of the number of Americans who had attacked Cervantes at Guerrero. The detachment, "General" Francisco Beltran, retreated to Bachinesa by way of Calera Pass. "Colonel" Martin Lopez followed them with his detachment to 20 men.

Villa's Itinerary. (Continued).

March 29,- The Fernandez detachment that left Guerrero at 10:00 p.m. as escort for wounded train at daybreak this date found itself marching across country at a point eight miles west of Minaca. Villa was overtaken at daylight riding a coach and joined the column. Officers and soldiers were surprised at meeting Villa at this point as upon leaving Guerrero, they believed him to be with the other wounded.

The march continued to a small ranch about five miles south of Minaca which was reached at 9:00 a.m., there the first rest halt was made. It was intended to halt here for the day but the plans were suddenly changed at about 4:30 o'clock p.m. The detachment left the ranch at about 4:30 p.m., and marched in the direction of Cusihiuiriachic. On account of the critical condition of "Colonel" Mauro Dominguez, he was left in the vicinity of the ranch in care of the natives, and "Major" Alberto Camargo, who died during the halt was buried before departure. At midnight the detachment passed in the vicinity of the pueblo of Cusihiuiriachic. The march that night was continued to a draw about five miles south of Cusihiuiriachic, which was reached about daybreak, March 30; a dry camp was made at this point.

March 30,- The march of the Fernandez detachment with Villa was again resumed at about 7:00 a.m.; the object being only to locate water for men and beast. A water hole was found at about one hour's march due south from the morning camp. Since leaving Ciudad Guerrero the men of the detachment had had but very little nourishment. The order to saddle and resume the march was given at about four o'clock. A short march of about two hours was made to the south off the trail so as to preclude all probability of discovery.

March 31,- The march is resumed at about 7:00 a.m., and continued due south for about two hours to a small ranch house about four miles from the night's camp. In crossing a ravine the vehicle carrying Villa very nearly overturned. It was decided to remain here in camp to rest and construct.

litters for the wounded. Horses are again quickly saddled on information that a Carranza force is moving south and at about 4:00 p.m. the march is resumed. A dry camp is made at about 2:00 A.M.

April 1, - The Fernandez detachment leaves camp at 11:00 a.m. Villa is carried on a litter, the other wounded follow in wagons. The road this day was unusually rough and the intermittent snow falling during the day caused the road to be slippery and dangerous; at a distance of about three miles north of Cienegitta (Perez Ranch) one of the wheels of the vehicle Villa had occupied broke and the vehicle was abandoned. Villa himself reached Cienegitta (Perez Ranch) at about 5:30 p.m.

April 2, - The Ciengetta camp was left at 8:00 o'clock a.m. The detachment marched south by a ranch road in the direction of Santa Ana, passing to the east of San Borja. At about 1:00 o'clock p.m. a small ranch house in the outskirts of Santa Ana was reached. Villa was left at a short distance from the house with an escort of ten men, while the detachment under Fernandez and the other wounded entered and occupied the pueblo of Santa Ana. Fernandez in person, delivered a verbal message from Villa to one Dolores Rodriquez, asking him, Rodriquez, to accompany an orderly to the outskirts of the pueblo for a very important mission; (Villa's presence was not disclosed to Rodriquez at this time). Fernandez carried an autograph letter from Villa dated Ciudad Guerrero, March 27, which he handed to one Mariano Hernandez; the letter requested Hernandez to provide for the wounded, he, Villa, was sending him. Rodriquez visited Villa in the outskirts of Santa Ana and arranged for a hiding place for him. With Rodriquez as guide, Villa and escort are led to a water hole about ten miles southeast of Santa Ana called Ojitos. In order to reach this place of concealment it was necessary for Villa to ride a horse. Villa remained at Ojitos from April 3 to 6, inclusive.

April 7, - Dolores Rodriques returned at Ojitos during the night of April 6 - 7, and informs Villa of the announced intentions of the Carranza commander, General Cavazos, who had arrived at Santa Ana, to search the mountains in that vicinity for him, Villa. Acting under Rodriquez's advice, Villa again mounts his horse and with his escort marched due south about fifteen miles, following an indistinct and dangerous trail, to the vicinity of El Aguaje. A messenger had been sent in advance to one Gorgonio Beltran of Santa Cruz de Herrera, asking him to come to El Aguaje for conference. Beltran arrived at Villa's camp near El Aguaje on April 9. Villa remained at El Aguaje on April 8th and 9th.

April 10, - Villa leaves the vicinity of El Aguaje this date and marches to the vicinity of Santa Cruz de Herrera, arriving there the same day. Since Villa was wounded at Guerrero he had made it a practice not to remain within the limit of any pueblo overnight. He made no exceptions at the pueblo Santa Cruz de Herrera; his camp was established at a point about one mile from the group of houses which constitute the pueblo.

The American troops arrived at Santa Cruz de Herrera during the night of April 10 - 11, and surrounded the town with a view of searching the houses at daylight. On the morning of April 11, Villa was not more than one kilometer

from the houses being searched by the American troops. Villa is quoted as saying: "It was the closest call to capture I have ever had in my life; I was actually in very great danger."

April 12,- On this date when the antagonistic attitude of the defacto government was disclosed by their forces firing on the U.S. troops at Parral, Villa was located at Santa Cruz de Herrera; Fernandez and Francisco Baltran with their respective detachments at or near San Juan de Bantista, about twenty-five miles southeast of the pueblo of Rio Florido. (Villa Coronado on map).

(Villa Itinerary continued, page 13).

DISPERSION OF THE VILLISTAS UNDER "COLONEL" CANDELARIO CERVANTES.

"Colonel" Candelario Cervantes with his force, estimated at two hundred men, after his retreat from Guerrero to Arisiachic, March 29, sought to avoid encounter with the U. S. troops by moving from one mountain ranch to another in the mountain fastness of the Sierra Madre. He alone of the Villa leaders, however, remained within the zone of operations of the U.S. troops. He was pursued constantly and vigorously and on April 22, forced to fight at the pueblo of Tomochic. On May 1, the Cervantes detachment had been reduced to a small following not exceeding fifty, and on May 25, in an encounter with a small detachment of U. S. troops at El Alamillo Canyon, near Cruces, he was killed in action. The number of his followers was further reduced at this time to about twenty, remained in the mountains in the vicinity of Namiquipa until about June 27, when they were granted amnesty by the Carranza authorities and returned to their homes.

Villa Itinerary, (Continued).

April 13 to May 31 - "General" Villa remained undisturbed in a house in the outskirts of the pueblo of Santa Cruz de Herrera from April 13 until May 31, under the care of "Colonel" Gorgonio Beltran. For the purpose of security and information a local guard was organized under the command of "General" Gorgonio Beltran. False information as to Villa's whereabouts was spread from time to time with good results.

June 1, - Villa left Santa Cruz de Herrera on this date to join his forces operating in the vicinity of Rio Florido (Villa Coronada on map). His wound had not healed, but he was able to mount his horse and ride for short distances. He was accompanied by Beltran with an escort of about twenty men. San Juan de Bantista, a rank situated about six miles north of Cerro Gordo, in Durango, was reached on June 12. The route selected leads generally southeast to the pueblo of Olives, thence to Rasario, (south of Parral and the terminus of the National Railroad), thence east to Canutillo. Villa established his headquarters at San Juan de Bantista, determined upon a concentration of his forces. He sent letters of instruction to all of his leaders urging them to join him at once; with the exception of an attack and capture of the pueblo of Rio Florido (Villa Conorado on map), June 18, Villa's forces under Fernandez and Beltran remained in the

mountains in the vicinity of Canutillo, undisturbed by the troops of the defacto government, since about April 12, awaiting the arrival of Villa.

June 27, - Villa's effort to concentrate his forces and recruitment from June 13 to 27, met with singular success; on June 27 with his forces, estimated at seven hundred, fifty men, he moved from San Juan de Bantista to Hacienda de Torreon, about five miles northeast of Canutillo.

June 28, - At Hacienda de Torreon Villa reorganized his forces into detachments in order to carry out an attack on Jimenez. The following is an estimate of the strength and leaders of each detachment on this date:

"General" Francisco Villa:	
Escort in immediate command of "General" Gorgonio Beltran,	50 men.
"General" Nicolas Fernandez,	200 men.
"General" Banderio Urives,	100 men.
"General" Francisco Beltran,	
35 of whom are Yaqui Indians,	150 men.
"General" Agustin Garcia,	150 men.
"General" Jose Mesa,	100 men.
TOTAL - - - - -	750 men.

June 29, - The Villa detachment left Torreon de Cana at about 7:00 p.m., for a night march in the direction of Jimenez. The Villa plan being to reach unobserved the mountain range running north and south parallel to and to the east of the Jimenez-Villa Lopez-Rio Florido Road; then follow the western slope of that mountain to a point east of Jimenez and take by surprise the garrison at that pueblo. Villa at this time was badly in need of ammunition and clothes. Camp for the night is made at a point about eight miles north of Hacienda de Torreon, having gone there, however, by a circuitous route. As yet Villa is unable to ride a horse except for short distances; on the march he rides a light vehicle and in camp he moves with the aid of crutches.

June 30, - The Villa force left the dry camp eight miles north of Torreon de Canas at about 9:00 o'clock a.m., and marched to the eastward across country to Parida, arriving there at 3:00 o'clock p.m.

# About BACM Research – PaperlessArchives.com

BACM Research/PaperlessArchives.com publishes documentary historical research collections.

Materials cover Presidencies, Historical Figures, Historical Events, Celebrities, Organized Crime, Politics, Military Operations, Famous Crimes, Intelligence Gathering, Espionage, Civil Rights, World War I, World War II, Korean War, Vietnam War, and more.

Source material from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Secret Service, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Justice, National Archive Records and Administration, and Presidential Libraries.

<http://www.paperlessarchives.com>